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iAbstract
The last two decades has seen a revolution in how information is stored and transmitted
across the world.  In this digital age, it is vital for banking systems, governments and
businesses that this information can be transmitted to authorised receivers quickly and
efficiently.  Current classical cryptosystems rely on the computational difficulty of
calculating certain mathematical functions but with the advent of quantum computers,
implementing efficient quantum algorithms, these systems could be rendered insecure
overnight.  Quantum mechanics thankfully also provides the solution, in which
information is transmitted on single-photons called qubits and any attempt by an
adversary to gain information on these qubits is limited by the laws of quantum
mechanics.
This thesis looks at three distinct different quantum information experiments.  Two of
the systems describe the implementation of distributing quantum keys, in which the
presence of an eavesdropper introduces unavoidable errors by the laws of quantum
mechanics.  The first scheme used a quantum dot in a micropillar cavity as a single-
photon source.  A polarisation encoding scheme was used for implementing the BB84,
quantum cryptographic protocol, which operated at a wavelength of 905 nm and a clock
frequency of 40 MHz.  A second system implemented phase encoding using asymmetric
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers, with a weak coherent source, operating at a
wavelength of 850 nm and pulsed at a clock rate of 1 GHz.  The system used
depolarised light propagating in the fibre quantum channel.  This helps to eliminate the
random evolution of the state of polarisation of photons, as a result of stress induced
changes in the intrinsic birefringence of the fibre.  The system operated completely
autonomously, using custom software to compensate for path length fluctuations in the
arms of the interferometer and used a variety of different single-photon detector
technologies.  The final quantum information scheme looked at quantum digital
signatures, which allows a sender, Alice, to distribute quantum signatures to two parties,
Bob and Charlie, such that they are able to authenticate that the message originated
from Alice and that the message was not altered in transmission.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Cryptography, the science of secret writing, is already several millennia old and was
known and used to good effect by the ancient Spartans and Greek civilisations.
Cryptography now plays a vital part in secure global communications in the world today
and is used by governments, international commerce and military organisations [1].
In 1917, work by Gilbert Vernam made an important contribution to field of
cryptography with the discovery of the one-time pad [2].  This encryption method
combines a plaintext message with a pseudorandom key via Boolean arithmetic, and
when the key is the same length of the message is proven to be impossible to crack by
pioneering work developed by Claude Shannon [3].
Prior to the 1970’s encryption required that communicating parties shared a private key
in advance to encrypt and decrypt messages.  In such a scheme, where the same key is
used to encrypt and decrypt, the secure and efficient distribution of keys was an issue.
In 1976 the problem of secure key distribution was overcome by Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman by the protocol that bears their name [4].  Diffie-Hellman key exchange
also allowed the possibility of signing documents using digital signatures, in which
messages transmitted could be verified to be authentic.  For cryptography appylications
it meant that by using the principle of one-way functions, a shared secret key could be
established between two communicating parties without a key being exchanged in
advance.  This so called secret key cryptography, which used the same key for
encryption and decryption, was later replaced by public key cryptography using
different keys for the encryption and decryption process following on from the work of
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (RSA).  The widely used cryptographic
protocol called RSA relies on the infeasibility of reversing certain one-way
mathematical functions [5].  Currently the time and the amount of computational
resources required to invert these functions makes these protocols secure [6] but a
breakthrough in mathematical science or with the advent of quantum computing which
could implement Shor’s factoring algorithm [7] could render current cryptosystems
insecure.
2In the late 1970’s the meeting of ideas in quantum information and public key
cryptography lead to the birth of quantum cryptography, whose security could be
guaranteed by fundamental laws of quantum mechanics.  Information could be encoded
on single-photons of light and any attempt by unauthorised parties to learn the state of
an encoded photon would disturb the state as a direct consequence of the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle [8].  This concept enabled the distribution of quantum
cryptographic keys whose security could be verified.  Bennett’s and Brassard’s BB84
cryptographic protocol [9] was the first to be fully described and subsequently
implemented, and paved the way for further research in the area.
This thesis will look at various quantum information experiments which have been
implemented in the research group, with this chapter serving as a general introduction
and brief outline.
Chapter 2 will begin by giving a brief overview of classical cryptography, describing
some early substitutional encryption methods and eventually leading on to describe
public key cryptography (PKC).  The weakness of PKC, which relies on one-way
functions, will be described and leads to a description of quantum key distribution
which seeks to eliminate this problem.  Several quantum cryptographic protocols will be
described including the widely used BB84 protocol which is used extensively in the
experimental sections of this thesis.  The second part of Chapter 2 looks at some of the
technology required to implement a quantum key distribution (QKD) system including
the generation and detection of single-photons.
Chapter 3 will describe a QKD system using semiconductor quantum dots embedded in
a micropillar cavity as a source of single-photons emitting at a wavelength of 895 nm.
The system implements the BB84 protocol using polarisation encoding, with the
quantum channel composed of standard telecommunications fibre.
Chapter 4 will describe an environmentally robust gigahertz QKD system operating at a
wavelength of 850 nm, tested using a variety of single-photon detector technologies.
Using optical depolarising techniques on a weak coherent source, birefringence effects
in the quantum fibre link can be removed, therefore removing the necessity of
complicated and costly polarisation monitoring equipment.
3Chapter 5 will introduce a topic which is slightly different from, but related to that
described in previous chapters.  Digital signatures, which enable communicating parties
to authenticate messages and allow verification that the messages have not been altered
in transmission, will be introduced.  Like classical encryption schemes, these rely on the
unproven computational difficulty of reversing certain one-way functions.  Quantum
digital signatures can replace these classical one-way functions with the quantum
mechanical equivalent of these functions.  The amount of classical information that can
be gleamed from the generated quantum state is restricted by the laws of quantum
mechanics.  Chapter 5 will also describe an experimental demonstration using two
recipients and one sender employing similar experimental techniques to those used in
previous experimental chapters.
Chapter 6 will serve as a general conclusion to the thesis, briefly summarising each
chapter and highlighting the key results and discoveries.  It will also outline possible
future work and research directions which are worth pursuing.
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5Chapter 2
Introduction to Cryptography and Equipment
2.1 Introduction
The first part of this chapter gives a brief overview of classical cryptography and
describes the development towards quantum key distribution (QKD).  The second part
gives a description of some of the technologies required for QKD including the
generation and detection of single-photons.
2.2 Overview of Classical Cryptography
Cryptography deals with the art of converting ordinary information called plaintext into
seemingly unintelligible gibberish using a process called encryption.  Decryption
converts the ciphertext back into plaintext.  A cipher is the algorithm that describes the
encryption and decryption process.  The cipher is controlled by the algorithm and the
secret key.  This key should only be available to authorised parties enabling messages to
be sent securely.
The ability to securely transmit information between two parties has always been a
desire for many civilisations.  Over the course of history the secure transmission of
messages became more important with the increasing quest to achieve military
superiority over other nations. The ancient Greeks wrote messages on wooden tablets
and then covered them with wax so as to appear that there was no information contained
on the tablet. It was the Spartans who established the first system of cryptography to be
used in warfare. They invented a device called a scytale which consisted of a wooden
staff and a strip of papyrus wrapped around it. The secret message would be written on
the papyrus from left to right and then unwound. The letters on the strip do not make
sense unless it is wrapped around a staff of the same thickness of the first.  This was a
form of a transposition cipher in which the letters of the message are simply rearranged
to form an anagram [1].
The Romans were the first to use substitution ciphers, called the Caesar Cipher and
named after Julius Caesar. This technique was used by him to communicate with his
generals. The messages were written using a cipher in which the plaintext letters were
replaced by letters standing a certain number places further down the alphabet (Table
2.1 shows a shift of three).  Although easy to encrypt it was also easy to decrypt by
6unauthorised parties by the technique of frequency analysis which relies on the fact that
certain letters in the alphabet are repeated more often than others.
Plaintext a b c d e f  g h i j k l  m n o p q r s t  u v w x y z
Cipher D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
Table 2.1. Caesar Cipher implemented using a shift of 3.
2.2.1 Vigenère Cipher
The Vigenère cipher is a simple form of polyalphabetic substitution.  It uses 26 different
cipher alphabets to encrypt a message.  The Vigenère Cipher consists of several Caesar
Shift Ciphers in sequence with different shift values.  To encipher, a table of alphabets
can be produced called the Vigenère square.  It consists of the alphabet written out 26
times in different rows, each alphabet shifted cyclically to the left compared to the
previous alphabet[2].  At different points in the encryption process the cipher uses a
different alphabet from one of the rows.  For example if the plaintext to be encrypted is
ATTACKATDAWN The person sending the message chooses a key and repeats it until
it matches the length of the plaintext, for example the keyword “LEMON”
LEMONLEMONLE
The first letter of the plaintext is enciphered using the alphabet in row L which is the
first letter of the key.  This is done by looking at the letter in row L and column A of the
Vigenère square namely L which can be determined from Figure 2.1.  Similarly for the
second letter of the plaintext, the letter at row E and column T is X.  The rest of the
plaintext is enciphered in a similar fashion.
Plaintext: ATTACKATDAWN
Key: LEMONLEMONLE
Cipher LXFOPVEFRNHR
7Figure 2.1. Vigenère square used for the encryption and decryption cipher.
Decryption is performed by finding the position of the cipher text letter in a row of the
table and taking the label of the column in which it appears as the plain text. For
example in row L the ciphertext L appears in column A which is taken as the first
plaintext letter.
    mod 26i i ie m k= + Equation (2.1)
Unlike normal alphabetic substitution, the Vigenère cipher is immune to frequency
analysis.  For a long time the Vigenère cipher was consider unbreakable and was often
referred to as le chiffre indéchiffrable.  The cipher was eventually broken by deducing
the length of the keyword used in the polyalphabetic substitution cipher.  With the
length of the keyword known the ciphertext can be lined up into n columns.  Each
column can then be treated as the ciphertext of a single substitutional cipher and can be
broken using frequency analysis [2].
2.2.2 One time pad
The one time pad, also called the Vernam-cipher, is a crypto algorithm where plaintext
is combined with a random key. It is based on the Vernam Cipher developed by Gilbert
Vernam in 1917.  In order to achieve secrecy the following must be obeyed.  The key
should be as long as the plaintext message, the key should be truly random, there should
only be two copies of the key, one for the sender and one for the receiver, and finally
the key should only be used once.  When used properly it is mathematically impossible
8to crack a message encrypted using the one time pad.  This concept was first developed
by Claude Shannon in his famous paper on information theory [3].  To implement the
one-time pad, Alice the sender and Bob the receiver, must produce a huge number of
random bits and share them secretly.  When Alice has a message to send to Bob, she
retrieves a number of random bits equal to the length of her message, and uses them to
be the message’s key. She can apply the exclusive-OR operation (XOR) to the key and
the message to produce the encrypted message.  The key must be exactly the same size
as the message.  The key must also consist of completely random bits that are kept
secret from everyone except Alice and Bob.  When Bob receives the message, he
retrieves the same bits from his copy of the random bit collection.  He must retrieve the
same random bits in exactly the same order that Alice used them.  Then Bob uses the
sequence of random bits to decrypt the message.  He applies the XOR operation to the
message and the key to retrieve the plain text.
2.2.3 Symmetric-key cryptography
The previous examples used symmetric key cryptography which is an encryption
processes in which Alice and Bob share the same secret key.  For Alice to send a
message m to Bob they must first agree on a secret key k .  Alice encrypts her message
m  using an encryption algorithm E  to obtain a ciphertext ( ),c E k m= .  She then sends
it to Bob who decrypts his message using his decryption algorithm D  to recover the
plaintext ( ),m D k c= .  Symmetric-key cryptography has the problem of how Alice and
Bob can agree on the shared key in a manner which is secure and efficient.
Nevertheless, this was the type of encryption used until the discovery of public-key
cryptography in 1976 [4].
2.2.4 Public Key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography which has been described to date has a number of
practical limitations.  The requirement that communicating parties share a common key
which is known to no one else is not a trivial problem.  It requires sending the key in
advance by a secure channel often by a private courier.  The advent of public-key
cryptography eliminated the need for a secure communication channel and allowed
communications between two parties even if they were previously unknown to each
other [5].  Whitfield Diffie and Martin Helman in their 1976 paper [5] suggested a new
type of public key distribution which requires only one key to be exchanged.  In general
public key cryptography is an asymmetric scheme that uses a pair of keys for
9encryption, a public key E which is used to encrypt data and a corresponding private
key D  for decryption.  A user publishes their public key to the world while keeping the
private key secret.  Anyone with a copy of your public key can then encrypt information
that only you can read.  It is presently computationally infeasible to deduce the private
key from the public key if long keys are used.  Anyone who has a public key can
encrypt information but only the person who has the corresponding private key can
decrypt the information.  The scheme uses invertible functions KE  for encryption and
KD  for decryption with the properties that for every key K , KE  is the inverse of KD
and that it is computationally difficult to obtain KD  from KE .
2.2.5 Diffie–Hellman key exchange
In Diffie’s and Helman’s 1976 paper they also outlined a key exchange method which
became known as the Diffie-Helman key exchange [5].  The Diffie–Hellman key
exchange method allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to
jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel.  The
scheme is based on discrete algorithms which take the form of
( )modma g nº Equation (2.2)
The key exchange as follows
(Private data in red, public data in blue)
1. Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number p=19 and base g=3.
2. Alice chooses a secret integer a=14, then sends Bob A=ga mod p
§ A=314 mod 19
§ A=4,782,969 mod 19
§ A=4
3. Bob chooses a secret integer b=26, then sends Alice B=gb mod p
§ B=326 mod 19
§ B=2,541,865,828,329 mod 19
§ B=6
4. Alice computes s=Ba mod p
§ s=614 mod 19
§ s=78,364,164,096 mod 19
§ s=5
5. Bob computes s=Ab mod p
§ s=426 mod 19
§ s=4,503,599,627,370,496 mod 19
§ s=5
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6. Alice and Bob now share a secret: s=5. This is because 14×26 is the same as
26×14. So somebody who had known both these private integers might also
have calculated s as follows:
§ s=314×26 mod 19
§ s=326×14 mod 19
§ s=3364 mod 19
§ s=52,226,895,197,709,578,372,156,471,421,169,310,383,980,817,485,079,
062,358,448,435,612,040,315,502,855,394,952,348,837,866,966,144,815,8
36,290,966,448,962,341,841,264,961,544,065,279,388,544,410,108,981,71
8,679,226,404,541,792,809 mod 19
§ s=5
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack as the
exchange protocol does not authenticate the participants.
2.2.6 RSA
The RSA algorithm for public key distribution was described by Ron Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1978 [6].  RSA is an encryption method in which
publically revealing the encryption key does not reveal any information about the
decryption key.  The two main important aspects of the encryption method they
developed are
1: A secure means is not necessary to transmit keys since a message can be enciphered
using an encryption key publically revealed by the intended recipient. Only he can
decipher the message since only he knows the corresponding decryption key.
2: A message can be signed using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify
this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption key. Signatures
cannot be forged.
A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M , raising it to the power e
which has been publically revealed and then taking the remainder when the result is
divided by n  which is the production of two large secret prime numbers p  and q  .
Decryption follows in a similar fashion where the secret power d  is used such that
( )( )1mod 1 1e d p q× º  - - .  The secrecy of the system relies on the difficulty of
factoring the published divisor.  Whereas the Diffie-Helman is a key exchange
algorithm, RSA is an encryption/signing algorithm.
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2.2.7 Problems with classical cryptography
Since the advent of public key cryptography the RSA encryption algorithm has proved
hugely successfully for encrypting sensitive data used all around the globe by
governments, militaries and the financial sector.  However this security is based on the
complexity of prime factorisation and the huge time required to reverse certain one-way
functions with even the most powerful supercomputers.  In 1991 RSA Laboratories
setup the RSA Factoring Challenge with the goal of factorising larger numbers and
cracking RSA keys.  The largest number factorised was RSA-768 (768 bit number) but
it took over two years to complete using hundreds of computers [7].  This demonstrates
that security is not guaranteed infinitely as advances in factoring algorithms or
computer technology may render current public-key cryptography systems insecure.
One possibility is that with the invention of a quantum computer, in which a single bit
can be represented by a quantum superposition of a binary 1 and 0, could dramatically
decrease the time required for prime factorisation.  Shor’s algorithm[8], which runs on a
quantum computer, runs exponentially faster than the best classical factorising
algorithm.  A demonstration of this was first reported in 2001 by a group from IBM
who used seven spin ½  nuclei in a molecule to find the prime factors of 15, 3 and 5 [9].
Although the number factored is quite small, it nevertheless demonstrates the
possibilities.  At first it appeared a quantum computer could spell the end of modern
cryptography but it was soon realised that the properties of quantum mechanics which
gives a quantum computer its huge potential could also be used in a new idea of
quantum cryptography.  This new idea relied on the fundamental laws of quantum
mechanics for its security and not on the difficulty of prime factorisation.
2.3 Quantum Cryptography
The concept of quantum cryptography was first proposed in the 1970’s by Stephen
Wiesner.  Wiesner’s paper called “Conjugate Coding” [10] proposed the notion of
quantum bank notes which would be impossible to counterfeit by encoding a two state
system in orthogonal and non-orthogonal basis sets.  The quantum bank notes could
contain a series of light traps, each of which would be filled with randomly polarised
photons.  The polarisation can only be read out and restored by the bank who knows the
exact sequence of polarised filters needed to read the serial.  Then in October 1979 a
chance meeting on a beach in Puerto Rico between Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard
laid the groundwork for the new field of quantum cryptography.  They combined ideas
from Wiesner’s coding scheme with new concepts which were developing in public key
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cryptography [11].  The first quantum cryptography key protocol was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 and is referred to as the BB84 protocol [12].  The security
of the protocol is guaranteed by the basic principles of quantum mechanics, namely, it is
impossible to make a measurement without perturbing a quantum system, one cannot
determine simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle with absolute
certainly and finally, it not possible to duplicate an unknown quantum state, referred to
as the no cloning theorem.  The no cloning theory is a direct consequence of quantum
mechanics which forbids the creation of identical copies of an arbitrary quantum state
and was described by Wooters et al. in 1982 [13].  The ability to clone a quantum state
would be in violation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle [14].  The consequences
of this is that eavesdropper is not able to intercept qubits sent from Alice and make a
perfect copy of them and then resend the original to Bob, which prevents her from
measuring the qubits having listened into the public discussion between Alice and Bob
about basis set reconciliation.
The schematic of a general QKD system is shown in Figure 2.2.  Alice sends her
quantum bits (qubits) to Bob over the quantum channel.  A public classical
authenticated channel is used later for post-processing of the data [15].  This
authentication can be provided by classical digital signatures or quantum digital
signatures.  It is assumed that an eavesdropper Eve can listen in on the quantum channel
to gain information on the key.
Figure 2.2. The QKD system consists of a quantum channel in which Alice sends her
single-photons to Bob.  A public classical authenticated channel is used after
transmission for reconciliation and error correction.  It is assumed that an
eavesdropper can listen into the quantum channel [15].
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2.3.1 BB84 protocol using the non-orthogonality of quantum states
The BB84 protocol for distributing quantum keys derives part of its security by
encoding information on two mutually non-orthogonal states of a photon.  If light is
polarised at a particular angle a  and is sent through a polariser orientated at an angle b
then the transmitted photons are transmitted with probability ( )2cos a b-  and those
that do not make it through with probability ( )2sin a b- .  The photons only behave
deterministically when the two axes are parallel where the probability of transmission is
1 or when the axes are perpendicular, where the probability of transmission is 0.  When
the axis are not perpendicular so that some of the photons are transmitted one might
hope to learn additional information about a  by measuring the transmitted photons
again with a polariser orientated at some third angle, by this is fruitless because the
transmitted photons in passing through b polariser emerge with exactly a polarisation
b  having lost all information about their previous polarisation a .  The BB84 protocol
uses two basis sets for encoding a binary 0 or 1 as shown in Figure 2.3.  Vertical and
horizontal polarisation states (linear basis) are used in one basis while left and right
circular states are used in the other (circular basis).  In each basis set the states are
orthogonal to each other while states from different basis are non-orthogonal.  The use
of these non-orthogonal quantum states for representing a binary 1 or 0 is one of the
underlying principles which guarantees the security of QKD.  Only when Alice and Bob
use the same basis set for encoding does Bob obtain an unambiguous result on his
detectors.  This can be seen in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.3.Two basis set required for BB84.  The states for encoding a binary 1 and 0
are orthogonal in a given basis set but are non-orthogonal in different basis sets.
Here 1 and 0 are represented by horizontal and vertical polarised light in one basis
and left and right circular in the other.
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Figure 2.4. Demonstration of an unambiguous measurement by Bob with a
polarisation beam splitter (PBS) using polarisation encoding. Polarisation axis are
aligned that vertical polarised light is 100% reflected at PBS in (a) and horizontal
polarised light is 100% transmitted as in (b). In the case of right (c) and left circular
(d) polarisation unambiguous measurements is obtained on transmission through a
quarter wave plate ( )4l .
Figure 2.5. Demonstration of an ambiguous measurement by Bob using a PBS using
polarisation encoding. For each case (a), (b), (c) and (d) detector 1 and detector 0
can fire with 50% probability.
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The BB84 protocol proceeds as follows (Table 2.2): Alice the sender chooses a random
bit string and a random sequence of polarisation bases either linear or circular. She then
sends to Bob a train of photons each representing one bit of the string in the basis
chosen for that bit position, a horizontal or right circular polarisation representing a
binary zero and a vertical or left circular polarisation representing a binary 1.  As Bob
receives the photons he decides randomly for each photon whether to measure the
photons rectilinear polarisation or its circular polarisation.  All the information is lost
when he attempts to measure the rectilinear polarisation of a photon with a circular
polarisation and vice versa.  Therefore Bob only obtains useful information from only
half of the photons he detects, those for which he guessed the correct polarisation basis.
The information that Bob receives is also affected by the fact that some of the photons
are lost in the transmission or would fail to be detected due to inefficient detectors.
Alice’s
random bit
0 1 1 0 1 0 0  1
Alice’s
random basis
set selection
Photon
polarisation
Alice sends
Bobs random
measuring
basis
Photon
polarisation
Bob Measures
Public
Discussion of
basis
Shared Secret
Key
0 1 0 1
Table 2.2. Progression of the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution.  The linear
polarisation basis set is denoted by +  and the circular basis set is denoted by d .
The coloured ticks indicate if Alice and Bob choose compatible basis sets while the
greyed boxes indicate bits which have been discarded after basis set reconciliation
because Bob measured in the wrong basis set.
Alice then publically reveals to Bob in which basis set a particular photon was sent but
not its bit value.  They then perform basis set reconciliation in which they agree to
disregard those events in which incompatible basis sets were used, to create a sifted key.
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If the basis set choice was completely random they discard 50% of the original bit
string.  Alice and Bob can test for the presence of an eavesdropper by publicly
comparing some of the bits on which they think they should agree and calculate a figure
of merit called the quantum bit error rate (QBER), which is the fraction of wrongly
encoded bits divided by the total number sent.  The bit position used in this comparison
should be a random subset of the correctly received bits and are discarded for final key
generation.  If all the comparisons agree Alice and Bob can conclude that the quantum
transmission has been free of significant eavesdropping and that the remaining bits can
be safely used as a one-time pad for subsequent secure communication over the public
channel.  The preceding assumes the communication system is of free of errors.  These
errors can arise from optical imperfections in the transmitter/receiver stations,
transmission losses, detector imperfections and eavesdropping.  To reduce these errors
to a minimum, error correction and privacy amplification steps are then performed
which are discussed in section 2.5.2.
2.3.2 Phase encoding for QKD
The idea of phase encoding was first mooted by Bennett in 1992 [16].  State
discrimination of phase encoded states can be performed using interferometers.  Figure
2.6 shows a single balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer for use in quantum
cryptography.
Figure 2.6. Schematic of a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer.  Alice can apply
her phase shift fA using her phase modulator (PM) and Bob makes his basis set choice
with his phase modulator applying a random phase shift of fB  [17].
When the path length difference between the arms is kept smaller than the coherence
length of the source interference is observed.  The intensity at the detector labelled 0 is
given by
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0 cos 2
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Equation (2.3)
where A Bf f-  is the phase difference between Alice’s and Bob’s phase modulator, I  is
the input intensity, k  is the wavenumber and DL  is the path length difference.  When
2A B nf f p p- = + , destructive interference is observed and when A B nf f p- = ,
constructive interference is observed ( n  is an integer value).  For intermediate phase the
light is split depending on the phase difference.  This implementation can be used for
quantum cryptography where single-photons are used.  The interference observed can
be considered as the equivalent of Young’s slit experiment where the arms of the
interferometer have replaced the slits [17].
In quantum cryptography Alice can apply one of 4 phase shifts to encode a bit value.
Bob performs a basis set choice by randomly selecting a phase shift of 0 or p .  When
Alice’s and Bob’s phase choice differs by 0 or p  Bob’s detectors behave
deterministically.  However, if the phase difference is half integer of p  each of Bob’s
detectors clicks with 50% probability.  This can be seen more clearly in Table 2.3.
Alice Bob
Bit value Af Bf BAf f- outcome
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2p 3 2p ?
1 p 0 p 1
1 p 2p 2p ?
0 2p 0 2p ?
0 2p 2p 0 0
1 3 2p 0 3 2p ?
1 3 2p 2p p 1
Table 2.3.  Shows the available phase encoding options available for Alice and Bob
for implementing the BB84 protocol in phase.  When the applied phase difference
between Alice and Bob is 0 orp  Bob’s detectors behave deterministically and he
receives a 1 or 0.  When the applied phase difference between Alice and Bob is 3 2p
or 2p  Bob’s detector clicks with 50% probability which gives an ambiguous result
denoted by “?”.
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The schematic just described is impractical to implement over long distances as
maintaining the path length difference becomes impossible due to environmental
fluctuations.  This problem can be overcome by the use of unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometers connected in series by a single fibre shown in Figure 2.7.  Now Alice
and Bob only have to keep their path length stabilised over a much shorter distance.  To
maintain the path length difference and to reduce polarisation evolution of the state it is
necessary to keep the temperature constant and to eliminate stress in the fibre.  This
setup was first demonstrated by Townsend, Rarity and Tapster in 1993 over a 10 km
quantum channel [18].  The approach also required alignment of the polarisation state of
the photons at Bob and required corrections in the path lengths in the arms of the
interferometer.
Figure 2.7.  Schematic of the unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer approach for
QKD.  If Bob monitors his count rate as a function of time three peaks are observed.
The pulse left and right of the central peak correspond to non-interfering photons that
have taken the short path in Alice and Bob or the long path in Alice and Bob.  The
central pulse which undergoes interference is due to photons which have taken the
short path in Alice and the long in Bob and vice versa[17].
2.4 Other QKD protocols and experimental implementations
2.4.1 B92
In 1992 Bennett realised that only two states were required for QKD only if the states
are not mutually orthogonal to each other [16].  The protocol relied on the fact that non-
orthogonal states cannot be unambiguously distinguished with 100% success
probability.  However in 1987 Ivanoic proved that unambiguous states discrimination is
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possible but with the drawback of additional losses [19] a situation shown
experimentally by Huttner et al. in 1996 [20].  For the B92 protocol Alice sends a
random binary sequence of non-orthogonal states f  and j  to represent the binary bit
1 and 0 as shown in Figure 2.8.  Let the projection operators 0 1P f f= -  and
1 1P j j= -  have the property that 0P  acting on j  annihilates the state but a
deterministic result is obtained with probability
2
1 2 0f j- >  when it acts on j .
Bob randomly chooses to make a measurement of 0P  or 1P .  He then publically
announces to Alice only when his measurements had a positive result and they both
discard all other cases.  In the absence of an Eavesdropper, Bob achieves unambiguous
discrimination with a probability given by
2
1 2f j- Equation (2.4)
The B92 protocol has the advantage of not requiring two basis sets like in BB84 but
does offer a potential eavesdropper the opportunity to replace the quantum channel with
a lossless one in which the presence of an Eavesdropper would go unnoticed.
Figure 2.8. Two orthogonal states required for B92.  When the angle a  is 45° Bob’s
success probability of correctly determining the state is given by 1-cos45=0.2928.
2.4.2 Distributed phase reference protocols
2.4.2.1 Coherent one-way time coding
The BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard uses two orthogonal basis sets X
and Y for encoding.  It is also possible to use a third basis { }1 0 , 0 1 which when
implemented involves measuring the time-of-arrival of photons and is insensitive to
optical errors.  A schematic of the method is shown in Figure 2.9.  Alice uses her laser
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to produce a pulse with mean photon number m for encoding 0 or 1 and “vacuum”
pulses by using her intensity modulator.  The sequences of 1 and 0 occur with
probability ( )1 2f-  and the vacuum pulses occur with probability 1f = .   After
transmission of the sates Bob reveals which bits he obtained on detector DB and detector
DM2.  Alice then tells Bob the bits he must remove from his raw key which are due to
the detection of decoy sequences.  Alice then analyses the detection event in D2M to
estimate the break of coherence by examining visibility 1 0V -  and dV  which are
associated with 1-0 bit sequences and decoy sequences respectively.  Since equally
spaced pulses are produced, the coherence of both decoy and 1-0 bit sequences can be
checked by a single interferometer.  The scheme has the added benefit that it is able to
detect the photon number splitting attack as Eve cannot count the number of photons in
any finite number of pulses without introducing errors [21].
Figure 2.9. Schematic of the quantum channel for implementing coherent one-way
time-coding.  The pulse are sent to Bob and are split at an unequal beamsplitter with
transmission 1=Bt .  The interferometer is used to check the quantum coherence
[21].(IM intensity modulator)
2.4.2.2 Differential Phase sift protocol
Differential phase shift (DFS) QKD uses a weak coherent pulse train of the form
1 ,k k ki i ie u e u e uy y yy -= K  where y can be 0 or p  [17].  Alice sends the
coherent pulse train to Bob with an average intensity less than one photon per pulse.
Each pulse is randomly modulated by 0 or p .  Bob’s receiver consists of a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer whose delay is chosen to be the same as the pulse interval as
shown in Figure 2.10.  This causes neighbouring pulses to interfere with each other.
The bits are encoded using the difference between two successive phases.  Bob detects a
21
bit 0 if 1k ki ie ey y +=  or 1 if 1k ki ie ey y +¹ .  The key is generated after transmission by Bob
revealing to Alice the time slots in which his detector clicked.  From Bob’s information
and Alice’s phase encoding information Alice can determine which of Bob’s detector
clicked.  Each detector is designated for a binary 1 or 0.  No photons are thrown away
during the basis matching as bit information is not disclosed.  General security is given
by the mean photon number being less than one.  If Eve tries to tap part of the signal
since photon events are rare there is a small probability of Eve and Bob detecting a
photon from identical pulses ensuring information leakage is small [17].
Figure 2.10. Schematic of the differential phase shift for QKD.  The delay in the
interferometer is chosen that neighbouring pulse interfere with each other [22].(Pm is
the phase modulator)
2.4.3 Continuous variable QKD
To combat the necessity of using a single-photon state in the original vision of the BB84
protocol which is difficult to produce and detect, continuous variable (CV) protocols in
QKD using Gaussian modulated coherent states and homodyne detection were proposed
by Grangier in 2002 [23].  Homodyne detection techniques which can make good use of
high speed detectors with near unit efficiency.  A coherent state a , in Dirac notation,
is the quantum mechanical equivalent of a classical electromagnetic wave and can be
written as
1 2X iXa = + Equation (2.5)
where 1X  and 2X  are dimensionless quadratures of the field.  When written as
ie fa a=  it can be represented on a phasor diagram (Figure 2.11) where
2 2
1 2X Xa = +  is the amplitude.  A coherent state is a minimum uncertainty state
which means that
1 2
1
2
X XD = D = Equation (2.6)
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Figure 2.11. Phasor representation of a coherent state.  The length of the phasor
is given by a  and f  is the optical phase.  The quantum uncertainty is
represented by the grey circle of diameter 1 2
The CV QKD protocol proposed by Grangier et al. was based on a similar idea in the
BB84-type protocol and uses many non-orthogonal bases represented by slight
modulations of different quadrature amplitudes.  The security of the protocol uses the
fact that coherent states are non-orthogonal which results in an ambiguity in trying to
determine the states.  To ensure the sufficient overlap between all signal states, the
scheme operates at a low light level.  The CV QKD protocol proceeds as follows: Alice
generates coherent states of the form ( )1 2ie X iXqa a= = +  with Gaussian distributed
quadratures and sends them to Bob via a quantum channel along with a strong phase
reference or strong local oscillator.  In Bob’s system the local oscillator is randomly
shifted by either 0 or p .  Bob then randomly measures the 1X  or 2X  quadrature by
homodyne detection methods by making the signal interfere with the local oscillator.
The intensity on the homodyne detection system is directly proportional to the rotated
quadrature of the signal.  Bob then publically reveals to Alice in which quadrature he
measured in order for Alice to discard irreverent data [23].  Binary 1 and 0 are
designated depending on the sign of the signal from the homodyne detector.  Figure
2.12 shows a schematic of a CV QKD scheme used in the SECOQC QKD network.
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Figure 2.12. Schematic of a continuous variable (CV) QKD system used in the
SECOQC QKD network [24].
2.4.3.1 Entanglement, EPR paradox and non-locality
In the 1930’s there was fierce debate relating to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics.  Scientists like Albert Einstein were deeply unhappy with the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Neils Bohr where physical properties
like spin and polarisation seemed to depend on the measurement process itself.  In 1935
the famous paper now commonly referred to as EPR was published by Einstein along
with Podolsky and Rosen and was an attempt to prove the ‘incompleteness’ of quantum
mechanics [25].  Einstein was in favour of using so called hidden variables to provide a
complete descriptive account of all observable behaviour and eliminate the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics.  The EPR thought experiment consisted of two
particles A and B who are allowed to interact with each other briefly, thereby becoming
entangled, and are then separated.  One of the simplest systems in which entanglement
occurs is for two spin ½ particles.
( )sin 1 2 0,1 1, 0gletj = - Equation (2.7)
for particle A and B with 0 and 1 the notation for spin ‘up’ and spin ‘down’.  This
singlet state has zero total angular momentum and it arises often in atomic physics.  In
the ground level of hydrogen the electron and nuclear spins are found in this state.  The
entanglement is the result of the hyperfine coupling between the electron and the
nuclear spin.  A system of particles is said to be entangled if its wave function cannot be
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factorised into a product of the wave function of the individual particles.  After the
particles have been entangled the uncertainty principle prevents the exact measurement
at a given instance of both the position and momentum of either particle however it does
allow the exact and simultaneous measurement of the total momentum of A and B and
the relative distance between them.  The idea in is then to leave particle B undisturbed
by not making any direct observation of it.  No matter how far apart A and B are
quantum mechanics allows a measurement of the momentum of A revealing
information about the exact momentum of B, with B being not being disturbed in the
measurement process.  In effect when the momentum of A is measured exactly, it
indirectly but simultaneously allows the exact momentum of B to be determined.
Einstein referred to this process as “spooky-action-at-a-distance”.  He argued that
locality prevented the possibility of an event in a certain region of space to influence
another event simultaneously elsewhere when separated by even large distances.  This
idea of locality was the key assumption in the EPR argument in which simultaneously
action at a distance does not exist.  In the Copenhagen approach the measurement of the
state of one entangled particle instantaneously determines the result of the other, an idea
referred to as nonlocality.  Then in 1964 John Bell published work that showed that
results predicted by quantum mechanics, like the EPR thought experiment, could not be
explained by any theory which preserves locality [26].  Bell derived an inequality which
is always obeyed if the local hidden variables of the microscopic world are correct
whereas quantum mechanics predicts violations of his so called Bell’s inequality.  These
violations were subsequently experimentally found by experiments performed by
Aspect et al. [27] in which they looked at linear polarisation correlations of pairs of
photons emitted in a radiative cascade of calcium.  Bell’s inequality can be explained by
considering Aspect et al.’s experiment.  After a source emits pairs of spin ½ particles,
correlation measurements of their spin components can be carried out along arbitrary
directions a
r
 and b
r
.  For each measurement yields two results.  For a photon measured
along a
r
 yields +1 if the polarisation is found parallel to a
r
 and -1 if the polarisation is
found perpendicular.  Quantum mechanics also predicts measurement outcomes
between these two values.  The term ( ),P a b±± r r  describes the probabilities of obtaining
the result ±1 along ar  and ±1 along b
r
.  The quantity given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , ,E a b p a b p a b p a b p a b++ -- +- -+= + - -r r r rr r r r rr   Equation (2.8)
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expresses the correlation coefficient of the measurement on the two particles.  Bell
examined theories explaining these correlations as a result of common properties of
both particles of the same pair.  When he added the assumption of locality he was able
to demonstrate that these correlations are constrained by certain inequalities that are not
always obeyed by the predictions of quantum mechanics. These theories lead to the
generalised Bell’s inequality given by
2 2S- £ £ Equation (2.9)
where
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,S E a b E a b E a b E a b¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= - + +r r ur urr r r r Equation (2.10)
This involves measurements in four various orientations along a
r
, a¢
ur
,b
r
 and b¢
ur
.  For
suitable sets of orientations, quantum mechanics predicts that S  can reach values of
2 2±  which is in violation of Equation (2.9) and shows that quantum mechanics is not
compatible with a theory which preserves local variables.
2.4.3.2 E91 protocol
In 1991 Ekert [28] devised a QKD scheme using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
thought experiment [25] and the use of Bell’s inequality to test for security.  Bell’s
inequality predicts correlations which are stronger than any classical counterpart [26].
In the QKD scheme (Figure 2.13), a sources emits two entangled qubits with a state
given by
( )1 2 1 212 12 H H V V
+F = + Equation (2.11)
and are separated, one being sent to Alice and one sent to Bob.  They perform
polarisation measurements using a polarisation beam splitter and two single-photon
detectors.  Alice will obtain 1 if detector 1 fires and a 0 if detector 2 fires.  If Bob
chooses the same basis set he will always obtain the same result as Alice.  From ideas
put forward by EPR, Alice is able to predict with certainty what Bob’s result will be.
The principle of locality means that no physical signal can go instantly from Alice’s
detection system to Bob’s which means that Bob’s measurement results depends only
on his detection system and the properties of his qubit.  Bell investigated the possible
correlations for the case when Alice and Bob chose detection bases with arbitrary
oblique angles a , b  and g .  The quantity S  given in Bell’s inequality is composed of
the correlation coefficients when Alice and Bob uses analyser of different orientations
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and quantum mechanics requires that 2 2S = - .  After transmission has taken place
Alice and Bob publically announce the orientation of the analyser for each particular
measurement.  For the case where they used different orientation of analysers Alice and
Bob publically reveal the result they obtained which allows them to calculate S   which
should give a result of 2 2S = - .  In the case of measurements where they choose the
same polarisation orientation the measurements are anti-correlated and converted into
the key.  If an eavesdropper has been present the entanglement between Alice’s and
Bob’s state will be broken which results in a value of S  deviating from the expect value
predicted by quantum mechanics.  Key generation should be halted if 2 2 2 2S- £ £
which implies the presence of an Eavesdropper [29].
Figure 2.13. Correlation measurements between Alice’s and Bob’s detection events
for different choices for the detection bases indicated by the angles a  and b for the
orientation of the polarisation beam splitter (PBS) lead to violation of Bell’s
inequality [29].
2.4.4 Quantum dense encoding
In 2000 a protocol for QKD based on a higher dimensional system than the two level
quantum system traditionally used in quantum cryptography was proposed.  The
protocol is based on using four orthogonal states in two different basis sets and offers an
increase in the key generation rate since every photon carries more information.
Similarly as in the case of the BB84 protocol Alice first randomly selects one of the two
basis sets to encode the information and then unlike in BB84 she then selects from one
of the four states.  With the 4-dimensional case, each of the states occurs with
probability 1/8.  The first basis set can be given by the following
, , ,a b g dy y y y
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With each of the states being orthogonal to each other, i j ijy y d= .  The second basis
set f  must have the property that 12i jy f =  to ensure the protocol is symmetric.
These states take the form
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
,
,
,
a a b g d
b a b g d
g a b g d
d a b g d
f y y y y
f y y y y
f y y y y
f y y y y
= + + +
= - + -
= - - +
= + + -
each with the property that i j ijf f d= .  Every time Bob receives a states he must
randomly choose to measure in the f  or y basis set (time and energy basis set).
Figure 2.14. Schematic for four-letter quantum key distribution [30].
This can be achieved experimentally by Alice routing her photons into one of 4 time
delays shown in the upper diagram in Figure 2.14.  Then using another optical switch a
photon with a desired delay ( ), , ,t t t ta b g d  can be emitted to Bob.  For Bob to distinguish
each of the 4 states in the basis all he is required to do is measure the arrival time of the
pulse with respect to 0t , the initial time.  In order for Alice to produce a superposition of
the four emission times with appropriate phase differences, a 1×4 optical coupler shown
in the lower diagram in Figure 2.14 is used.  The states , , ,a b g df f f f  can be
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created by randomly applying a phase of , , ,A A A Aa b g d .  For Bob to distinguish the
states in this basis set he takes the pulse arriving at time , , ,t t t ta b g d  and recombines
them to achieve constructive or destructive interference on  a particular output [30].
2.4.5  “Plug-and-play” system
To overcome some of the difficulties posed by the unbalanced Mach-Zehnder approach
described in section 2.3.2, in 1997 a system was designed and built using phase
encoding in which optical and mechanical fluctuations are compensated for using a
system called “plug-and-play” [31].  The system made use of the fact that when a light
pulse travels through an optical fibre and is reflected by a Faraday mirror the output
polarisation state is orthogonal to the input regardless of fluctuations in the
birefringence due to environmental effects.  A schematic is shown in Figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15.  Schematic of the “plug-and-play” system.  The time multiplexed
arrangement ensures that inferring pulses travel through the same optical path which
removes the need for path length control.  The additional of Faraday mirrors (FM)
ensures that the system is immune to random fluctuations in birefringence due to
environmental effects [31]. LD is a laser diode, APD is an avalanche photodiode, DA
is a photodiode and C1 and C2 are optical couplers.
A laser pulse is injected into the system via an optical coupler.  At coupler C1 it is split
into two parts, P1 and P2.  P1 propagates through the short arm in Bob and its
polarisation is arranged that it is transmitted at the polarisation beam splitter (PBS) and
is sent to Alice.  P2 takes the long arm in Bob and its polarisation is such that it is
reflected at the PBS but no phase shifted is added.  The pulse P2 is then sent to Alice
delayed with respect to P1.  At Alice P1 is diverted by coupler C2 where it is detected
by a classical detector DA to provide a timing reference.  The light which is not diverted
travels through an attenuator and an optical delay line.  The light is then reflected by a
Faraday mirror which rotates the polarisation by 45º on a single pass.  A Faraday mirror
is a non-reciprocal optical device which means that the direction of rotation of the
polarisation is independent of the light propagation direction.  This is used to eliminate
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the time evolving birefringence effects which would randomly change the state of
polarisation of the light.  The pulse P2 follows the same path.  Alice applies a phase
shift to encode a bit value on this pulse P1 only.  Due to rotation by the Faraday mirror
pulse P1 is now reflected at the PBS into the long arm in Bob where he applies a phase
shift to make a basis set choice.  The pulse P2 is transmitted at the PBS and both pulse
P1 and P2 arrive at coupler C1 at the same time to interfere.  Single-photons detectors
are used to determine which output the photon travelled through [31].
One of the disadvantages of this approach is that it is more susceptible to Trojan horse
attacks.  It is possible for Eve to send a probe beam and look at the reflections from the
mirror at the end of Alice’s system to gain information on the phase encoding.  To
counter such an attack Alice can add an attenuator to reduce the light in the system but
this means such a system would not be compatible with single-photon sources.  Due to
the bidirectional nature of the system Rayleigh scattering is also a potential issue when
the clock frequency is high which can cause an increase in the error rate in Bob [31].
2.5 Security discussion of quantum cryptography
2.5.1 Shannon information theory
One of the most important contributions of Claude Shannon to the area of information
theory was contained in his paper “The Mathematical Theory of Communication” [3]
where he introduced the concept of entropy into the field of information theory.  From
the second law of thermodynamics entropy is a measure of the randomness in a system
and its value always increases.  When applied to information theory this meant that
many sentences can be dramatically shortened without losing their meaning.  He proved
that in a noisy communication, a signal could always be sent without distortion.  If the
message is encoded in such a way that it is self-checking, signals can always be
received with the same accuracy as if there was no interference on the communication
channel.  Shannon showed that if the entropy rate, the amount of information you wish
to transmit, exceeds the channel capacity then there were unavoidable and un-
correctable errors in the transmission.  If the entropy rate is below the channel capacity
then there is a way to encode the information so that it can be received without errors.
This is true even if the channel distorts the message during transmission.  In Shannon’s
paper he introduced two important theorems, the noisy coding theorem and the noiseless
coding theorem.  As a simple example of the noiseless theorem can be understood by
considering the following message:
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TXT MSSGS SHRTN NGLSH SNTNCS
It is still possible to correctly read the above message even though there are 11 vowels
missing.  The noiseless coding theorem tries to quantify how much redundancy can be
introduced and still the message can be decoded without errors.  In communications
redundancy is used to combat errors.  The noisy coding theorem quantifies how much
redundancy is needed in a message in order to correct errors introduced by noise present
in a communication channel [32].
In the area of cryptography Shannon showed that the one-time pad achieves perfect
secrecy if Alice and Bob share a secret key that is as long as the message to be
encrypted.
2.5.2 Error correction, reconciliation and privacy amplification
The basic quantum key distribution protocol is inadequate in practice because realistic
detectors have noise which results in Alice’s and Bob’s data differing even without the
presence of an eavesdropper.  When the quantum transmission is complete Alice and
Bob must exchange a public message which enables them to reconcile the differences
between their data.  One of the most common methods of error correction is the Cascade
error correction code [33].  Cascade is easily implemented and has the added benefit of
information leakage which is close to the theoretical limit shown in Figure 2.16.  Other
methods include a low density parity check (LDPC) and Winnow.  Although Cascade
requires a lot more two-way communications than Winnow, Cascade is more efficient at
error rates up to 10% and is therefore more commonly used in QKD systems [15].  The
first step of the Cascade error correction protocol is that Alice and Bob publically agree
on a permutation of their bits.  The shuffled strings are then portioned into blocks of
size k  in such a way that it is believed that it contains no more than one error.  Next
Alice and Bob publically compute and compare the parity bits of each block.  If the
block contains an error, a difference in parity is detected.  With this method an odd
number of errors are detected but even numbers remain undetected.  If a block has an
unequal public parity the block is searched using a bisective search to locate the error
and corrected.  In order to locate and correct blocks with an even number of errors in
them Alice and Bob then repeat the randomising and partitioning step for several passes
with increasing block sizes for each pass.  To correct further errors Alice and Bob
continue to compare the parities of randomly chosen subsets of bits.  If a parity
mismatch is detected a similar procedure described above is performed to locate and
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correct the error.  The last bit of each random subset is deleted to avoid information
leakage [34].
Figure 2.16. The gain for privacy amplification against increasing error rate is shown
for the Cascade error correction protocol and for the theoretical Shannon’s limit.  The
maximum error rate allowable for Cascade is about 10% while it is about 11% if the
Shannon limit is obtained [34].
The efficiency of the error correction is given by the Shannon limit and it gives the
minimum number of bits which must be revealed about the correct key to reconcile an
error rate e  [35].  The Shannon limit can be given in terms of the amount of Shannon
information ( )sI e  contained in the final version of the key and is given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 log 1 log 1sI e e e e e= + + - -  Equation (2.12)
The minimum number of bits needed to correct a key whose length is n  is given by
( )( )min 1 sn n I e= - Equation (2.13)
The last step in a quantum cryptography protocol is called privacy amplification which
was first described by Bennett et al. in 1988 [36] and is an attempt to reduce Eve’s
information about the key.  For this step Alice randomly selects pairs of bits and
computes their parity.  Unlike in error correction she does not publically announce the
parity value but only the bits which were used.  Alice and Bob then replace the two bits
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by their value of the parity.  The key length is shortened but if Eve has only partial
information on the two bits, her information on the value of the parity is even less [17].
2.6 Eavesdropping in QKD
The BB84 protocol allows Alice and Bob to share a secret key.  In the simplest case, if
an eavesdropper attempts to measure an unknown quantum state sent from Alice and
resends it to Bob she will introduce unavoidable errors in the system due to the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle.  Alice and Bob can look at their error rate for
transmission (quantum bit error rate) and decided if it is safe to continue the key
generation.  It is generally assumed in eavesdropping attacks that Eve has perfect
technology and is only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics.  The eavesdropping
strategies can be divided into three categories, individual attacks, collective attacks and
joint attacks.  The individual attack is a strategy in which Eve attaches independent
probes to each quantum state and measures each probe independently.  In collective
attacks Eve probes each quantum state independently but she measures the whole set of
probes jointly.  In a joint attack Eve can probe all the quantum states jointly and is the
most general attack on the quantum channel.  It is generally assumed that for joint and
collective attacks Eve measures her probe after Alice and Bob have completed all public
discussion about basis reconciliation, error correction and privacy amplification [17].
2.6.1 Eavesdropping attacks
2.6.1.1 Photon number splitting (PNS) attacks
By using a strongly attenuated coherent source in a quantum cryptography system
allows Eve to perform a type of attack called the beam splitting attack.  This attack
results from the multiphoton probability from a weak coherent pulse and the loss in the
transmission line.  In Quantum cryptography experiments the mean photon number per
pulse is usually 0.1 which means that about 1 in 10 pulses contain only photon and 1 in
about 200 pulses contain two or more photons.  The eavesdropper can use this to tap off
a fraction of the signal by means of a beamsplitter so that in some cases both Bob and
Eve each receive a photon.  If a polarisation encoding scheme is used both Bob and Eve
can receive the photon such that the polarisation state remains undisturbed.  If Eve can
store the photon until Bob publicly announces the representation that he choose she can
then use this information to perform a measurement in the same basis announced by
Bob and she is able to obtain some of the key.  The transmission of the key becomes
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completely insecure with a high channel loss as Eve can replace it with a lower loss one
[37].  For four state protocols like BB84, Eve can obtain full information from three-
photon pulses using unambiguous discrimination techniques [38].  She can measure the
total number of photons in each signal state by performing a quantum non-demolition
measurement which does not introduce any error on the signal [39].
2.6.1.2 Intercept resend attack
The intercept-resend attack is an attack in which Eve measures the photons emitted
from Alice and then retransmits the measured photons via a lossless quantum channel.
Eve measures each qubit in one of the two basis sets for the BB84 protocol in the same
manner as Bob would perform.  She then sends another qubit in a state which
corresponds to her measurement result.  In 50% of the time she measures in the correct
basis set and then transmits the qubit to Bob. In this occasion the eavesdropper in not
detected by Alice or Bob. However 50% of the time she measures the qubit in the
wrong basis set and transmits this to Bob.  In this case after Alice and Bob eliminate the
cases where they used incompatible basis sets they obtain a 25% error in their sifted key
which alerts them to the presence of an eavesdropper [17].
2.6.1.3 QKD security attacks based on imperfect detectors
Very recently attacks on QKD systems have concentrated on using design imperfections
in single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APD) [40].  The operation of these devices is
discussed more thoroughly in section 2.11.  These attacks are not based on any flaws in
the cryptographic protocol but only on the engineering implementation as QKD has
already been proved to have unconditional security. APDs are operated in Geiger mode,
in the case of Si-APD (Perkin Elmer) they are biased by a high voltage source through a
360 kΩ bias resistor about 10 volts above the breakdown voltage (Figure 2.17).  Two
stray capacitances in the device help in the operation.  When there is no current
following in the APD the capacitors are biased at the bias voltage.  During an avalanche
process the capacitors quickly discharges through the APD which produces a short
current pulse.  When the voltage at the APD drops below the bias voltage the
avalanched is quenched and the capacitors are slowly recharged through the bias
resistor.  While the capacitors are charging the detectors are insensitive to single-
photons.  A photon which arrives before the capacitors are fully charged can reset the
voltage but without causing the detector to click. In this way the detector can be blinded
indefinitely. In this attack scheme Eve makes use of the intercept resend attack which
allows her full knowledge of Bob’s systems.  She intercepts the state which Alice
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transmits but she has a 50% chance of measuring in the correct basis set. She sends the
state not at the single-photon level but instead sends bright trigger pulses which enables
her to force Bob’s detector to click only when he measures in the same basis set as Eve
and with the correct bit value.  Lydersen’s group demonstrated this attack on the
comerically available id3110 Clavis2 and QPN 5505 QKD systems from IDQuantique
[41].  Using bright light illumination they managed to successfully blind gated
InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD) which converts them to classical linear
detectors.  In this way the detector are fully controllable by classical laser pulses
superimposed over the bright continuous-wave illumination.  Subsequently work by
Yuan et al. [42] sought to eliminate this security loophole in QKD.  Their work focused
on the bias resistor in the APD.  A photon is detected if the voltage drop across the
sensing resistor Rs exceeds the discriminator voltage level which ideally is set as low as
possible.  Yuan et al. showed that the range of continuous wave input powers over
which the detector is blind to single-photons narrows as the bias resistor Rs is decreased.
For most gated Geiger mode APDs this resistor is redundant and can be removed
therefore eliminating the blinding attack.
Figure 2.17. Equivalent circuit diagram for APD.  The two stray capacitors are shown
to the left [42].
2.6.1.4 Time shifted attacks
Another form of attack which can be used to gain an eavesdropper information on the
shared key is via the time-shifted attack [43].  This has shown that there is a non-zero
probability (4%) of breaking the security of the QKD system.  This form of attack relies
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on the fact that most if not all QKD systems will have at least two detectors and each
will have a slight difference in the detection efficiency.  This detection can vary as a
function of time, frequency, polarization or spatial information.  Eve has the ability to
manipulation one of these variables to slightly change the detection efficiency at her
choosing.  In QKD it is assumed that Bob’s detector will have an equal number of
binary “1” and “0” values but this is not necessary the case under such an attack.  Eve
has the ability to time delay the signal so that in the case of a two detector system,
detector 1 and detector 2, she can delay the signal so that the photons arrive at Bob
when detector 1 has higher detector efficiency than detector 2 thereby manipulating the
number of binary ones and zeros that Bob receives.  The time-shift attack can also be
more generalised to spatial, spectral, and polarisation-shift attacks which also make use
of the detection efficiency mismatch.
2.6.1.5 Trojan horse attacks
Instead of Alice attempting to gain information about the quantum states sent between
Alice and Bob it is also possible for her to send signals into Alice’s and Bob’s systems
through the quantum channel.  Eve can send bright pulses of light into their systems and
analyse the back-reflected light in an attempt to gain information about which detectors
fired or the settings of phase and polarisation modulators.  The “plug-and play” system
is particular susceptible to this attack as light is reflected off Faraday mirrors in Alice’s
system back to Bob [17].
2.6.2 GLLP security analysis
The work of Gottesman, Lo, Lütkenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) produced a security
analysis which deals with imperfective devices and sources for QKD systems.  In their
paper they introduce the concept of tagged and untagged qubits.  Fred, an adversary
working with Eve can attached to each qubit from Alice a tag which allows Eve to
know which basis set the qubits were prepared in.  Tagged qubits are unsecure for QKD
because their basis choice encoding is revealed to Eve.  These bits have been attacked
without any visible errors. D  is the fraction of qubits that have been tagged.  Of the
remaining 1-D  pulses (untagged) these can suffer phase errors due to Eve’s interaction.
In the BB84 protocol untagged qubits are those which are generated by single-photons
and tagged qubits are generated from multi-photon pulses [44].  In GLLP post
processing error correction is applied by Alice and Bob to all the qubits. A fraction of
the bits given by ( )2H d  are sacrificed during error correction, where d  is the bit error.
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Of the remaining 1-D key elements ( ) ( )1 phuntaggedh e- D  have to be removed for privacy
amplification where phuntaggede  is the phase error rate.  In the worst case scenario all the
errors are on the untagged key elements therefore 1phuntaggede d® - D  [15].  The final
secure key generation rate is given by Equation (2.14).
( ) ( ) ( )2 2max 1 1 ,01R H H
ddæ öæ ö= - D - - - D ç ÷ç ÷- Dè øè ø
Equation (2.14)
In GLLP analysis the net key generation rate is ( )2O h ,  where h  is the overall
transmission probability of the channel.  For many QKD experiments the choice of m of
0.1 photons per pulse is chosen.  In most cases this value is arrived at arbitrarily.
Lütkenhaus looked at this problem and found that for weak coherent pulses the
optimum m  value depended on the both the detector efficiency and the loss of the
quantum channel.  The optimum value is given by
opt B Tm h h» Equation (2.15)
where Bh  is Bob’s detector efficiency and Th  is the transmission efficiency of the
quantum channel.  This means that as the transmission distance is increased between
Alice and Bob m must be decreased accordingly for security against the photon number
splitting attack [45].
2.6.3 Decoy states
The security of quantum key distribution is guaranteed by fundamental laws of quantum
physics.  However in real world applications this security is compromised by imperfect
instruments.  Qubits are often encoded using highly attenuated lasers but the finite
probability of the signal containing multiphoton pulses leaves the system vulnerable to
possible eavesdropping attacks.  When preforming a full security analysis the secure
key generation rate can be dramatically reduced by the presence of multi-photons as
only qubits encoded on signal photons are guaranteed to be secure.  The use of decoy
states offers the opportunity to increase the secure key generation rate without much
additional complexity in the experimental apparatus.  In this method Alice has the
ability to prepare her qubits and then turn her power up or down for each signal that she
transmits by the use of a variable optical attenuator.  The basic principle involves Alice
randomly replacing pulses from the signal source by multiphoton pulses (decoy pulses).
Eve does not have the ability to distinguish multi-photon pulses of the signal from those
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of the decoy which means that the yields from these must be similar.  Alice and Bob can
detect the photon number splitting (PNS) attack by monitoring the yield of the decoy
pulse.  The number of photons that Alice prepares for the signal state follows a
Poissonian distribution.  The secure key generation rate for decoy states is given by
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 1 2 11S q Q f E H E Q H em m m= - + -é ùë û Equation (2.16)
where q  depends on the QKD implementation, Qm  and Em  is the gain and QBER of the
signal state, 1e  is the QBER of detection events by Bob from single–photon signals from
Alice, ( )f Em  is the efficiency of the error correction, 2H  represents the Shannon
entropy function and 1Q  is the gain for the single-photon state [46].  Alice and Bob can
experimentally measure Qm  and Em  and if they know certain properties of the channel
loss any eavesdropper will with a high probability change these values.  Shown in
Figure 2.18 is the comparison of the secure key generation rate with and without decoy
states using experimental values used by Gobby et al. [47].  In decoy states the key
generation rate scales as ( )O h  which leads to a dramatic increase in the key generation
rate compared to the case with decoy states.
Figure 2.18: Effect of secure key generation rate with and without decoy states [48].
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2.7 Important experimental QKD systems to date
There has been rapid progress in the field of quantum key distribution ever since the
first practical demonstration was made back in 1992 [49].  Although the free space
quantum channel was only 32 cm in length it never the less opened the field for further
experiments.  In 1994 work published by Gisin’s group from the University of Geneva
described an all-fibre quantum cryptography QKD system based on polarisation
encoding [50].  However, such a system was limited due to the intrinsic birefringence of
an optical fibre, polarisation mode dispersion and polarisation dependent loss.  In the
same year Paul Townsend demonstrated a QKD system operating at a wavelength of 1.3
µm using phase encoding of the photons [51].  Such a system used a cascaded Mach-
Zehnder interferometer arrangement which required polarisation monitoring at the
receiver to ensure that birefringence effects in the fibre did not degrade the visibility.  In
1996 Jacobs and Franson demonstrated [52] a free space QKD system under daylight
operation.  The technique adopted was similar to the approach already used for fibre
systems with the addition of collimating optics for the free space transmission and
optical filtering techniques to remove background light.  In 1996 Gisin’s group in
Geneva introduced the concept of “plug- and-play” system for QKD which also
employed fibre interferometry but without the need for active polarisation control [31].
Such as system was susceptible to a Trojan horse attack in which an Eavesdropper
could gain information on the state of Alice’ modulator by shining light into the
quantum channel and looking at the reflected light from Alice [53].
The first demonstration of a single-photon source for use in QKD was performed by
Philippe Grangier’s group in France in 2002 [54].  This experiment operated in free
space and used nitrogen vacancies in diamond as the source of single-photons, which
operated at room temperature.  This system achieved bit rates of 7700 bits/sec and a
quantum bit error rate less than 4.6% over a distance of 50 m.  Later that same year
researchers at Stanford University demonstrated QKD using a single quantum dot
located in a microcavity.  The sample was held between 5-10 K and was optically
excited with a repetition rate of 76 MHz.  They reported a ( )2 0g  of 0.14.  A final key
generation rate of 25 kbits-1 was obtained over a free space link of 1 metre [55].
In 2005  Lo, Ma, and Chen working in the University of Toronto introduced the idea of
decoy state QKD which could be used to extend the distance at which keys could be
securely distributed [46].  The first experimental demonstration using decoy states was
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performed the following year by the same group [56].  The experiment employed an
acousto-optic modulator to vary the intensity of the pulses sent by Alice.  To date the
method of decoy states have enabled quantum keys to be transmitted with the highest
bit rates, with 1 Mbit/sec over 20 km of fibre and 10 kbits/sec over 100 km [57].
In 1991 Ekert proposed a QKD scheme based on entangled pairs of photons [28].  The
security of the system could be tested using the Bell inequality.  The first demonstration
of two photon entanglement over a large distance was performed by Tittel et al. in 1998
[58].  Violation of Bells inequality was observed by 10 standard deviations over a
distance of 10.9 km.  In 2000 Jennewein reported the first entangled based QKD system
operating over 360 m of optical fibres producing raw rates of between 400-800 bits/sec
[59].  In 2007 Ursin et al. demonstrated a free space entanglement based QKD system
in the Canary Islands over 144 km [60].  Operating over this distance acted as a test for
future possibilities communicating from a low-Earth-orbit satellite to two different
ground stations.
The first gigahertz QKD system operating in fibre was performed by Gordon et al. in
2004 [61].  The system used polarisation encoding to implement the B92 protocol.  The
system operated at a wavelength of 850 nm employing commercially available Si
single-photon detectors which ensured a detection efficiency of ~40% at this
wavelength.  A net bit rate of 7 kbit/sec was achieved over a 10 km fibre.
QKD at telecom wavelengths have been demonstrated recently using semiconductor
APDs and superconducting detectors.  In 2007 a differential phase shift QKD (DPS
QKD) system using superconducting single-photon detectors was demonstrated.  The
system generated keys at a rate of 12.1 bits s-1 over a 200 km reel of fibre with a clock
frequency of 10 GHz.  The system operated at 1550 nm where the detection efficiency
was 0.7% [62].  In 2008 Shields et al. demonstrated a 1 GHz system using InGaAs
APDs operating in self-differencing mode using phase encoding with asymmetric
Mach-Zehnder interferometers.  They obtained a secure bit rate of 2.37 Mbit s-1 at 5.6
km and 27.9 kbits s-1 at 65.5 km [63].
QKD has now advanced to such a stage now where there are many commercial systems
available.  ID Quantique, a commercial spin off from the Group of Applied Physics in
the University of Geneva, using their Cerberis QKD system was used to secure a point-
to point Ethernet link to send ballot information from the central ballot counting station
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to the Geneva government data centre [15].  Other commercial companies include
MagiQ based in New York and Quintessence in Australia.
In June 2004 the DARPA Quantum Network became the world’s first quantum
cryptography network linking BBN Technologies to Harvard and Boston Universities.
The network uses a variety of QKD technologies including weak coherent pulses for
phase encoding, polarisation entangled photons and a free space QKD system [64].
Another notable QKD network was the European funded Secure Communication based
on Quantum Cryptography (SECOQC).  It was built to overcome the issue of QKD
links only being able to operate over point-to-point connections between two users.  The
SECOQC network was designed to use a variety of QKD implementations including
coherent one-way, entanglement based and free space systems.  The SECOQC
prototype in Vienna consisted of six nodes connected by 8 QKD links at distances
greater than 25 km in standard telecoms fibre obtaining a key generation rate of 1 kbits-1
[65].
2.8 Photon sources for QKD
2.8.1 Weak coherent pulses
Quantum cryptography, when implemented correctly makes use of single-photon Fock
states. In quantum mechanics a Fock state is any state with a well-defined number of
particles [66]. In real life these are difficult to implement. Practical implementations
involve using faint laser pulses in which the photon and the photon number distribution
obey Poissonian Statistics due to its discrete nature. Coherent states which use low
photon numbers can be implemented using semiconductors and calibrated attenuators.
The probability of finding n  photons in a weak coherent state is given by
( ),
!
n
P n e
n
mmm -= Equation (2.17)
Poisson distributions are characterised by their mean value m.  Figure 2.19 shows the
Poisson distribution for m = 0.1, 1, 5 and 10.  As the value of m decreases the width of
the distribution decreases and its peak increases.  The standard deviation for a Poisson
distribution is given by
n mD = Equation (2.18)
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Figure 2.19. Poisson distributions for mean values of 0.1, 1, 5 and 10.  Distributions
obtained using Mathcad.
Many quantum key distribution systems use a mean photon number per pulse of 0.1.
However using Equation (2.18) we can see that there is non-zero probability that a
given pulse may contain more than one photon.
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 Equation (2.19)
In fact 5% of the nonempty pulses contain more than one photon, as shown in Figure
2.20, and the choice of m depends on the transmission loss of the system [45].  One of
the drawbacks of weak coherent sources is that when m  is small most of the pulses are
empty. This leads to a decrease in the bit rate for communication purposes. This
decrease can be overcome nowadays thanks to the gigahertz modulation rate of
telecommunication lasers.  This problem becomes more of an issue operating at longer
wavelengths. Detectors which operate in this wavelength suffer from a huge increase in
the noise when operated at high frequencies. This effect limits the use of low photon
numbers smaller than 1% [67], [68], [69].
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Figure 2.20.  The probability that a pulse contains n>1 photons using Poissonian
photon statistics.  Using m =0.1 there is a 5% probability that the pulse contains n>1
photons.
2.8.2 Quantum dots
A quantum dot is an engineered structure which is used to confine the movement of
carriers in all 3 dimensions which leads to quantisation of the available energy levels.  It
is possible to obtain single-photon emission from a quantum dot if one of the available
energy transitions is selected.  The density of states of a semiconductor is given by
( ) ( )g E dE N E dE= Equation (2.20)
where ( )N E  is the probability of occupancy of a state with energy from E  to E dE+ .
The equation for the energy of the electron in terms of its k  vector is given by the
following expression
( )2 2 2 22 x y zE k k km= + +
h
Equation (2.21)
In classical physics all values of energy would be allowed since there are no restrictions
on the number of electrons with the same k  value.  On the atomic scale quantum
mechanics comes into effect.  The wave function of the electron has to satisfy the
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Schrödinger wave equation and as a consequence for a quantum dot the values of k
take the form of
22 2, ,yx zx y z
nn nk k k
L L L
pp p= = =
where xn , yn and zn are integer values.  Therefore in a 0-dimensional structure the
values of k  are quantised in all three directions.  The available states exist at discreet
energies and can be represented by a delta function.  In real quantum dots the size
distribution leads to a broadening of the line function [70].  Figure 2.21 shows the
density of states for various dimensional structures.
Figure 2.21 Density of states per unit volume verses energy for a 3-D semiconductor
(blue curve), a 10 nm quantum well with infinite barriers (red curve) and a 10 nm by
10 nm quantum wire with infinite barriers (green curve). 0 0.8m m
* =
Semiconductor quantum dots can be used as a source of single-photons.  They have the
advantage of narrow spectral line width and can be integrated into devices structures
such as p-n junction and resonator configurations [71]. Due to the high refractive index
contrast ratio between the semiconductors and the air few photons can escape the
structure.  The extraction efficiency can be increased by embedding the quantum dot in
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a microcavity.  A quantum dot can be placed into a Fabry-Perot cavity which has the
effect of changing the energy available to the emitted photon [72].  This is because the
cavity only supports certain standing waves depending on the dimensions of the cavity.
At resonance when the dot emits at the same wavelength as the cavity mode the photon
emission rate increases accompanied by a decrease in the decay time.  This is called the
Purcell effect.  The Purcell enhancement is a low temperature effect as at higher
temperatures the enhancement factor is diminished when the spectral linewidth of the
emitter becomes much larger than the linewidth of the cavity [73].
The standard technique of growth of quantum dots is by the Stranski-Krastanow
method, also known as the process of self-assembly [72], [74], [75].  Quantum dots are
grown this way when heterostructures are grown with slight lattice mismatch.  The
lattice mismatch creates strain in the structure which is relieved by the formation of
small islands.  It is the formation of these islands that form the quantum dots [76], [77].
The layer containing quantum dots can be fabricated using molecular beam epitaxy
(MBE) or metal oxide chemical vapour deposition techniques (MOCVD).  When
quantum dots are fabricated they are arrange randomly on the substrate surface which
represents a problem when the application requires the addressing of an individual dot.
Nanometre scale site control has been demonstrated using scanning tunnelling
microscope assisted nanolithography together with self-organising molecular beam
epitaxy [78].  A further discussion of quantum dots is contained in Chapter 3.
2.8.3 Vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL)
A vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL) is a type of semiconductor laser whose
emission is perpendicular to the surface, contrary to traditional edge emitting lasers
where the resonant cavity is in the plane of the active layer.  The first operation of a
VCSEL was first demonstrated by Soda et al. in 1979 [79].  The light resonates between
mirrors on the top and bottom of the laser wafer (see Figure 2.22) so that photons pass
through only a very short length typically <1 µm of active medium.  VCSELs have
much lower round trip gain than horizontal edge emitting lasers and as a result they
require high reflectivity mirrors.  The laser resonator consists of two distributed Bragg
reflector mirrors consisting of several alternating 4l layers of AlAs and AlGaAs.
VSCELs have a rotationally symmetric beam profile and low threshold currents.  They
are available in the wavelength 650-690 nm using GaAs/GaAlAs and from 850-980 nm
using InGaAs/GaAs [80], [79], [81], [82].  VCSELs operating at speeds of up to 40
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Gbits/second have now been reported making them very useful in modern optical
communication systems [83].  Highly attenuated VCSELs have been used in many
quantum key distribution systems [84], [85], [86].
Figure 2.22. Structure of VCSEL laser. Quantum well layer is contained between two
Bragg reflectors with light emission perpendicular to the surface.
2.8.4 Heralded single-photon source
Single photons which are produced in pairs without any intra-pair correlation are useful
in quantum information.  This technique is based on the probabilistic emission of
correlated photon pairs, and heralds the presence of one photon by the detection of the
second photon of the pair.  These heralded single photon sources are produced by either
spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [87], [88] or by four wave mixing
[89], [90].  In spontaneous parametric down conversion a pump photon is split in a
nonlinear crystal into two photons, an idler and a signal photon.  Energy
1 1 1pump signal idlerl l l= +  and momentum pump signal idlerk k k= +  conservation laws are
obeyed.  If the two photons produced have the same polarisation the process is called
Type I SPDC or if they have perpendicular polarisation it is referred to as Type II
SPDC.  Heralded single photons at a wavelength of 1550 nm using SPDC was
demonstrated by Soujaeff et al. producing photons at a rate of 52.16 10´  photons per
second [91].  Recently in 2008, Hayat et al. observed the first two-photon emission
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from optically pumped bulk GaAs and in electrically driven GaInP/AlGaInP quantum
wells [92].  Two-photon emission is a process in which an electron transitions between
quantum levels via the simultaneous emission of two photons.  This process was
reported to be three orders of magnitude more efficient the existing down-conversion
schemes which would have many interesting quantum applications such as photon
entanglement.  Four wave mixing is a nonlinear effect that results from the third order
nonlinearity coefficient ( )3c  and results when two frequencies propagating through a
nonlinear medium to produce two additional frequency components.
2.8.5 Nitrogen-vacancy single-photon source
Single nitrogen vacancies (N-V) in diamond are a promising option for producing non–
classical light in the 600-800 nm wavelength region.  The N-V centres in diamond are
formed by a substitutional nitrogen atom with a vacancy trapped at an adjacent lattice
position [93].  An advantage of this approach is that the device can work at room
temperature and the short decay time of the excited state [94].  However a potential
disadvantage for some applications is that the emission from the N-V centre is
broadband, often several hundred nanometres [95] and quite often the emission
efficiency can be low, typically a few per cent [96].
2.9 Proving the existence of the quantum nature of light
In the 1950s, when Hanbury Brown and Twiss were working on a technique to increase
the resolution of stellar interferometry they discovered that the intensity fluctuations
from a light source falling on two photodetectors were correlated [97].  They found that
the joint probability of photodetection ( )2 ,P t t t+  at time t  and t t+  is greatest at 0t =
and falls to a lower constant value at times ct t>  when dealing with a thermal source
with a coherence time of ct .  This was the first demonstration of bunching where
photons from a classical light source arrive in bunches rather than at random times like
a Poissonian source.  Their experiment, shown in Figure 2.23, used the 835.8 nm
emission line from a mercury lamp and split the light equally on a 50:50 half silvered
mirror to be detected by two photomultiplier tubes whose output currents 1i  and 2i  were
multiplied and integrated together electronically.  The variations in the current, 1iD  and
2iD , were related to the fluctuations in the intensity ( )1I tD  and ( )2I tD .  The output
given by ( ) ( )1 2I t I tD D  was monitored as a function of the distance d between the
photodetectors.  The split light had intensities given by
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2I t I t I t I t= = + D Equation (2.22)
where I  is the average intensity and ( )I tD  is the intensity fluctuation.  For time
0t =  the output was given by
( ) ( ) ( )20I t I t I ttt =D + = D Equation (2.23)
The quantity ( )2I tD will be non-zero and strong correlations are observed in the
intensity fluctuations.  For times ct t>  the output is given by
( ) ( ) 0
c
I t I t t tt >D D + = Equation (2.24)
which means that the intensity fluctuations are completely uncorrelated.  The second
order cross correlation function can be related to the intensities by the following
expression
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2g 0
I t I t
I t I t
t
t
+
=
+ Equation (2.25)
The value of ( ) ( )2 0 1g ³  for all values of t .  The preceding takes a semi-classical
approach in which the light is treated as a classical wave where the detection process is
governed by quantum mechanics.  In quantum theory, electromagnetic fields associated
with a beam of light are given by operators.  The second order autocorrelation function
in quantum theory is given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )† †1 1 1 1 12
2 2†
11 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
0
ˆ ˆ
a t a t a t a t n n
g
na t a t
t t+ + -
= =   Equation (2.26)
where †1aˆ and 1aˆ  are the annihilation and creation operators and 1n  is the number of
photons in a mode with average number n .  For non-classical light with 1n = , ( ) ( )2 0g
is less  than  1 [98].
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Figure 2.23. Hanbury Brown’s and Twiss’s 1957 experimental arrangement for the
observation of bunching from a chaotic light source [66].  The detector PMT1 can be
moved which is indicated by the horizontal grey arrows.
2.9.1 Hanbury Brown and Twiss experiment with single-photons
The Hanbury Brown and Twiss (HBT) experiment with single-photons is shown
schematically in Figure 2.24. A stream of photons is incident on a 50:50 mirror and are
divided equally to the two outputs.  The photons are then collected onto detectors D1
and D2 are then recorded by an electronic counter/timer which simultaneously records
the time between electrical pulses from D1 and D2 and the number of counts on each
detector.  The number of photons recorded on each detector is proportional to the
intensity which allows the second order autocorrelation function to be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 22
1 2
0
n t n t
g
n t n t
t
t
+
=
+ Equation (2.27)
where ( )1n t  and ( )2n t  are the counts recorded on detector D1 and D2. ( ) ( )2 0g  can be
thought of as the conditional probability of detecting a second photon at a time t t=
given that we have already detected a photon at 0t = .  In the HBT experiment, when a
stream of photons are incident on the beamsplitter they are randomly directed to D1 or
D2.  There is a 50% chance that a photon event will be recorded in D1 which starts the
electronic timer.  There is therefore zero probability of this same photon being recorded
by D2 and stopping the timer and there will be no events at 0t = .  The next photon in
the stream has a 50% chance of being recorded by D2 and stopping the timing
electronics.  If the pulse was recorded by D1 nothing happens as no stop signal was
received.  This process is repeated until a stop signal is recorded.  No photon events are
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expected at 0t =  while some events are recorded at for larger values of t .  A typical
autocorrelation measurement on a pulsed single-photon emitter is shown in Figure
2.25(c).
Figure 2.24. The experimental arrangement for the Hanbury Brown Twiss experiment.
2.9.2 Non-classical characteristics of a single-photon source
Figure 2.25 shows the second order autocorrelation functions for light sources with
different photon statistics.  For a coherent light source ( ) ( )2 0 1g =  and for a bunched
light source, such as the light from a discharge lamp, ( ) ( )2 0 1g > .
Figure 2.25. ( ) ( )2 0g  function for a thermal light source (a), coherent light (b),
continuous (CW) single-photon source (c) and a pulsed single-photon source (d).  For
a thermal and coherent state the photons are emitted with a random interval spacing
while a single-photon source has a regular interval [99].
50
A light source with a ( ) ( )2 0 1g <  is regarded as antibunched light in which the stream of
photons are emitted with regular intervals between them as opposed to a random
spacing.  To obtain a light source with such properties we must look at the emission
from a single atom.  Antibunching is not observed with a large ensemble of atoms
because the emission and excitation process are different for each atom and are
independent from each other.  The antibunching characteristic curve in Figure 2.25(c)
can be given by
( ) ( ) ( ){ }12 1 exp lifetimeg c rt t t-é ù= - - +ê úë û Equation (2.28)
where c  is a constant and r  and lifetimet  are the pump rate and lifetime of the excited
state respectively [100].  For large pump rates the temporal width of the antibunching
peak is reducing according to Equation (2.28).  When this temporal width becomes
comparable to the timing resolution of the detector the ability to resolve the peak is
reduced which can lead to an artificial increase in the ( ) ( )2 0g  value.
2.10 Quantum transmission medium
In a quantum key distribution system Alice needs to be able to send her qubits to Bob
over a quantum communication channel.  Optical fibres have been extensively used to
date as this medium since first demonstrated by Townsend in 1994 [51].  Free space
quantum key distribution has also been demonstrated by many groups [52], [101] which
opens up the possible of line of sight QKD and also between ground stations and
satellites.
2.10.1 Optical fibres
Light is guided in optical fibres due to the refractive index profile across the section of
the fibre leading to total internal reflection.  During the last 25 years significant research
and development has been carried out to increase the distance over which light can
propagate in fibres before it is attenuated to noise (Figure 2.26). In the early days
impurity ions in the fibre was the major source of attenuation but using better
manufacturing techniques, these impurities were removed. Nowadays the attenuation
(Figure 2.26) is 0.35 dB km-1 at a wavelength of 1310 nm and 0.19 dB km-1 at  a
wavelength of 1550 nm [102], [103].  Losses in optical fibres are mainly due to
Rayleigh scattering which has a 4l -  dependence and absorption losses mainly from
impurities like OHˉ and transition metals.  At wavelengths greater than 1.6 µm the main
absorption process is due to transition between the vibrational states of the lattice [104].
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Figure 2.26. Attenuation of optical fibre throughout the last 30 years [105].
If the core of an optical fibre is large then many guided modes can propagate in the
fibre.  Such a fibre is called a multimode fibre.  The cores of these fibres are typically
50 µm in diameter. Mode coupling is an issue in these fibres making them unsuitable as
the quantum channel in quantum cryptography.  When the core of the fibre is small
enough that only one longitudinal mode can propagate this type of fibre is called a
single mode fibre.  At a wavelength of 1550 nm a fibre is single mode if the diameter is
8 µm.  These fibres are suitable as the quantum channel in quantum cryptography.
Whether or not a fibre can be classified as a single or multimode fibre can be
determined by the following equation
( )12 2 21 2
0
dV n npl= - Equation (2.29)
where V  is called the normalised frequency, d  is the diameter of the fibre, 0l  is the
wavelength in the fibre and 1n  and 2n are the refractive indices of the core and cladding.
For a fibre to be classified as single mode 2V p<  [104], [106].
2.10.1.1 Fibre birefringence
Although many fibres are said to be single mode it is still possible for two orthogonally
polarised modes to propagate in the fibre.  In an ideal case the core of the optical fibre is
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isotropic and both modes experience the same refractive index.  However in real fibre
due to birefringence affects, each mode experiences a slightly different refractive index.
Birefringence is the presence of two different phase velocities for two orthogonal
polarisation states.  The effect is caused by asymmetries in the fibre geometry and stress
around the core from manufacturing.  Some fibres are made to be intentionally
birefringent.  These are called polarisation maintaining (PM) fibres and are used in fibre
interferometers, fibre optic sensing and quantum key distribution systems.  Two
common geometries are shown in Figure 2.27.
Figure 2.27. Design of two common PM fibres, on the left Panda and on the right
bow-tie [107].
PM fibre maintains the existing polarisation of linearly-polarised light that is launched
into the fibre with the correct orientation. If the polarisation of the input light is not
aligned with the stress direction in the fibre, the output will vary between linear and
circular polarisation. The exact polarisation will then be sensitive to variations in
temperature and stress in the fibre [104], [106].  The ability of a PM fibre to preserve
the state of polarisation is given by its beat length
02
b
x y eff
L
n
lp
b b= =- Equation (2.30)
where xb  and yb  are the propagation constants along the x and y axis, effn  is the
effective refractive index and 0l  is the wavelength.  A low value of bL  corresponds to
a fibre with a high polarisation preserving ability.  The length bL  is the distance along
the fibre in which the phase difference between the two orthogonal modes becomes 2π.
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Light coupled into both fundamental modes of the fibre will repeat its state of
polarisation every bL  as shown in Figure 2.28.
Figure 2.28. Evolution of the polarisation state of light guided along a birefringent
fibre when the x and y polarised modes are equally excited [107].
2.10.1.2 Polarisation mode dispersion (PMD) and loss (PDL)
Polarisation mode dispersion is a fundamental property of optical fibres and it is the
broadening of the input pulse due to a phase delay between the input polarisation states.
A single mode optical fibre supports one fundamental mode which consists of two
orthogonal polarisation modes. In an ideal case the core of the optical fibre is isotropic
and both modes experience the same refractive index.  However in real fibre due to
birefringence affects each mode experiences a slightly different refractive index and
travel with different group velocities.  This means that a single input pulse launched into
the fibre can split into orthogonally polarised pulses with each one having a different
transit time shown in Figure 2.29.  This effect can limit the bit rate of the
communication system when dealing with ultra-fast communications [107].  The effect
of PMD grows with the square root of the distance of the fibre and typical values for
modern telecommunications fibres are 0.1 ps km-1.
A closely related issue is polarisation dependent loss, which is the reduction in energy
of the propagating light pulse that is preferential to one polarisation state.  This
differential loss can have the effect of changing the state of polarisation of the output
beam.  This can be an issue when trying to achieve high fringe visibilities with fibre
interferometers.
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Figure 2.29. Polarisation mode dispersion (PMD) in optical fibres [107].  A short
optical input into the fibre is temporally broadened as it propagates through the fibre
by PMD.
2.10.1.3 Raman scattering
To ensure efficient use of resources it is beneficial if the quantum and classical channel
can be shared on the same link as modern telecommunications.  However this is limited
by Raman scattering.  Raman scattering is an inelastic scattering process in which
scattered photons either gain (anti-Stokes) or lose energy (Stokes scattering) from
interacting with a material.  This is in contrast to Rayleigh scattering in which the
energy of the photon remains unchanged upon scattering.  Raman scattering is
generated symmetrically in the forward and reverse directions in fibre and has a spectral
width of up to 300 nm centered on 1550 nm [108].  Figure 2.30 shows a typical Raman
spectra from an upstream and downstream laser centred at a wavelength of 1310 nm and
1550 nm respectively in standard telecommunications fibre.
Figure 2.30. Raman scattering effect showing a broad spectrum from the upstream
and downstream lasers used in classical communication systems [109].
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  Some of the photons travelling in the classical channel can undergo this Raman
scattering and make its way into the quantum channel.  Since classical channel power
levels are ~107 orders of magnitude more powerful than quantum power levels Raman
scattering can increase the error rate in the quantum channel [110].  This is particularly
an issue with “plug-and-play” systems when Bob initials key generation by sending a
bright light pulse to Alice.
2.10.2 Free space communication
Using free space as the quantum channel has many benefits for QKD applications over
fibre.  The atmosphere has a high transmission window at about 770 nm where single-
photons can be detected using commercially available single-photon detectors with high
efficiencies.  The atmosphere is also a non-birefringent media at these wavelengths
which means the polarisation of photons is preserved in transit.  However there are also
a few drawbacks to using free-space communication.  Background from sunlight can
increase the error rate and must be removed by spectral and spatial filtering.  The effect
of beam divergence is also a problem.  Even using diffraction limited optics a 20 cm
diameter beam at launch will expand to about 100 m after 300 km.  This requires larger
optics to ensure high collection efficiencies.  Atmospheric turbulence can affect the
arrival time of a photon and beam divergence but can be compensated for by using
adaptive optics or using a reference pulse [17].
2.11 Single-photon detection
As previously discussed they are several technologies available for the generation of
single-photons.  In a QKD system it must also be possible to detect the light signal
which has travelled through the quantum channel.  These detectors must be sensitive to
single-photons incident on the device.  The primary detector technologies which have
been used include semiconductor avalanche photodiodes, superconducting detectors and
photomultiplier tubes. The single-photon detection efficiencies of some of these
detectors are shown in Figure 2.31.  When describing optical detectors it is useful to
define some terminology to characterise them, namely detector efficiency, noise
equivalent power, timing jitter, dark count rate and afterpulsing.  The quantum
efficiency of a detector is the probability that when an incident photon is absorbed it
creates a detectable output electrical pulse.  The noise equivalent power is a measure of
the sensitivity of the detector and is defined as the signal power that gives a unity
signal-to-noise ratio in a one hertz output bandwidth and is given by
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2hNEP Rnh=
Equation (2.31)
where R is the count rate ,h  is the detection efficiency, h  is Planks constant and n  is
the frequency.  Dark counts are carriers created in the device which are uncorrelated
with incident photons and can be caused by the thermal generation of carriers.
Figure 2.31. Typical single-photon detection efficiencies for silicon thin and thin
junction SPADs, InGaAs/InP SPADs, photomultiplier tubes and superconducting
nanowire detector technologies [111].
2.11.1 Single-photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD)
Single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) are p-n junctions that operate at reverse
bias above the breakdown voltage. In this mode a single carrier can trigger a self-
sustaining avalanche current.  When a p-n junction is formed in a semiconductor
material a region which is depleted of mobile charge carriers is created. An electric field
appears across this depletion due to the presence of immobile atoms as shown Figure
2.32.
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Figure 2.32. Energy bandgap of semiconductor p-n junction in reverse bias.  The grey
region indicates the depletion region which is devoid of mobile carriers.
If an electron-hole pair is generated in the depletion region by the absorption of a
photon the carriers are separated by the electric field. The charge separation can be
detected by reverse biasing the structure and measuring the current in an external
circuit. Avalanche photodiodes work in a similar manner although they have internal
gain built in for the amplification of the photocurrent. The current-voltage characteristic
of an APD depends on the region in which it is biased as shown in Figure 2.33.  In
region I the device is forward biased and can be operated in the photovoltaic mode.  In
region II the device is reversed biased.  When there is no illumination a dark current is
observed due to thermally generated electron-hole pairs and also due to reverse bias
leakage currents.  When light is incident electron-hole pairs are created in the depletion
region and swept out due to the electric field.  An increase in the current is observed
depending on the illumination level.  In region III the device is biased close to but
below breakdown voltage of the semiconductor.  The high field results in photo-
generated carriers undergoing impact ionisation and creating secondary carriers.  The
avalanche current in this region is directly proportion to the input illumination but
without single-photon sensitivity.  Most long-haul communication APDs are operated in
this region.
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Figure 2.33 The current voltage characteristic of an APD structure under various
biasing conditions [112].  Region I is forward biased and can be operated in
photovoltaic mode.  Region II is operated in reversed bias.  When light is incident on
the device in this mode of operation, electron-hole pairs are created in the depletion
region.  The current depends on the illumination intensity.  Region III is biased close
to but below the breakdown voltage.  The high filed in this region results in photo-
generated carriers undergoing impact ionisation creating secondary carriers.  Most
long-haul communication APDs operate in this region where the avalanche current is
directly proportional to the illumination, but without single-photon sensitivity. Region
IV is biased high under reverse bias and carriers can undergo impaction ionisation.
There is a runaway avalanche process, where the gain is effectively infinite.  The APD
can have single-photon sensitivity in this regime.
In region IV the p-n structure is biased under high reverse bias voltages above
breakdown.  Carriers which travel through the depletion region gain enough energy to
enable further carriers to be excited across the energy gap by impact ionisation shown in
Figure 2.34.  The current rises rapidly to a macroscopic level in a few nanoseconds.  If
the carrier is photo-generated, then the leading edge of the pulse marks the arrival time
of the photon.  The current continues to flow until the avalanche current can be
quenched by reducing the bias voltage below the breakdown voltage.  For another
photon to be detected the bias voltage is then restored.  A quenching circuit is needed
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for this purpose which must be able to sense the leading edge of the avalanche current,
generate an output electrical pulse, quench the avalanche current by lowering the
voltage to the breakdown voltage and then restore the photodiode voltage to the
operating level.
Figure 2.34. Impact ionisation process in an avalanche photodiode.  An incident
photon creates an electron-hole pair in the depletion region.  Due to the high electric
field in this region further carriers are created by impact ionisation and grows
exponentially until a detectable current flows in the device [111].
2.11.2 Quenching circuits
When an APD is biased beyond its breakdown voltage a photo-generated events causes
an avalanche process which needs to be stopped before the next photo event can be
detected.  There are primarily three different quenching methods currently used which
are passive quenching, active quenching and gated quenching.
2.11.2.1 Passive quenching
Passive quenching, in which the avalanche circuit quenches itself, is the simplest form
of quenching the avalanche process.  This is achieved by biasing the device above the
break down voltage with a series resistor typically with a resistance of several hundred
kΩs, as shown in Figure 2.35.  When the device is ready to detect a photon there is no
current flowing.  When a photo-generated event occurs, a high avalanche current flows
through the device and reduces the voltage below the breakdown voltage thereby
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stopping the avalanche process.  The recovery time of the device is limited by the
biasing resistance and the capacitance of the device [113].
Figure 2.35. Schematic of the circuit arrangement for passive quenching [113].
Device is biased above breakdown by Rs and the avalanche current discharges
through RL.
2.11.2.2 Active quenching
Active quenching relies on the ability to detect the rise of an avalanche pulse and then
control the reverse bias voltage.  The quenching circuit shown in Figure 2.36 is able to
sense the rise of the avalanche pulse by a fast comparator and switches the bias voltage
source below the break down voltage. After a specific time called the hold-off time the
bias voltage is again switched back to its original voltage.  With active quenching the
device can be quickly changed from Geiger mode to quenched mode and the small
avalanche pulse limits the current through the device which improves after pulsing
effects.  This circuit is used extensively in commercially available Si SPADs [113].
Figure 2.36. Schematic of the active quenching circuit [113].Comp is the comparator
and D is the quenching and reset driver.
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2.11.2.3 Gated quenching
For some single-photon detectors to avoid excessive problems with darks counts and
afterpulsing effects it is necessary to operate the device in gated Geiger mode.  Most
InGaAs/InP detectors are gated in this manner.  The device is biased a few volts below
its breakdown voltage by a DC voltage.  A gated pulse is superimposed onto the DC
level which means that the device only operates in Geiger mode for the duration of the
gate pulse.  This form of gating is useful when the arrival time of a photon is well
defined like in time-of-flight laser range finding and QKD.  A schematic circuit diagram
for gated quenching is shown in Figure 2.37.
Figure 2.37. Schematic of the circuit for gated quenching [113].  Vg is the voltage
generator of the gating signal of time duration Tg.
2.11.3 SPAD electrical timing jitter
The electrical timing jitter of a single-photon avalanche diode, which is the variation in
delay between the absorption of a photon and the generation of an output electrical
pulse, can depend on many processes including the depth of the photon absorption
which leads to variations in the drift time [114] and also the stochastic nature in which
carriers are generated in the multiplication process [115].  The typical response of a
SPAD is shown in Figure 2.38.  It is characterised by a fast peak and a slow tail.  The
peak is caused by the photo-generated carriers within the depletion layer of the active
junction.  The width of the peak is determined by the stochastic nature of the avalanche
build-up time and the timing resolution can be improved by increasing the maximum
electric field in the active junction.  The tail is due to the carriers photo-generated in the
neutral region beneath the junction and reach the depletion region by diffusion [114].
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Figure 2.38 Typical instrumental response of a thick and thin junction Si-SPAD [116].
2.11.4 Thick and thin junction Si-SPADs
Silicon SPADs can be divided into two main groups depending on the thickness of the
depletion layer of the p-n junction; thin junction diodes are typically a few µm and thick
junction devices are typically 20-200 µm.  Thin depletion layer SPADs (Figure 2.40)
can be characterised by a breakdown voltage of 10-20 V, small active region area with a
diameter from 5 µm to 100 µm, photon detection efficiencies from 45% at 500 nm to
about 10% at 820 nm and very high resolution in photon counting, better than 100 ps
FWHM and better than 30 ps with a small active region [114], [117], [118].
Reachthrough SPADs with thick depletion layer (Figure 2.39) have a breakdown
voltage from 200–500 V, detection efficiency of over 50% in the wavelength window of
540-850 nm and a timing resolution of 350 ps FWHM [119], [120], [121].
Figure 2.39 Geometry of a thick junction Si-SPAD [111].
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Figure 2.40 Geometry of a thin junction Si-SPAD [111].
Due to the spectral responsively of silicon, SPADs based on this material have
relatively poor quantum efficiencies at the telecommunications band around 1310 and
1550 nm wavelength as seen in Figure 2.31.  To improve the performance of SPADs at
these wavelengths it is necessary to use a material with a suitable narrow bandgap like
Ge or InGaAs.  These devices use separate absorption (InGaAs) and gain medium
regions (InP) and are based on the heterojunction between InP and InGaAs (Figure
2.41). Under reverse bias operation, a high electric field is large enough to induce
impact ionisation in the InP layer, which is the multiplication layer of the device. Long
wavelength photons incident on the device pass through the InP layer and are absorbed
in the narrower bandgap layer producing electron-hole pairs.  The device is designed so
that under normal operating conditions the depletion region extends from the p+n
junction in the InP layer into the InGaAs layer. Photo-generated carriers created in the
InGaAs layer will undergo drift because of the presence of the electric field. In order to
obtain low multiplication noise the carrier with the higher impact ionisation coefficient
should initiate the avalanche process.
The valence band discontinuity between the InP and the InGaAs layers hinders the
transportation of holes from the narrow gap InGaAs material to the wider gap InP
material.  To increase the transport of holes, a quaternary layer of InGaAsP is placed
between the InGaAs and the InP layers, a schematic of which is shown in Figure 2.41.
The layer of InGaAsP has an intermediate bandgap between that of the InP and the
InGaAs and grades the valence band discontinuity. The result of this is that holes can
cross the barrier more efficiently.  Due to dark counts and after-pulsing effects these
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devices were found to operate best in gated Geiger mode using a periodic gate signal
but have also been demonstrated using the passive quenching method but still suffered
from high dark count rates of several hundred kHz [122].  The gating frequency was
initially limited to several hundred kHz but now using a self-differencing circuit an
InGaAs device has been operated at up to 2 GHz with a QE of 11.8 % at telecoms
wavelengths [123].
Figure 2.41. Cross-section of an InGaAs/InP SPAD structure and absolute electric
field (right) [124].
2.11.5 Afterpulsing and trapping centres
If one of the carriers trapped from previous avalanche pulses are released when the bias
is again above the bias voltage that carrier may succeed in triggering further avalanches.
This effect is known as afterpulsing and contributes to the overall dark count rate of the
detector.  The presence of trapping centres depends on the quality of the material used
in the detector.  Afterpulsing from trapping centres are often thought to be located in the
high-field region of the junction where impact ionisation occurs [124].  This is a low
temperature effect because the emission lifetime of carriers from trapping levels grows
exponentially with decreasing temperature.  A compromise is often needed between the
count created by thermally created carriers and those created by afterpulsing.  At low
temperatures the dark count rate is reduced but the trapped carriers have a long lifetime
and afterpulsing effects are even seen at relatively low count rates of a few kHz.  This
effect is especially seen in Ge and InGaAs/InP APDs.  The afterpulsing probability is
directly proportional to the amount of current flowing through the device and
techniques which limit the current flowing through the device can decrease this
probability [125].
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2.11.6 Cavity enhanced single-photon detectors
All photon counting applications would benefit from increased detection efficiencies.
In the case of SPADs the easiest way of achieving this would be to increase the
depletion region thickness.  However the high electric field strength across the depletion
region would require high operating voltages leading to heating effects.  An increased
depletion region would also increase the timing jitter due to photon absorption in neutral
regions creating minority carriers which then diffuse into the depletion region [126].
The probability of a photon being absorbed can be increased by the use of a Fabry-Pérot
cavity which increases the optical field inside the cavity at resonant frequencies [127].
A planar SPAD device can be grown between two reflectors as shown in Figure 2.42.
Figure 2.42. Schematic of the cross section of a resonant cavity SPAD [128].  The
cavity is formed by the buried Bragg reflector and the air interface at the surface.
The lower reflector uses a two-period distributed Bragg reflector fabricated using
commercially available silicon-on-insulator process (SOI).  The thickness of the DBR
layers (437 nm for the SiO2 layers and 174 nm for the Si layers) was specifically tuned
to achieve a reflectance in excess of 90% around 850 nm.  The SPADs are then grown
on top of this reflecting wafer.  The top reflector is provided by the upper
semiconductor air interface.  The detection efficiency of the device reported by Ghioni
et al. was about 34% at a wavelength of 850 nm shown in Figure 2.43 with a photon
timing resolution less than 35 ps full-width at half-maximum [128].
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Figure 2.43. Detection efficiency for control SPAD (red) and the resonator cavity
enhanced SPAD detector (blue) [128].
2.11.7 Transition edge sensors (TES)
Superconducting transition edge sensors operate on the principle of a bolometer in
which the absorption of a photon energy is detected as a rise in temperature.  A
bolometer typically consists of an absorber and a thermometer of heat capacity C which
is connected by a small thermal conductance G, to a heat sink held at a fixed
temperature shown in Figure 2.44.  The energy E of the incident radiation is converted
into heat in the absorber, leading to a temperature rise, until the radiation power flowing
into the absorber is equal to the power flowing into the heat sink through the weak
thermal link.  The temperature rise is subsequently measured and is directly
proportional to the absorbed energy [129].  The fine temperature sensitivity which is
required for single-photon detection is obtained by a thin film of superconducting
material which is in transition between superconducting and normal resistance on an
insulating substrate.  A constant bias is applied across the film which increases the
temperature of the electrons above that of the substrate.  When a photon is absorbed the
increase in the temperature in the sensor increases its resistance which then reduces the
current flowing through it, thereby reducing the heating effect caused by ohmic heating.
The temperature is maintained at a constant level by the constant bias voltage in
addition to the negative feedback from the reduction in the ohmic heating.  A single-
photon can be detected by the reduction in the current flowing in the sensor [130].
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Figure 2.44 Schematic of a transition edge sensor.  A bias voltage keeps the electrons
in the absorber between superconducting and normal resistance.  The absorption of a
photon increases the temperature of the sensor and increases the resistance of the
device.  The reduction in current signifies the detection of a single-photon [131].
Although not implementing single-photon detection, superconducting TES are currently
being used as one of the sensors for the European Space Agency’s James Clark
Maxwell telescope in Mauna Kea Observatory, Hawaii [132].  The SCUAB-2 camera
(sub-millimetre common user bolometer array) is designed to operate in the sub-
millimetre wavelength regime where it is particularly sensitive to electromagnetic
emission from interstellar dust and gas which is of interest to studying stellar and
planetary evolution [133].  Simultaneous measurements are performed at wavelengths
of 450 µm and 850 µm.  As is common with most bolometers, thermometry and
absorption are performed by different materials.  The absorber is a doped silicon surface
and the heat is coupled though to the TES [129].  Observations in the sub-millimetre
band are used to trace molecular (H2) gas clouds in galaxies, using spectral emission
lines from trace molecules or the continuum thermal emission from dust grains.
2.11.7.1 Superconducting nanowires
Superconducting devices are becoming a very attractive radiation sensor because of
their ultrafast response and quantum nature.  Each absorbed photon is able to generate a
large number of excited particles because the superconducting energy gap 2∆, is 2-3
orders of magnitude lower than the bandgap in most semiconductors which create
efficient secondary electron cascade.  Their operation can be followed using Figure
2.45.
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Figure 2.45 (a) The absorption of a photon creates a resistance hotspot region within
the nanowire.  (b)The superconducting current is expelled from the resistive hotspot,
increasing the current density in the adjacent areas of the nanowire.  (c) the
superconducting biasing current is exceeded in the sidewalks (d) a non-
superconducting barrier is formed across the entire width which results in a voltage
signal [134].
When a photon of light hn is absorbed by a Cooper pair, highly excited quasiparticles
are created.  A Cooper pair is composed of two electrons which are bound together at
low temperatures [135].  These particles lose their energy on a very fast time scale of
~10 fs by electron-electron scattering and by the creation of an avalanche of secondary
quasiparticles.  At lower energies these excited quasiparticles lose their energy by
electron-phonon interaction.  The mean free path of these phonons is small and they
break other Cooper pairs. As the average energy of the excited electrons in the cascade
decreases toward the energy gap 2∆, their number increases reaching 2hn D  and their
effective temperature Tc increases above the superconducting critical temperature.  The
result is that a single-photon can create the collapse of superconducting in a localised
region and the formation of a normal-state hotspot region.  The hotspot formation
enables a precise detection of the photon arrival event.  When a localised hotspot is
created it grows due to the diffusion of quasiparticles out of the hotspot core.  The
biasing super current is prevented from flowing in the resistive hotspot volume and is
instead concentrated near the edges of the film.  The biasing current exceeds the critical
value outside the hotspot and phase slip centres are created in the sidewalks.  The
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superconductivity is destroyed and a resistive barrier is formed across the entire cross-
section of the stripe.  The resistive barrier produces a voltage signal which is directly
proportional to the biasing current.  The hotspot then decreases in size due to relaxation
and diffusion of the quasiparticles.  After about 30 ps the hotspot stripe collapses and
superconductivity is restored [136], [137], [134].
These type of detectors have been used in quantum key distribution systems
demonstrated by Takesue et al. at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
[62] and by Hadfield et al. in a 1550 nm fibre-based QKD link clocked at 3.3 MHz
[138].
2.11.8 Photomultiplier tubes
Photomultiplier tubes (PMT) operate using the principle of the photoelectric effect.
When light is incident on a photo-emission surface with a low work function electrons
are emitted from the surface.  These photoelectrons are then accelerated towards a series
of electrodes called dynodes which are successively at higher potentials with respect to
the cathode [96].  When an electron strikes the dynode it causes the emission of
multiple secondary electrons which themselves are accelerated towards the next dynode
and continues the multiplication process.  These tubes must be operated in a vacuum to
avoid electrons colliding with air molecules.  A box-and-grid type PMT is shown in
Figure 2.46.
Figure 2.46 Box-and-grid type PMT [139].  The dynodes are labelled 1 to 7, the
Anode is labelled 8 and F is the focusing electrode.
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The wavelength of the PMTs maximum response and long wavelength cut-off is
determined by the combination of the alkali metal that is used for the photocathode and
its fabrication process.  The spectral response of these devices can be extended up to 1.7
µm by using InP/InGaAs(Cs) as the photocathode material as shown in Figure 2.47.
Figure 2.47 Quantum efficiency of three PMTs available from Hamamatsu [140].  The
maximum quantum efficiency is about 2% for these devices.
The quantum efficiency of these devices is typically about 40% at a wavelength of 500
nm and 2% at 1550 nm [96].  The relatively large area of the device means that it is
quite useful when collecting light from an extended source but has the disadvantage that
the vacuum technology tends to make bulky devices which limits its reliability and
scalability.  The most common types are box-and-grid shown in Figure 2.46, ventain
blind and linear focused.  PMTs are capable of giving extremely high sensitivity and
very fast response. PMT have a noise free gain on the order of a million however the
timing jitter of such devices are limited to about 1 ns which means that they are
unsuitable for applications such as gigahertz quantum key distribution systems [96].
2.11.9 Quantum dot field-effect transistor detectors
In 2000 Shields et al. demonstrated that the conductance of a field effect transistor
(FET) gated by a layer of quantum dots was sensitive to the absorption of a single-
photon. Unlike many traditional semiconductor single-photon detectors which depend
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on the avalanche process, the gain in a quantum dot detector is achieved from the fact
that the conductivity of the FET channel is very sensitive to the photo-excited charge
trapped in the dots [141], [142].  The device shown in Figure 2.48 consists of a thin
layer of quantum dots located between the gate electrode and conduction channel in a
field-effect transistor (FET).  Photo-generated carriers are captured by the dot and alter
the channel conductance of the FET.  The change in this conductance can be used to
detect a single-photon.  The quantum efficiency of these devices can be as much as 68%
at a wavelength of 805 nm [142] but they suffer from larger timing jitters in the order of
microseconds [143].
Figure 2.48 Diagram of a quantum dot FET. The quantum dots located between the
gate electrode and conduction channel in a field-effect transistor [144].
2.11.9.1 Photon number resolving detectors
The ability to be able to resolve the number of photons in an optical pulse would be a
considerable benefit to the field of quantum information where n-photon states are
produced.  In the past photon number resolving detectors were approximated using
beam splitters and single-photon sensitive detectors but the probability of detecting N
photons drops exponentially with N due to the probabilistic path a photon can take at a
beam splitter even for 100% efficient detectors [131].  Recently, photon number
resolving detectors have been demonstrated using transition edge sensors and also
avalanche photodiodes using self-differencing technique.  In TES detectors which are
near the superconducting critical temperature a rapid change in resistance enables a very
sensitive measurement of the temperature.  This change in temperature is proportional
to the photon energy which enables the sensor to be able to resolve the number of
photons in a monochromatic optical pulse [131].  Superconducting nanowires have been
shown to have photon number resolving capabilities when a series of nanowires are
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connected in parallel and each connected to a series resistor.  The linear addition of the
currents on an external load from the different wires produces an output pulse which is
proportional to the number of photons [145].
In 2008 Kardynał et al. demonstrated photon number resolving in avalanche
photodiodes [146].  When InGaAs APDs are operated in gated Geiger mode, the output
signal produced by a photo-induced electron-hole pair is affected by the capacitance
response of the device to the gating signal pulse.  To be able to resolve photon numbers
it is necessary to measure the current shortly after the avalanche build up.  The output
signal is split into two paths one of which has a delay.  They are then recombined with a
difference circuit which removes the capacitance response of the device and the small
current which is produced shortly after avalanche build up can be detected.  The device
then produces an avalanche current which is directly proportional to the incident photon
flux.
2.11.10 Electron multiplying charge couple device (EMCCD)
Electron multiplying charge couple devices (EMCCD) are a digital camera technology
that are able to detect single-photons while at the same time achieving high quantum
efficiencies via an electron multiplying structure built into the sensor.  This allows the
use of the full quantum efficiency of the silicon sensor which can be as high as 95%
using back illumination techniques.  EMCCDs resemble traditional CCD cameras in use
today in which the object is imaged onto a capacitor array in which it builds up an
electric charge proportional to the light intensity.  A control circuit then causes each
capacitor to transfer its contents to its neighbour operating as a shift register.  The last
capacitor in the chain dumps the charge into a charge amplifier and converts it into a
voltage.  In EMCCD sensors the shift register is extended to include a gain register
where weak signals can be detected above the readout noise of the camera at any
readout speed.  The gain register is similar to a shift register and consists of a line of
electrodes which are driven by a controlled sequence of voltages to move charges to the
next electrode in the chain.  However in the gain register, one of the three voltage
phases is a high voltage pulse typically 40-60 volts.  This high electronic field can
create secondary carriers through impact ionisation thereby creating gain [147].
EMCCD cameras are commercially available with a sensor size of 512×512 pixels
(16×16 µm pixel size), a full frame rate of 56 per second and an overclocked readout of
17 MHz [148].  These types of cameras are particular useful in quantum imaging [149]
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and continuous variables QKD protocols [28] where the spatial information of arriving
photons is important.
Figure 2.49. Schematic of EMCCD.  Charges are transferred across the shift and gain
register by a controlled sequence of voltage pulse.  Gain is achieve by applying a
large voltage at phase 2f  causing avalanche multiplication via impact ionisation
[147].
2.12 Time correlated single-photon counting techniques and counting modules
2.12.1 Time correlated single-photon counting
Time correlated single-photon counting (TCSPC) is a very sensitive method for
recording repetitive low-light levels with high resolution and precision.  It involves the
detection of single-photons from a periodic light signal and using the detection time to
reconstruct the waveform of the light pulse.  It was originally designed to measure time-
resolved fluorescence and photoluminescence.  The TCSPC technique relies on the fact
that when using low light signals, the probability of detecting one photon in a signal
period is much less than one [150], [151], [152].  The TCSPC technique is in some
ways analogous to a stop watch.  The stop watch is started by a start signal which can be
an external clock.  The detection of a photon produces an electrical signal which is then
used to stop the timer.  The difference in time between the start and stop is then
recorded.  This is repeated many times and a histogram is produced of the time
difference between the photon arrival times and the clock signal.  The histogram which
is produced is a representative of the original shape of the waveform.
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Figure 2.50.Principle of TCSPC [153]. (a) shows the input analogue signal, (b) shows
the individual detector pulse from each clock period and (c) shows the resulting
histogram.
Figure 2.50 shows the TCSPC technique in more detail.  The detector signal is
composed of a sequence of randomly distributed pulses which correspond to the
detection of the individual photons.  When a photon is detected, the time of the
corresponding detector pulse in the signal period is measured.  The events are collected
in memory by adding a ‘1’ in a memory location with an address proportional to the
detection time.  After many photons the distribution of the detection times, which is the
waveform of the optical pulse, is built up.  The time of the individual single-photon
pulses can be measured with high precision [153].  Photon counting techniques offer
several advantages over analogue techniques.  The bandwidth of a photon counting
experiment is only limited by the transit time spread of the pulses in the detector and not
by the width of the single-photon pulses.
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Figure 2.51. Typical electrical timing jitter from a detector showing a series of
superimposed detector signals [153].
Single-photon pulses can suffer from considerable amplitude jitter.  This amplitude or
gain noise of the detector is a result of the random amplification process of the detector.
A typical single-photon pulse obtained from a photomultiplier tube is shown in Figure
2.51.  In analogue techniques the gain noise adds to the noise of the measurement.  In
TCSPC techniques the effect of amplitude jitter is removed by constant fraction
triggering.
Figure 2.52 Architect of TCSPC module (forward mode) [153].  The CFD is the
constant fraction discriminator, TAC is the time-to-amplitude converter, Amp is the
amplifier and ADC is the analogue to digital converter.
The general architect of the TCSPC is shown Figure 2.52.  The detector produces pulses
from a periodic light signal which is then detected by a fast discriminator.  The
amplitude of these pulses fluctuates because of the varying gain of the detector.  If a
simple leading edge discriminator was used it would trigger when the leading edge of
the pulse reached a certain threshold.  This amplitude jitter would induce a timing jitter
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which would be comparable to the pulse rise time.  To overcome this issue a constant
fraction discriminator (CFD) is used which triggers at a constant fraction of the pulse
height.
Figure 2.53 Left is a demonstration of the timing jitter caused by amplitude jitter.
Right shows the method of constant fraction triggering [153].
Constant fraction triggering is achieved by triggering on the zero cross point of the sum
of the input pulse with the delayed and inverted pulse as shown in Figure 2.53.  The
time position of the zero cross point is independent of the pulse amplitude and
triggering on this point minimises the timing jitter induced by the amplitude jitter.
The time to amplitude converter (TAC) measures the time of a detected photon from the
pulse at the detector input to the next pulse at the reference pulse.  TCPSC modules like
the Becker and Hickel SPC-600 operates in “reverse start stop”.  In this mode the TAC
is started when a photon is detected and is stopped with the next reference pulse.  The
“reverse start stop” method enables high photon count rates at high pulse repetition rates
as it reduces the TAC trigger rate.  When the TAC is started by a pulse at the start input,
it generates a linear ramp voltage until a stop pulse appears at the stop input.  In effect
the TAC generates an output voltage depending linearly on the temporal position of the
photons.  The output from the TAC is then used as the input to a programmable gain
amplifier.  The gain can be changed which enables the user to select a smaller time
window within the full-scale conversion range of the TAC.  The SPC 600 can operate in
two modes; histogram mode and in “time tag” or “FIFO” (first in, first out) mode.  The
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FIFO mode does not build up a photon distribution but stores information about each
individual photon.  For each photon the time in the signal period, the channel word, and
the time from the start of the experiment (macro-time) is stored in a FIFO buffer.  The
FIFO buffer is continuously read during the course of the experiment and the photon
data is stored in memory.  The benefit of the “FIFO” mode over the histogram mode is
that it gives timing information for each individual photon. There are two clocks
recording the arrival times of photons, one called the macrotime clock records the time
since the start of the experiment and the microtime clock which corresponds to the time
since the last synchronisation pulse. In the SPC-600, if the arrival time of a photon lies
between two different macrotimes the recorded macrotime is rounded up or down in an
arbitrary way which means that it is not possible to accurately measure the arrival times
of photons in FIFO mode [154], [155], [153].  This makes it unsuitable for use in QKD
systems where the timing information of the arrival of the photon is important since the
start of the measurement is all important.  In modern TCSPC modules like PicoQuant’s
Hydraharp 400 [156], the role of the time-to-analogue (TAC) and the analogue-to-
digital (ADC) converters have been largely replaced by a time to digital converter
(TDC) [157].  When operated in “Time Tag Time Resolved” (TTTR) mode it allows for
the continuous collection of data.  The HydraHarp is operated in “start stop” mode
unlike conventional TCSPC due to independent operation of the two time digitisers and
a programmable divider in front of the sync input.
2.12.2 Time interval analysis
The measurement of accurate time intervals has many applications which include
navigation systems, radar ranging, and telecommunication systems.  The time interval T
is measured between the leading edges of two electrical pulses which are applied to the
start and stop of a time-to digital converter.  In its most basic mode of operation,
measuring the time interval involves using a counter which is controlled by a reference
clock (frequency f).  Clock pulses are accumulated for the duration of the gate, shown in
Figure 2.54.  In a one shot measurement (period from one START pulse to one STOP
pulse) the resolution is determined by the clock frequency.  In most devices this limits
the resolution to about 1 ns resolution.  To achieve picosecond resolution averaging
techniques can be used in which a series of measurements are performed and then
averaged.  This method is based on the assumption that contributions to timing jitter are
random and when averaged tend to zero [158].
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Figure 2.54. In a time interval measurement, clock pulses are accumulated for the
duration the main gate is open. The gate is opened by one event, start and closed by
the other stop [159].
TIAs are usually grouped into one of two categories either START-to-STOP time
interval analysers or time stamp analysers.  START-to-STOP TIAs are devices which
only measure the timing from a START event relative to a previous STOP event.  Time
stamp analysers (like the Guidetech GT658PCI [160]) are devices where all event
timings are measured relative to a unique reference [161].  Quite often the signals that
are to be measured are asynchronous to the clock and therefore there are zones of time
which are shorter than the clock which cannot be counted.  This fractional or residual
times lie at the starting or ending edge of a measurement interval (Figure 2.55).  Most
TIAs make use of at least one high resolution time interval measurement circuit.  A
reference clock counter is used to count the number of precise clock cycles within the
time interval of the measurement and an interpolator to measure any residual time
which is less than one cycle of the reference clock.  Circuits to implement this approach
include delay chain, vernier delay line, vernier oscillator and time-to-voltage
techniques.  With delay chain techniques the time interval is quantised with a
quantisation step which is given by the unit gate delay which limits the resolution.
Vernier delay line techniques use the difference in delay between two delay elements to
quantise the time and offer better timing resolution but at the expense of linearity and
limited measurement range.  Vernier oscillator methods make use of the difference
between two oscillator clock periods to quantise the time interval.  Time-to-voltage
converters charge or discharge during the time interval of the measurement.  The
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voltage at the end of the time interval indicates the time interval or it’s residual relative
to the clock reference.  The general architect of a TIA device is shown in Figure 2.55.
Figure 2.55. The time interval analyser uses an accurate and stable time base and a
counter to measure the event timing with a resolution of one time base.  An
interpolator then measures the event timing to the closest subsequent edge of the time
base. The digital logic circuit is used to combine signal N from the counter with the
signal from the interpolator to produce the time stamp [161]. INTPT  is  the time base
residual time.  This is the time between the selected input edge and the following time
base rising edge and determines the edge timing relative to the time base. TBT  is the
time base average period, _INTP PWT  is the interpolator pulse width.  For above
_INTP PW TB INTPT T T= + .
2.13 Conclusions
This chapter has given a brief overview of some topics in classical cryptography and the
development towards quantum key distribution.  The enabling technologies for QKD
which developed in tandem with the field were also described namely the generation
and detection of single-photons.
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Chapter 3 	
Quantum dot micropillar cavity for quantum key distribution
3.1 Introduction
The generation of single-photons on demand has many useful applications in quantum
communication and quantum information processing.  Single-photon sources (SPS)
have been used in quantum teleportation systems, in which a quantum state can be
transmitted and reconstructed over arbitrary long distances [1].  Single-photons can also
be used to build universal quantum gates using only linear optics [2] which is
fundamental for quantum information processing.  Probably the most widespread use of
single-photon sources in quantum information has been in quantum key distribution
(QKD) systems.  In the infancy of quantum cryptography many QKD systems used a
highly attenuated laser beam with an average of 0.1 photons per pulse in order to
approximate a single photon source [3].  The problem of using such a classical light
source is that the photon number distribution is determined by Poissonian statistics.
Laser sources which are attenuated to less than one photon per pulse on average still
have a probability of containing more than more photon [4].  Such a case would present
a potential eavesdropper with the opportunity to use an intercept-resend attack to gain
information about the key.  Obviously then a perfect single-photon emitter which
exhibits true single-photon characteristics would be beneficial in a quantum key
distribution system.  To meet this challenge this chapter looks at the characterisation of
a quantum dot emitting at a wavelength of 894 nm and its integration into a QKD
system implementing the BB84 protocol using polarisation encoding.  The benefits of
using a SPS over an attenuated laser pulse in a QKD environment are also discussed.
3.2 Semiconductor quantum dots
Semiconductor quantum dots are a particular type of semiconductor structure which
confines the motion of an electron in all three dimensions.  This confinement to length
scales smaller than the de Broglie wavelength h pl = , where h  is Plank’s constant
and p  is the momentum, results in an electronic structure with discrete energy levels
[5].  The directionality and the emission characteristics of a quantum dot (QD) can be
altered if it is placed within a cavity.  Dots contained within cavities tend to have higher
collection efficiencies than those in bulk semiconductors.  Examples include
micropillar, disk, and photonic crystal cavities shown in Figure 3.1.  Cavity
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enhancement in photonic crystal waveguides involves introducing a point defect in a 2D
photonic crystal.  The photonic bandgap is used for optical confinement in the
transverse direction while total internal reflection between the air-slab interface
provides confinement in the longitudinal direction.
Figure 3.1. Images of different semiconductor cavity geometries, (left) 2 µm diameter
GaAs microdisk, (centre) AlGaAs/GaAs micropillar and (right) photonic crystal
cavities etched on a 180 nm thick GaAs membrane [6].
Optical confinement in a microdisk cavity is obtained by the high index contrast ratio
between the air and the disk and confines the optical mode to the plane of the disk
ensuring interaction with the dot.  However, these devices tend to suffer from poor
collection efficiencies due to the distribution of optical modes around the entire disk.
3.2.1 Excitation and recombination processes in semiconductor quantum dots
The optical spectra of quantum dots can be understood by examining the electronic shell
structure, the spin structure and the interactions between electrons and holes.  The
excitation and relaxation processes are seen in Figure 3.2.  An optical excitation pulse
creates carriers in the wetting layer or higher quantum dot states.  Fast scattering (~1-
100 ps) relaxes the carriers into the lower quantum states by carrier-carrier and carrier-
phonon interactions.  The quantum states are solely populated at low temperatures and
low carrier concentrations [7].  The emission energies of the quantum dot can be altered
if more than one electron-hole pair is in the quantum dot.  If two electron-hole pairs are
created (biexciton),  the emission of the first pair is at slightly lower energies than the
second pair due to Coulomb interactions between the pairs [8].  The quantum dot may
be excited by non-resonant methods in which excitation occurs into the wetting layer,
and by resonant methods into the s-shell.  Non-resonant excitation has the drawback of
increasing the timing jitter of the emission process and also defect centres near the
quantum dot can capture the carriers.  Resonant excitation, into the s-shell has the
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benefit of a timing jitter due solely to the radiative lifetime and allows the emission
from a single dot to be selected [9].
Figure 3.2. Schematic showing carrier capture from a GaAs barrier into a QD and
carrier relaxation within the QD. Both the conduction and the valence band have p-
and s- shells.  A thin 2D InAs layer is formed during the growth process and is referred
to as the wetting layer [6].
Experimentally it is more challenging as it requires a tuneable laser to exactly match the
desired transition and [7] separating the strong pump signal from the weaker emitted
signal at the same wavelength is more difficult.  Quantum dots can also be electrically
excited [10] and offer many simplifications over optical excitation.  In many working
demonstrations of the device, the quantum dot is located in the intrinsic region of a p-i-n
junction (p-type, intrinsic and n-type semiconductor region).  The mesa containing the
quantum dot can be apertured so that emission from a single dot can be collected.  Other
single-photon turnstile devices use the Coulomb blockage effect for both electrons and
holes, to precisely control the charge transport, one by one, into p-n junction type
devices [11].
3.3 Quantum dot micropillar cavities
Employing growth techniques and different material combinations quantum dots have
been made to emit at various wavelengths, at 850 nm using InAs/GaAs [12], at 1.3 µm
using InAs/GaAs with a capping layer of InGaAs, which acts as a strain relief layer
(SRL) [13] and at 1.5 um using InAs/InP [14].  InAs quantum dots with an InxGa1-xAs
strain relief layer can be tuned from 1.3 µm to 1.5 µm by changing the indium
composition ratio (x value) of the InGaAs SRL.  For the experiments conducted in this
chapter an InAs quantum dot in a micropillar cavity was used throughout.  Optical
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confinement in the quantum dot microcavity is obtained through a combination of
waveguiding along the pillar and longitudinal confinement by the distributed Bragg
reflector (DBR).  DBR work by employing multiple layers of alternating refractive
index material which are a quarter of a wavelength thick.  Fresnel reflection occurs off
each boundary and light which is 4 times the optical thickness of the layers undergoes
constructive interference and act as a high quality reflector.  Light which is emitted
from the fundamental mode of a microcavity can be approximated as a Gaussian beam
which enables it to be more efficiently coupled into optical fibres than free space
quantum dots [15].  The DBR is often composed of mirrors consisting of alternating
quarter-wavelength thick layers of GaAs and AlAs, which are separated by a one
wavelength-thick spacer layer of GaAs.  In this scenario the cavity between the DBR
mirrors can support a resonant mode with electric field antinodes at the mirrors and the
centre of the cavity [16].  The reflectivity of the bottom DBR can be designed to be
significantly higher than that of the top DBR by selecting the number of mirror pairs, so
that almost all of the light in the cavity escapes upwards rather than downwards.  The
reflectivity of m  double layers each of quarter-wave thickness is given by
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Equation (3.1)
where 1n  and 2n  are the refractive indices of the dielectric layer and 0n  and 3n  are the
refractive indices of the medium above and below respectively [17].  A typical quantum
dot micropillar is shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3. A scanning electron microscope (SEM) image of a 2 µm quantum dot
pillar grown at the III-V Facility in Sheffield.  The quantum dot pillar consists of
distributed Bragg reflectors (DBR) of GaAs/AlGaAs layers [18].
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In the weak coupling regime the spontaneous emission of the quantum dot in the cavity
can be modified compared to how it would emit if outside the cavity by a phenomena
which is known as the Purcell effect [19].  The weak coupling regime is defined as
when photons are lost from the atom cavity system at a faster rate than the characteristic
interaction time between the atom and the cavity [20].  The strong coupling regime
occurs when the coupling rate between the emitting atom and the cavity is larger than
the photon loss rate which enables a photon to be reabsorbed by the atom before it is
lost from the cavity.  The Purcell factor is defined as the ratio of the free space radiative
lifetime freeRt  to the radiative lifetime of the cavity cavityRt . Figure 3.4 photoluminescence
trace from a quantum dot micropillar cavity on and off resonance.
Figure 3.4. Photoluminescence showing a quantum dot micropillar cavity when on
resonance and off resonance.  The ratio of their decay lifetimes when on and off
resonance can be used to calculate the Purcell effect [21].
An increase in the Purcell factor is observed when the emission of the dot is in
resonance with the cavity, the emitter is at the antinode of the vacuum field and its
dipole is parallel to the vacuum electric field [21].  The modification to the spontaneous
emission rate caused by the interaction of the dipole with a single cavity is given by
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The first term is the largest spontaneous emission enhancement induced by the cavity
mode that can be obtained and depends only on the optical characteristics of the optical
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mode, namely the quality factor Q  and the effective mode volume V .   In
Equation (3.2) d
r
 is the electric dipole moment and ( )u rr r  describes the polarisation and
the relative amplitude of the electric field at a location rr .  This second term considers
the spatial overlap and the orientation matching between the transition dipole and the
electric field of the cavity mode.  The deterministic overlap of the electric field of the
dipole and the cavity is challenging during the manufacture stage and many cavity
electrodynamics experiments have relied on the random spatial and spectral overlap
between the quantum dot and the cavity mode. Badolato et al. showed a deterministic
way this overlap could be achieved by growing vertical stacks of quantum dots so that
their position could be detected by scanning electron microscopy [22].  The third term
in the equation represents the spectral detuning between the cavity mode and the
emitter, where cl  is the cavity resonance wavelength and c Ql lD =  is the cavity
linewidth.
3.4 Quantum dot microcavities for QKD
The quantum dot samples were produced at the National Centre of III-V Technologies
in Sheffield using the Stranski-Krastanov (SK) growth method also known as self-
assembly[23].  SK is a heteroepitaxial growth method based on the deposition of a film
on a substrate which has a different lattice constants.  The lattice mismatch results in
elastic potential energy which must be released.  In the case of InAs on GaAs the lattice
mismatch is 7%.  This energy may be released by the formation of dislocations or the
nucleation of three-dimensional islands on top of the flat film (the wetting layer) when
the InAs layer thickness reaches a critical value.  When the 3D islands are embedded
within epitaxial layers of a material which has a larger bandgap, the carriers within the
island are confined by the potential barriers of the material that surrounds it forming a
quantum dot.  The size and density distribution of the quantum dots depend on the
growth conditions including substrate temperature and InAs deposition rate [24].  The
growth of these dots is referred to as self-assembly as no further processing is required
to form the islands.  The random nucleation site of the individual quantum dots is an
issue when trying to position the dot in a micropillar cavity [25].
The micropillar samples were produced using electron beam lithography (EBL) and
inductively coupled plasma etching.  The micropillar cavities are spin coated by a
polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) resists which is sensitive to an electron beam.  The
pillar cross section is written onto this resist using high resolution electron-beam
lithography.  The resist is then developed so that the exposed regions are removed.
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Plasma etching is then used to shape the micropillars out of the semiconductor material
[26].  The samples were arranged in a grid-like structure depending on the pillar
diameter size.  The structure also contained alignment features for easy identification of
a particular pillar of interest.  The 1 µm diameter quantum dot microcavity structure
itself consisted of an InAs quantum dot located in an optical cavity with 16 pairs of
distributed Bragg reflector mirrors below the dot layer and six above.  The best
candidate pillar had been determined from work done previously in the group [27].  The
samples were grown specifically to have an emission in the wavelength range 890-905
nm as a comprise to ensure high detection efficiencies (~35% at 894 nm) using thick-
junction silicon avalanche photodiodes (SPAD), whose detection efficiency decreases
rapidly with increasing wavelength, while at the same time ensuring low loss in
standard telecoms fibre (~2.2 dB/km at 894 nm) which decreases in attenuation with
increasing wavelength. Figure 3.5 shows the nature of the compromise required between
detection efficiency and fibre attenuation.
Figure 3.5. Left axis shows the detection efficiency of a commercial Perkin Elmer
thick-junction silicon SPAD against wavelength while the right axis shows the
attenuation of silica optical fibre against wavelength.  At increasing wavelength the
fibre loss decreases but this is accompanied by a rapid fall in the detection efficiency
of the silicon SPAD [28].
A single transition in a quantum dot was selected by one 55 nm full-width-at-half-
maximum (FWHM) bandpass filter centred at 905 nm and two custom made Omega
100
Optical narrow bandpass filters centred on 894.5 nm with a FWHM of 1.47 nm shown
in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6. The transmission spectra of the narrow (1.47 nm FWHM) and broad
(55nm FWHM) filters by Omega Optical used in the quantum dot experiment.
The filters can also reject stray light from the background and from the excitation laser.
These filters are based on a Fabry-Pérot etalon whose transmission spectrum shows
peaks when the wavelength of the light is in resonance with the etalon.  The
transmission is given by
( ) ( )2
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Equation (3.3)
where F is the finesse of the cavity and d  is the phase thickness of the film.  These
filters are designed for operation at normal incidence but as the angle of incidence
increases the central wavelength of transmission decreases and the FWHM increases.
[29].  The phase thickness of the film is given by 2 cosndd p l= , where n  is the
refractive index, d  is the thickness of the film and l  is the wavelength.  The optical
thickness cosnd q  varies with the angle of incidence so that the layer appears optically
thinner when tilted.  The predicted central wavelength obtained when angle tuning can
be given by the following expression
( )2
0 2
sin
1c
effn
ql l= - Equation (3.4)
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where cl  is the central wavelength, 0l  is the central wavelength at normal incidence
and effn  is the effective index of refraction [30]. Figure 3.7 shows the effect of angle
tuning on the central wavelength and the FWHM of the transmission (data obtained
previously by the research group).
Figure 3.7. The transmission of the narrow bandpass filter (Omega Optical) is shown
at three different angles of incidence of the transmitted light.  As the angle is
increased from zero the central wavelength decreases and the FWHM increases.  The
central wavelength can be predicted using Equation (3.4).  The measured values of the
central wavelength are 894.4, 893.6 and 890.4 nm for angles of incidence of 0°, 5°
and 10° respectively and agree well with the predicted values of 893.48 and 891.1 nm
for angle of 5° and 10° when using 2effn = .
The predicted values for the central wavelength were calculated to be 893.48 nm and
891.1 nm when using 2effn =  which is in close agreement to the measured values of
893.6 nm and 890.4 nm for angles of incidence of 5º and 10º respectively.  One of the
narrow bandpass filters was angled tuned to 2 degrees to ensure the maximum
transmission for the quantum dot sample with the three filters in place.
The quantum dot was non-resonantly optically excited using a 784 nm PicoQuant LDH
series pulsed semiconductor diode with a 90 ps temporal response.  Resonant excitation
into the first excited state (s-shell) in a quantum dot results in a lower ( ) ( )2 0g value due
to electron-hole pairs being created within the dot [31] however a tuneable laser at this
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wavelength was not available.  A custom microscope shown in Figure 3.8 allowed the
sample to be optically excited and allowed the emitted light to be collected.
Figure 3.8. Diagram showing the microscope used with the quantum dot microcavity.
The imaging optics are on a moveable (x-y plane) baseplate and the cryostat was held
fixed below.  The white light source and the camera provide the ability for course
alignment and sample identification.  The excitation laser diode at a wavelength of
784 nm is reflected off the BK7 beamsplitter and the gold face mirror to the sample
through the 50× objective lens.  Photons emitted from the sample were collected by
the objective lens (NA=0.42) and coupled into the 9 µm core diameter fibre.  The
transmission at each stage of the microscope relative to the cryostat window is shown
numerically in red.
The microscope system operated in an infinite conjugate system which allowed the easy
addition of beamsplitters or mirrors into the optical path.  An infinity corrected
Mitutoyo 50× objective with a numerical aperture (NA) of 0.42 was used to collect light
from the sample and also to focus the excitation laser onto the sample.  The light
collecting ability of the lens is given by
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where n  is the refractive index, D  is the entrance pupil diameter and f  is the focal
length.  The higher the NA value the more photons emitted from the quantum dot
microcavity that can be collected by the lens.  The objective lens was mounted in a three
axis piezo-electric motor stage with sub nanometre resolution [32].  The white light
source and camera system was used for sample identification and for rough alignment
purposes.  The excitation diode laser, operating at a wavelength of 784 nm is focused
onto the sample by first reflecting off a BK7 glass beamsplitter and then is reflected 90
degrees from this plane by a gold-face mirror via the 50× objective, through a glass
window in the cryostat and onto the sample.  A gold mirror has the advantage of having
one of the highest relativities of metals in the infrared and has a flat spectral response
[33].  The objective lens has a long working distance of 13 mm which allowed light to
be focused through the cryostat window and onto the sample which lay beneath.
A 9 µm core diameter collection fibre mounted on a three axis piezoelectric
micropositioner allowed the light emitted from the sample to be used for
characterisation or for use in the QKD experiment.  A 9 µm core fibre offered the best
compromise of maximum collection efficiency while at the same time ensuring good
spatial filtering of unwanted cavity modes.  To ensure optimal alignment of the
collection fibre a laser with a similar wavelength to the emission from the quantum dot
was coupled into the fibre and the three axis piezoelectric micropositioner was adjusted
until the laser spot was in a sharp focus in the same position as the excitation laser.  To
evaluate the coupling efficiency of the microscope a laser with an identical wavelength
to the emission from the quantum dot was transmitted through the microscope.  It was
determined that of the photons emitted from the microcavity that were successfully
captured by the microscope objective, 11% were coupled successfully into the 9 µm
core fibre shown in Figure 3.8.  The cryostat was maintained at a pressure of about
2×10-6 mbar (0.2 mPa) to ensure that contaminants (including the ambient air) in the
chamber did not freeze or condense onto the sample when operated at low temperatures.
This was achieved by using a rotary vane vacuum pump and a turbo pump.  The
quantum dot samples were placed onto the coldfinger of an Oxford Instruments CF-
1104 cryostat [34].  The continuous flow cryostat can be cooled by liquid nitrogen or
liquid helium depending on the required temperature of operation.  When the cryogen
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evaporates in the cryostat it is continuously replenished by a steady flow from a storage
dewar.  The temperature inside the cryostat can be maintained at the desired level by
controlling the flow rate of cryogen into the cryostat together with using a heating
element controlled by a proportional–integral–derivative (PID) feedback loop.  The
cryostat had its thermal heat shield removed to allow optical excitation of the quantum
dot which meant that temperatures of 80 K could be achieved using liquid nitrogen
(LN2) or 26.7 K using liquid helium (LHe).  This can place a restriction on the
narrowest spectra linewidth that is achievable as it was shown experimentally elsewhere
that the spectra linewidth can increase with increasing temperature due to exciton–
phonon interactions [35].  The ability to not only stabilise the temperature but also to
controllably alter it is very important in order to tune the quantum dot emission with the
microcavity resonance.  As the temperature of the system is increased the wavelength of
emission from the quantum dot increases as does the wavelength of the cavity mode.
However the cavity mode increases at a slower rate than the quantum dot thereby
allowing the quantum dot to be brought into resonance with the cavity [36].  The cavity
mode emission wavelength increases due to temperature dependence of the refractive
index while the quantum dot emission shifts due to the temperature dependence of the
bandgap [37].  It is also possible in general to tune the quantum dots by the quantum
Stark effect which allows the wavelength of emission to be tuned over a wider range
[38].  The quantum dot can be placed between a metallic contact and a Schottky barrier.
The gate voltage induces a vertical electric field which shifts the exciton energy through
the Stark effect [39].
3.5 Characterisation of quantum dot micropillar samples
The spectral characteristics of the quantum dot were analysed using a triple grating
monochromator (Acton SpectraPro 2500i, 0.05 nm resolution) using a liquid nitrogen
cooled front illuminated charged coupled device (CCD) camera with a dark count rate
of 750 count/s per pixel.  The triple grating offers good spectral resolution in the
infrared [40] but does have the drawback of having less throughput.  The
monochromator had an internal swing mirror than allowed the light reflected from the
grating to be imaged onto the CCD camera or to be coupled into a fibre.  When used as
a tunable filter the resolution of the monochromator is determined by the collection
fibre core diameter.  The effect of temperature tuning the quantum dot in and out of
resonance with the cavity is shown in Figure 3.9.  Emission from the cavity mode is
evident at a temperature of 24.8 K when the dot is not resonant with the cavity.
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Figure 3.9. The top graph shows the spectra obtained at 24.8 K when the quantum dot
is out of resonance with the cavity while the bottom graph shows the spectra obtained
at resonance at a temperature of 53 K.  An increase in the intensity was observed
when the quantum dot was tuned into resonance with the cavity, an effect which was
also observed in Ellis et al [41].  The Q factor of the micropillar was estimated to be
~14000 using l lD  [42].  The linewidth was determined using a Lorentzian function
fit.
By temperature tuning the dot from off resonance at 24.8 K to on resonance at 53 K the
central wavelength shifted from 894.23 nm to 894.79 nm ( d dTl =  0.01985 nm/K)
with a reduction in the linewidth from 0.079 nm to 0.061 nm.  The quality factor Q  (a
measure of the time a photon is trapped in the cavity) of the device can be estimated by
the ratio of the central wavelength l  to the linewidth lD .  The Q  factor was
calculated to be 14668 using these values when the QD is at resonance with the cavity.
The Purcell factor can be related to the Q  factor by Equation (3.2).  It can be seen from
this equation that there is a definite advantage to having a cavity with a higher Q
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factor.  The Purcell effect predicts an increase in the spontaneous emission rate from an
atom when it is in resonance with a cavity.  In Figure 3.9 an increase in intensity is
observed when the dot is on resonance at 53 K.  The integrated count in the peak
increases by a factor of ~2.2 when the dot is on resonance compared to the off
resonance case.
Figure 3.10 shows the spectra obtained from the quantum dot when only using a single
55 nm width bandpass filter.
Figure 3.10. Spectra of the quantum dot at various excitation powers measured at the
cryostat window using a 55 nm bandpass filter.  The transition marked X was the
emission that was chosen for the QKD measurement, centred on 1.3885 eV or 893.6
nm.  The temperature was maintained at 53 K to ensure the dot was in resonance with
the cavity.
Several distinct emission peaks, which is a feature of non-resonant excitation, are
evident resulting from the fact that more than one quantum dot is being excited with
each one having slightly different emission characteristics due to the Stranski-Krastanov
growth process and also biexciton transitions [12].  As the excitation power is increased
the emission from the cavity mode also increases which results in a higher baseline in
the emission spectra due to emission from the wetting layer.  The quantum dot which
has an emission at 894.5 nm was chosen as the best candidate as it gave the best ( ) ( )2 0g
values over the range of excitation powers as shown in Figure 3.15.  Although the peak
height appearing at a wavelength of 893.3 nm is larger the integrated photon flux is
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comparable and the main advantage is seen at the lower excitation power levels where
the peaks at 895 nm are about 10% higher than at 893.3 nm.
Figure 3.11. Spectra from quantum dot source with two 2 nm bandpass filters.  The
central wavelength was 894.66 nm (1.387 eV), with a spectra FWHM of 0.086 nm.
The  sample  was  maintained  at  a  temperature  of  53  K  to  ensure  the  dot  was  in
resonance with the cavity.
Figure 3.11 shows the spectra obtained from the quantum dot source with the
combination of the 55 nm bandpass filter and two 2 nm narrow bandpass filters.  The
additional emission peaks evident in Figure 3.10 have been eliminated and the emission
from a single quantum dot transition was obtained.  The spectral FWHM was measured
to be 0.086 nm (0.165 meV) and showed no obvious trend with increasing excitation.
The homogenous linewidth of the fundamental transition in InAs/GaAs quantum dots at
low temperatures (< 10 K) ranges between a few µeV for resonant pumping [43] and a
few 10’s of eV when increasing the energy detuning between optical excitation and the
optical fundamental transition.  The measured linewidth of 0.86 nm is not resolution
limited by the spectrometer and its relatively large FHWM indicates that broadening
could be caused by either acoustic phonons which becomes more important at higher
temperatures [44] [45] or that emission from an ensemble of other quantum dots could
be contributing to the broadening [46].  Quite often in order to identify whether an
exciton or biexciton is responsible for a particular emission line, the integrated PL
intensity is plotted as a function of the laser power [47].  Figure 3.12 shows a typical
log-log plot showing the photoluminescence (PL) integrated intensity dependency on
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the laser excitation power.  As is quite commonly observed under low excitation
powers, a PL intensity which shows an almost linear dependence on the pump power
( )P , 1XI Pµ , indicates a recombination due to an exciton whereas a quadratic
dependence,
2
2
XI Pµ , indicates a biexciton recombination.  Since it takes two electron-
hole (e-h) pairs to form a biexciton (two-photon excitation), the emission intensity of
the biexciton to exciton transition depends nonlinearly on the excitation intensity
whereas an exciton is formed in a dot primarily by directly capturing one e-h pair, the
emission intensity of the exciton recombination depends linearly[6].  Figure 3.12 shows
an exciton PL intensity which is proportional to 0.72 0.02P ±  with the uncertainly determined
by a least square fitting.  Santori et al. [48] and Pelton et al. [15] also using InAs
quantum dots in a micropillar cavity achieved counts rate of the order of ~200k counts/s
in comparison to about 2500 counts/s achieved here at the highest excitation power
shown in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12. Log-log plot of the integrated PL intensity against pump power for the X
transition. The almost linear dependence of the PL intensity on the laser pump power
suggests an exciton recombination process.
The experimental setup for the measurement of the second order cross correlation
function ( ) ( )2 0g  is shown in Figure 3.13.  The implementation uses the Hanbury
Brown-Twiss experiment described earlier.  The detector events registered on the
single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPAD) are recorded on a Becker and Hickl SPC-
600 time-correlated single-photon counting (TCSPC) card and are used as the stop and
start for the timer.
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Figure 3.13. Experimental apparatus to perform the second order autocorrelation
function.  The experiment is implemented using the Hanbury Brown Twiss approach.
The dashed red box denotes the single-photon source elements.
Figure 3.14 shows a typical autocorrelation measurement performed on the emission
line of interest from the dot within the 1 µm diameter pillar.  The excitation pulse
repetition rate is 40 MHz, wavelength 784 nm and excitation power is 1 µW.  The count
rate on each detector was ~2000 counts/sec and 6450 coincidence counts were recorded
in a 150 integration time.  The value for ( ) ( )2 0g  can be calculated by the summation of
the normalised counts in the single-photon peak at 0t =  divided by the total counts in
the multi- photon peaks [49].  The peaks were fitted with a Lorentzian and the total
counts within a 3ns FWHM were taken.  The variation in ( ) ( )2 0g  as a function of the
excitation power on the sample surface is shown in the main graph in Figure 3.16.  The
insert graph shows the variation in the count rate outside the Lorentzian fit as a function
of the excitation power on the sample surface.  The increase in ( ) ( )2 0g  may be due to
other quantum dots which can feed the cavity.  It has been shown elsewhere [50], [51]
that when a single QD is isolated the cavity emission can be antibunched as well.  At
higher pump rates additional spectral lines can emerge, associated with multi-exciton
transitions from other dots which can add to the background signal [52].
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Figure 3.14. Autocorrelation measurement on the 1 µm diameter pillar quantum dot under an
excitation power of 1 µW measured at the cryostat window. The count rate recorded on each
SPAD was ~2000 counts/s.  The repetition frequency of the laser is 40 MHz. Peaks are observed
at repn t×  where rept  is the laser repetition rate and n  is  an  integer  value.   The  total
coincidence count was 6450 in a 150 minute acquisition time.
Figure 3.15 shows the photon flux leaving the single photon source measured at the 9
µm core diameter output fibre shown on the left axis.  The right hand axis shows the
estimated photon flux accepted by the microscope assuming an 11% coupling efficiency
of the microscope and a detector efficiency of 35%.  The maximum recorded photon
flux was about 4 MHz corresponding to an excitation power of 5 µW but results in a
relatively high ( ) ( )2 0g  value of 0.85.  The lowest excitation power of 0.25 µW resulted
in a photon flux of 200 kHz and a ( ) ( )2 0g  value of 0.32.  An upper bound on the
probability to generate two or more photons in a given pulse can be given by
( ) ( )
2
22 0
2
P n g
m³ = Equation (3.6)
where m  is the mean photons per pulse[53].  A ( )2 0g  of 0.85 and 0.32 reduces the
multi-photon probability to ~4.25% and ~1.6% respectively compared to a weak
coherent pulse with 0.1m = .  Using background subtraction techniques [54] the ( )2 0g
at the highest excitation power was reduced to 0.74 and at the lowest excitation power
was reduced to 0.21.
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Figure 3.15. The left-hand axis shows the photon flux which exits Alice as a function
of the excitation power at the sample surface.  The right-hand axis shows the
estimated photon flux emitted from the microcavity into the acceptance cone of the
microscope objective assuming 35% detection efficiency for the Si-SPAD and an 11%
coupling efficiency in the microscope.
Figure 3.16. The main graph shows the variation of ( ) ( )2 0g as a function of the
excitation power at the sample surface.  The insert shows the integrated count rate
obtained outside the peak area as a function of the excitation power.  The laser pulse
repetition rate was 40 MHz.
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In order to estimate the efficiency of the single photon source when measured at the first
collection lens, the number of emitted photons divided the number of incident photons
incident on the 1 µm diameter pillar was calculated.  The beam diameter of the
collimated excitation laser was ~4 mm, which when assuming diffraction limited optics,
gave a spot size of 0.9 µm using the 0.42 NA microscope lens (spot size ≈1.22 NAl
[55]).  Using this approach the source efficiency was estimated to be less the 1%.
Figure 3.17 shows a time resolved photoluminescence trace (TRPL) of the quantum dot
at an excitation power of 1 µW which show an emission lifetime of 464 ps.  An iterative
reconvolution technique [56] is used to measure the primary photoluminescence
lifetime of the sample.  The output of a linear system for an input ( )F t  and a detector
instrumental response ( )I t  is given by the convolution integral
( )
0
( ) ( )
t
G t F I t d
t
t t t
=
= -ò Equation (3.7)
where the instrumental response ( )I t  is the instrument output for a delta function input
at 0t =  and ( )G t  is the output data [57].  Both ( )G t  and ( )I t  are known and the
decay function of the quantum dot, ( )F t  is calculated by deconvolution.  The data
analysis program (Edinburgh Instruments T900) performs this deconvolution and fits
( )F t  using two exponential decays.  The emission lifetime recovered at the highest
excitation power of 5 µW was 563 ps, which ensures the dot has fully relaxed before the
next excitation pulse.  The radiative lifetime is characterised by the carrier capture and
relaxation process in the quantum dot.  Carriers are injected into the GaAs matrix
surrounding the dot.  These carriers are then captured via the wetting layer into the
quantum dot and rapidly relax to the ground state [6].  An electron and a hole, which
have spins which are antiparallel, results in an optically allowed transition and is
referred to as a bright exciton.  It has a total angular momentum projected into the QD
growth axis of 1zJ =± .  If the spins are parallel it leads to the formation of a dark exciton
with 2zJ = ±  which is optically forbidden.  The TRPL trace is characterised by a double
exponential, the fast component comes from the recombination of a bright exciton while
the slower decay tail may be due to the presence of a dark exciton state.  Emission from
a dark state is eventually possible by the exciton scattering into a bright exciton by
either the spin-flip of either the hole or electron [58].  An attempt to characterise the
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polarisation dependent spontaneous emission was prevented as reflection off the gold
faced mirror scrambled the polarisation information.
Using the radiative lifetime of 563 ps when optically pumped at 5 µW and the estimated
photon flux captured by the collection lens the collection efficiency was estimated to be
about 0.185%.  Other optically pumped microcavity pillar devices have reported
efficiencies of ~40% [59] [60].  The low efficiency of the quantum dot in this chapter
may be due to a combination of the generation of dark states which is a dipole forbidden
transition and can limit the maximum achievable emission rate, a mismatch in the
overlap between the emitter transition dipole and the electric field of the cavity mode,
given by the third term in Equation (3.2) or due to losses in the top mirror of the DBR.
Figure 3.17. The time resolved photoluminescence (TRPL) trace ( )F t  of the quantum
dot with an excitation of 1 µW is shown.  An iterative reconvolution technique [56] is
used to measure the primary photoluminescence (PL) lifetime of this sample, the
reconvolution trace is shown in red.  The PL lifetime was measured to be 464 ps. The
detector instrument response ( )I t  is also shown.
3.6 Quantum key distribution with a single photon source
3.6.1 Overview of system
The single-photon source which has been described in the previous sections is used to
implement the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution using polarisation encoding
on the photons.  A free space polarisation modulator (Newport 4102 NF broadband
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polarisation modulator) is used to produce the four polarisation states for the BB84
protocol using vertical and horizontal polarisation encoding for one basis set and left
and right circular polarisation for the other basis set.  The polarisation modulator works
by the electro-optic effect.  When an electric field is applied across an optical medium
the refractive index of the medium changes anisotropically [61].  This optic-electric
effect can introduce new optic axes into naturally refracting crystals or to make
naturally isotropic crystals doubly refracting.  The change in refractive index nD  due to
an applied electric field zE  in the z  direction is given by
3
0
2 z
nn rED = Equation (3.8)
where r  is the linear electo-optic coefficient and 0n  is the refractive index.  The device
operates when an optical beam, which is polarised at 45° to the crystal’s principle axis,
propagates parallel to the crystals optic axis.  When there is no applied electric field the
crystal acts as a retarding waveplate.  When an electric field is applied, the electro-optic
effect changes the indices of refraction along the two crystal directions by different
amounts, which changes the retardation of the waveplate.  The optical layout shown in
Figure 3.18 forms a Pockel’s electro-optic modulator and is used for the results shown
in Figure 3.21.
Figure 3.18. Components of a Pockels electro-optic modulator.  The modulator is
placed between crossed polarisers.  The crystal acts as a variable waveplate which
changes the polarisation of the output beam from linearly polarised to circular, to
linear to circular etc. as the applied voltage is increased which controls the amount of
light that is finally transmitted [61].
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A high extinction ratio input polariser (10000:1)  guarantees that the unpolarised output
from the quantum dot [27] is polarised at 45° to the crystal’s principal axes. The crystal
acts as a variable waveplate, changing the exit polarisation from linearly polarised (0°
rotated from the input) to circularly polarised, to linearly polarised (90° rotated), to
circular, etc., as the applied voltage is increased.  As in the case of Figure 3.18, when
the modulator crystal is placed between crossed polarisers the transmitted intensity I  is
given by
2
0 sin 2
VI I
Vp
p fæ ö= +ç ÷
è ø
Equation (3.9)
where Vp  is the voltage required for a phase retardation of p , V  is the applied voltage
on the crystal and f  is the phase.  The polarisation modulator required that the input
optical beam had a maximum diameter of 500 µm across the entire 56 mm length of the
crystal [62].  The optical arrangement to achieve this is shown in Figure 3.19.  For the
launch optics a 16 mm focal length lens (f1) is used to collimate the photons emitted
from the 9 µm core diameter fibre from Alice and a 500 mm focal length lens (f2) is
used to focus the photons through the modulator.  The collection optics comprises of
one 300 mm (f3) and one 8 mm (f4) focal length lens.  The loss of the launch/collection
optics and the modulator was 9.5 dB.
Figure 3.19. Optical layout to ensure the maximum beam width across the
polarisation modulator is 500 µm.  The loss of this stage including the collection loss
into the 9 µm diameter core fibre is 9.5 dB.
The Newport 4102 NF broadband polarisation modulator containing a crystal of LiNO3
is a resonant device which operates at a clock frequency of 40 MHz which limited the
maximum clock rate in the experiment.  The crystal is part of a resonant LCR circuit
which ensures that energy is efficiently transferred to the crystal and is not lost across
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the internal resistance, R , of the modulating source.  The inductance L  is chosen such
that 2 204 1f LCp = , where 0f  is the modulation frequency.  This enables crystals with
lower values of Vp  [61].  The driving electronics for the crystal allows an external
analogue voltage (0 to 5V) to modulate the output RF level.  Figure 3.20 shows the gain
curve for the Newport (Model 3363) resonant modulator driving electronics.  A pulse
pattern generator provided the input voltage signal.  The polarisation modulator can be
driven at a maximum of 25 V (peak to peak) [62] which is an issue when trying to
produce the final fourth polarisation state for BB84.  Figure 3.21 shows how the
transmitted optical power varies with the applied voltage when the polarisation
modulator is placed between crossed polarisers similar to the arrangement in Figure 3.18.
In Figure 3.21 it is possible to see that the first linear state occurs at 0 V, the first
circular occurs at 9.6 V indicated by the 50% transmission and the second linear at
17.67 V.  The voltage which is required to generate the second circular state is predicted
to occur at 27.27 V which exceeds the maximum safe driving voltage for the crystal and
also exceeds the maximum output of the modulator driving electronics.  This means that
the polarisation modulator is unable to provide the four polarisation states for a fully
working implementation of the BB84 system.
Figure 3.20. The gain curve for the amplitude modulator driving electronics.
117
Figure 3.21. Shows the normalised power measured at the output of the polarisation
modulator after passing through an analyser polariser.  The analyser is orientated
such that when there is zero applied voltage the transmitted intensity is zero.  The two
linear states are achieved at a driving voltage of 0 and 19.67 V.  The first circular
state occurs at 9.6 V indicated by 50% transmission.  After obtaining maximum
transmission the transmitted power never decreases to 50% again indicating that the
second circular state is not achievable.  The expected power is obtained using
Equation (3.9).
Figure 3.22. One period of the electrical driving signal to the polarisation modulator
to generate the 4 states.  A DC offset means that while the second linear state is
achievable in the first half cycle it is not obtainable in the second half cycle.
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Figure 3.22 shows a typical period of the electrical driving signal for the polarisation
modulator.  It becomes obvious from the figure that while the first linear, first circular
and second linear voltage levels are achievable on the first half cycle of the wave the
second linear is not achievable on the second half due to the DC offset in the electrical
signal.  In theory a bias Tee, which adds a DC offset to an AC source, could have been
inserted into the electrical circuit to compensate for this offset but the additional
electrical loss induced and electrical ringing issues made this impossible.
It is necessary to synchronise the optical light pulse travelling through the polarisation
crystal with the electrical signal driving the crystal to ensure that the light pulse is
modulated with the correct polarisation state.  To achieve this, the electrical signal used
to pulse the laser is delayed with respect to the modulator signal.  A schematic of the
experiment is shown in Figure 3.23.
Figure 3.23. Experimental arrangement to synchronise the optical light pulse
travelling through the polarisation crystal with the electrical signal driving the crystal
to ensure that the light pulse is modulated with the correct polarisation state.  The
Agilent 811134A PPG is used as the master clock for the system and drives the laser
driver with a 64 bit data pattern at 40 MHz.  The HP 8110A PPG, which is clocked by
the master clock frequency divided by 64, is used to drive the modulator driver.
The Agilent 81134A pulse pattern generator (PPG) is used as the 2.56 GHz master
clock in the system.  The output is frequency divided by 64 to provide the 40 MHz
clock input for the HP81110A PPG.  This HP81110A PPG is capable of outputting
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larger amplitude signals and is used to provide the source for the modulator internal
oscillator and also the AM modulation input.  The laser is triggered by the data output
channel on the Agilent 81134A PPG, which is a 64 bit pattern that repeats every 25 ns
and whose electrical width is 390.625 ps.  It is evident from Figure 3.21 that linear
polarisation modulation is only achievable over a limited operating range.  This results
in the polarisation states in Figure 3.24 being unequally spaced in time.  To compensate
for this the laser has to be pulsed non-periodically to coincidence with the polarisation
states produced by modulator.  This has security implications as an eavesdropper can
measure the time interval between pulses to gain full information about the states.
Figure 3.24. The variation in the polarisation extinction ratio is plotted as the active
bit in a 64 bit pattern, which is used to trigger the laser  is swept across one period of
the 40 MHz clock signal for the modulator.
The diagram shown in Figure 3.25 shows the outline of the test bed for the
implementation of the BB84 protocol.  The polarisation encoding system which
includes the polarisation modulator in Alice and the beamsplitter, polarisation
beamsplitters (PBS) and static polarisation controllers (SPC) in Bob was a relatively
uncomplicated system to build and to more importantly to maintain its alignment.  For
example the SPC in Bob needed adjustment to correctly align the polarisation with the
PBS but this was found to remain stable for at least a day.  If a phase encoding system
was employed using fibre interferometry, active and more frequent feedback is required
to ensure path length changes in the arms of the interferometer is minimised.  The
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importance of the stability of the polarisation encoding system can be understood when
considering the alignment of the optical components that make up the single-photon
source (SPS).  The SPS system required much more frequent adjustment to ensure the
highest photon flux was achieved and therefore having an encoding system which had a
stable alignment made data acquisition easier.  A PicoQuant LDH series excitation
diode laser at 784 nm, operating at 40 MHz, excites the quantum dot sample through the
custom microscope.  The emitted light at a wavelength of 904.5 nm is collected by the
microscope and focused through the polarisation modulator which sets the polarisation
state of the light.  Two orthogonal linear states were used in the course of the
experiment.  These states occur at bit positions 30 and 50 in Figure 3.24.  The pulse
pattern generator then outputted a 128 bit pattern with bits 30 and 114 active (one
period of 64 bits + 50 in the next).  This ensures that a laser pulse train is created which
has a mean frequency of 40 MHz.  The light then travels through standard
telecommunications fibre to Bob.  To ensure the light propagates in the fundamental
mode short lengths of 5 µm diameter core fibre are spliced onto the ends of the 9 µm
fibre which removes higher order longitudinal modes which is a form of spatial filtering
[63].
Figure 3.25. Schematic diagram of the QKD system.  The box labelled “single-photon
source” contains the custom microscope used to optically excite the quantum dot and
to collect its emission.  The quantum channel is telecommunications optical fibre.  To
ensure light at 895 nm propagates in the fundamental mode 5 µm core diameter optic
fibre is spliced onto the ends of the standard telecom fibre. Static polarisation
controllers (SPC) compensate for polarisation evolution in the fibre and return the
light into its input polarisation state to ensure either reflection or transmission at the
polarisation beam splitters (PBS).  The photons are detected using silicon single-
photon avalanche photodiodes (Si-SPAD).
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The light is then incident on a 50:50 fibre coupled beam splitter in Bob which randomly
routes the photon to one of two polarisation beam splitters (PBS) which are used to
make measurements of the polarisation state of the photon in either the linear or circular
polarisation basis set.  These PBS cubes separate the S polarisation (electric field
perpendicular to plane of incidence)  and P polarisation (electric field parallel to plane
of incidence) components by reflecting the S component at the dielectric beamsplitter
coating, while allowing the P component to pass [64], [65].  A static polarisation
controller (SPC) then directs the photons onto either the designated detector for
measuring a binary 0 or binary 1 value via the PBS in each basis set. This is achieved by
the controlled bending of the fibre which introduces birefringence [66].  The change in
the refractive induced by bending is given by the following expression
2
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Equation (3.10)
where r  is the radius of the fibre and R  is the bend radius [67].  Before any key is
transmitted, Alice sends an alignment optical pulse to Bob which ensures that the
polarisation axes between the two parties are correctly aligned.  Unambiguous
discrimination is only achieved when Alice encodes and Bob measures in the same
polarisation basis set.  Imperfections in Bob’s optical components resulted in a loss of
4.76 dB in his measurement apparatus.
Figure 3.26. Schematic of the in-line fibre optic polarisation controller.  Using
Equation (3.10) it can be shown that the induced phase change due to bending is given
by 20.136 8N r Rf p lD = ´ ´ ,where N is the number of loops.  If the bend radius is
given by 20.136 8R r Rp l= ´ then 1 loop creates a quarter waveplate (QWP) and two
loops creates a half wave plate (HWP) [68].
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3.6.2 Data acquisition and analysis
The electrical signal of one of the SPADs was used as the constant fraction
discriminator (CFD) of the Becker and Hickl SPC-600 TCSPC card.  Due to the poor
resolution of the macro clock in the SPC-600 when running in FIFO mode, which is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the card was run in Histogram mode to avoid
issues which resulted in the arrival time of the input electrical pulses being rounded up
or down to the nearest multiple of 50 ns.  This has the disadvantage that the timing
information of an individual time tag is lost.  Figure 3.27 shows a typical histogram
Figure 3.27. A typical histogram produced from the system for one detector
designated for measuring vertically polarised photons.  A horizontal polarisation state
is produced at 11.7 ns (bit 30) and a vertical polarisation state is observed at 44.5 ns
(bit 114).  The horizontal polarisation is visible due to the PER set to a deliberate
poor value for illustrative purposes.  The time axis represents two periods (50 ns) of
the system clock frequency (25ns) and shows two unequally temporally spaced laser
pulses.  The pulse pattern generator outputted a 128 bit pattern (top x-axis) with bits
30 and 114 active to trigger the excitation laser at 784 nm.
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produced from the electrical signal from a single detector.  In this example the detector
is designated for recording photons encoded with a vertical polarisation.  The issue of a
non-periodic laser pulse discussed in section 3.6.1 can clearly be seen.  The time scale
represents two periods of the system clock containing two pulses, giving a mean pulse
train of 40 MHz.  The photons encoded with a vertical polarisation are seen at 5.85 ns
(bit 30) and the photons encoded with a horizontal polarisation are seen at 22.26 ns (bit
114).  The ratio of the heights of the peaks at the two locations is determined by the
polarisation extinction ratio (ER) of the beam splitter in Bob and was measured to be
545:1 (Figure 3.27 shows an ER of about 4.7:1 for clarity).  The higher the extinction
ratio the lower the resulting quantum bit error rate (QBER) value will be.  To reduce the
effects of dark counts on the QBER, a 300 ps gate is opened on the peaks at the
expected locations of the bit times.  In Figure 3.27 the QBER may be calculated by
dividing the total counts in a 300 ps window centered on bit 114 (incorrect counts) by
the total count contained in a 300 ps window centred on 30 and 114.  This also enables
the sifted bit rate to be calculated which is used to determine the overall net bit rate in
section 3.6.3.  The above technique only uses one detector.  For a complete analysis a
similar procedure is completed for the three remaining detectors.  Had TCSPC modules
like the GuideTech GT65X time interval analyser, which is used in Chapter 4 or the
HydraHarp 400, which is used in Chapter 5, been available at the time of the experiment
this would have allowed the simultaneous recording of photon events on the four
detectors.
3.6.3 Experimental Results
The quantum bit error rate was measured at a range of different excitation powers.
Figure 3.28 shows the variation in the QBER against excitation power for 0 km and 2
km transmission distances.  0 and 2 km transmission distance were chosen due to the
availability of fibre reels and also the relatively low photon flux which would have
resulted at distances greater than 2 km.  At higher excitation powers, which results in a
higher photon flux the QBER decreases.  The lowest QBER measured was 1.22% at 0
km and 6.21% at 2 km.  At the lowest ( ) ( )2 0g  of 0.32, which is produced by an
excitation power of 0.25 µW, the QBER for 0 km was 21.9%.  The fraction of bits
which must be discarded for error correction is given by Cascade error correction
protocol [69]:
( )21net p siftedR f H QBER Ré ù= -ë û Equation (3.11)
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Figure 3.28. The QBER against the excitation power at the sample surface using the
quantum dot microcavity single photon source.  The black triangles denote a
transmission distance of 2 km while the grey circles denote a transmission distance of
0 km.  The numerical value next to each data point is the value of the autocorrelation
function ( ) ( )2 0g  for that excitation power.
where netR  is the net bit rate, siftedR  is the sifted bit rate after temporal filtering, pf   is a
measure of the additional inefficiency of the error correction protocol when compared to
the theoretical Shannon limit and ( )2H QBER  is the binary entropy function and is
given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2log 1 log 1H QBER QBER QBER QBER QBER= - - - -  Equation (3.12)
When using the Cascade error correction protocol [69] 1.16pf = .  Cascade error
correction was the preferred choice over other protocols like Winnow and low density
parity check (LDPC) as it is the most efficient at correcting errors up to about 11% [70].
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Figure 3.29. The net bit rates shown against the excitation power on the sample
surface using the quantum dot microcavity single photon source.  The black solid
triangles denote a transmission distance of 0 km while the grey solid circles denote a
transmission distance of 2 km.  The unfilled points denote the bit rates obtained using
the GLLP analysis described in the text.
The filled points in Figure 3.29 shows the calculated net bit rate as a function of the
excitation power for 0 and 2 km transmission distances when only considering the
Cascade error correction protocol. This analysis does not take into consideration the
extra additional bits which must be discarded as a result of the photon number splitting
attack (PNS) [71].  Work developed by Gottesman, Lo, Lükenhaus and Preskill (GLLP)
leads to a more complete security analysis based on imperfect devices and can be used
to calculate the secure bit rate.  In this proof the bit rate is given by the following
( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 1net p p sifted
QR f H Q f H Ré ùæ ö= -D - - -D ç ÷ê ú-Dè øë û
Equation (3.13)
where D is the fraction of the bits transmitted by Alice which are intercepted by Eve.
To establish a lower bound on the secure key rate it is assumed that Eve intercepts every
multiphoton pulse emitted by Alice so that ( ) ( )2 20 2g mD »  [72].  The unfilled data
points in Figure 3.29 represent the bit rate obtained when Equation (3.13) is applied.
Figure 3.30 shows the secure bit rate per pulse for various simulated single photon
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emitters with varying ( ) ( )2 0g  values and also for a weak coherent pulse (WCP) which
considers the PNS attack.
Figure 3.30. Secure key rate as a function of channel loss for various simulated single
photon emitters with different
( ) ( )2 0g  values and a weak coherent pulse (WCP
[73]).The analysis is based on 100% efficient detectors.
The bit rate for the WCP decreases much faster than an ideal single-photon source
(SPS) as the SPS does not suffer from the PNS attack.  The rate at which the bit rate
decreases is only proportional to the channel loss for an ideal SPS.  For the WCP as the
channel loss is increased the effect of multi-photon pulses increases which forces us to
reduce the mean photon number per pulse.  For a SPS with intermediate values
( ) ( )20 0 1g£ £  they behave like an ideal SPC at short distances where the bit rate
decreases with transmission distance but at longer distances the effect of multi-photon
pulses increases and they behave similarly to that of a WCP [53].  This demonstrates
that although there is a definite gain to be obtained by using single-photon pulses, for
their true potential to be realised values of ( ) ( )2 0g  need to be significantly improved.
Practically this means that using the lowest reported value of ( ) ( )2 0g  of ~0.05, means
that compared to an ideal SPS the maximum channel loss is reduced by ~30 dB [74].
3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has looked at the issue of generating single photons which exhibit sub-
Poissonian statistics using a quantum dot embedded in a micropillar cavity with an
emission wavelength of 984.5 nm.  The quantum dot source was used in a test bed
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implementation of the BB84 protocol for QKD.  Autocorrelation measurements were
performed to characterise how closely the quantum dot behaves like a true single-
photon emitter at a series of different excitation powers.  The lowest measured ( ) ( )2 0g
value was 0.32 at an excitation power of 0.25 µW rising to 085 at the highest excitation
power of 5 µW.  The highest photon emission rate from the quantum dot sample was 4
MHz which was calculated assuming an 11% coupling efficiency of the microscope into
9 µm diameter core fibre and a detector efficiency of 38% at a wavelength of 895 nm.
Due to difficulties with the polarisation modulator only three of the four states required
for the BB84 protocol could be generated.  The modulator was also a resonant device
which meant that the only clock rate at which the system could be operated at was 40
MHz.  The maximum observed value for the primary excited state lifetime was 563 ps
which would limit the maximum excitation pulse repetition rate to several hundred
megahertz.  This would allow a much higher photon flux.  In addition if the free space
modulator could be replaced by an in-line fibre coupled version the loss of the system
could be significantly reduced.
As a result of the non-equally spaced bit locations for the four polarisation states as seen
in Figure 3.24 it was necessary to pulse the laser non-periodically to ensure that the
optical pulse when inside the polarisation crystal was synchronised with the electrical
signal for each of the polarisation states.  This leaves the system vulnerable to a
potential eavesdropper who can measure the temporal separation between pulses to gain
information on the state sent by Alice.  In a more realistic scenario the laser pulse
repetition frequency should be kept constant.
A series of measurements investigating how the QBER and the net bit rate varied as the
excitation power was varied is shown in Figure 3.28 and Figure 3.29 for a transmission
distance of 0 km and 2 km.  The net bit rate was calculated using both the Cascade error
correction protocol and the GLLP security analysis.  The highest bit rate obtainable
using the GLLP analysis was 65 bits/sec for 2km and 396 bits/sec for 0 km.  The net bit
rate obtained using Cascade error correction is higher as it does not take into account
those extra bits which must be sacrificed because of the PNS.  The highest bit rate
obtainable using Cascade error correction was 179 bits/sec for 2km and 453 bits/sec for
0 km.  Other research groups have used single-photon sources in a QKD system.  The
Toshiba research group used an InAs quantum dot operating at ~1.3 µm over 35 km of
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optical fibre using phase encoding with a Mach Zehnder interferometer [72].  They
reported a ( ) ( )2 0g  value of 0.16 and a secure bit rate of ~2 bits/sec at 35 km using GLLP
analysis.  The reported single-photon efficiency was 4.6% at a clock rate of 1 MHz.  In
2010 researchers in Japan reported the lowest ( ) ( )2 0g  value of 0.055 obtained at a
wavelength of 1.5 µm using a quantum dot structure [75].  The single photon efficiency
was 5.8% corresponding to a single photon per pulse of 1.2 MHz.  Using simulations
based on Waks et al. [53] a single photon source with a ( ) ( )2 0g  of 0.055 can distribute
secure keys over 6 dB more channel loss compared to a SPS with a ( ) ( )2 0g  value of
0.85.  One of the highest reported emission rate for a quantum dot microcavity was
made by Strauf et al. with a emission rate of 31 MHz after correction for detection
efficiency, displaying a ( ) ( )2 0g  value of 0.4 [59].  If this single-photon source could be
integration into the QKD system described here, which has an emission rate of ~7.75
times the source used in this chapter then a calculated secure bit rate of 1653 bits/sec
could be expected using a ( ) ( )2 0g  of 0.4.
The issue of source efficiency and collection efficiency for a single-photon source was
examined by Gérard et al in 2010 [76].  They used self-assembled InAs quantum dots
embedded in a GaAs Photonic nanowire which was carefully tapered at one end and
with a metal-dielectric mirror at the other.  Using a 0.7 NA collection lens they obtained
a source efficiency, defined by the probability of collecting a photon into the first lens
in the system, of 0.72 (72%).  This corresponded to a single-photon emission rate into
the first lens of 55 MHz when optically pumped at saturation using a Ti:sapphire laser at
a repetition rate of 76 MHz. The emission wavelength of the source was 915.2 nm
which was maintained at 5 K.  A ( ) ( )2 0g  value of less than 0.008 was obtained.  They
stated that photonic nanowires have an advantage over quantum dot cavity single-
photon emitters as cavities which are detuned from the QD can contribute to the cavity
mode via coupling to the continuum of states leading to multiphoton pulses under non-
resonant excitation, thereby increasing the ( ) ( )2 0g  value.  The addition of a source
similar to the one developed developed by Gérard et al.,  which is  at  least  an order  of
magnitude more efficient than the source presented in this chapter, into the QKD system
here would be a huge benefit to the bit rate which could be obtained from the system.
The necessity for operating the QKD system described in this chapter with liquid
helium places restrictions on the practicality of such a system.  Already demonstrations
of single-photon emission at room temperature has been demonstrated in molecules
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[77], colour centres in diamonds [78] and nanocrystals [79].  Philip Grangier’s group in
Paris, used the nitrogen-vacancy colour centre in a diamond nonocrystal in a free-space
QKD system employing polarisation encoding at 1.55 µm.  They obtained a ( ) ( )2 0g
value of 0.15 and a bit rate of 1.67 kbits/sec at 30.5 metres [80].
Recently the interest in using quantum dots in a QKD system has dropped due to the
development of decoys states which can deliver superior bits rates with lasers offering a
much simpler solution [81].  In 2008 Dixon et al. demonstrated a gigahertz clocked
decoy-protocol quantum key distribution system [82].  A secure bit rate of 1.02 Mbits/s
was obtained over a fibre distance of 20 km while 10.1 kbit/s was achieved for 100km.
By simply sending decoy pulses, Alice and Bob are able to prevent the photon number
splitting attack.  However interest in single-photon sources could be reinvigorated for
applications in distributing entangled states over long distances using quantum repeaters
which require single-photon sources [83].
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Chapter 4 	
Robust GHz clocked fibre quantum key distribution
4.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have introduced the concept of quantum key distribution (QKD) and
gave an overview of the electro-optics components required in many modern QKD
systems.  This chapter will outline a novel method for eliminating the random
polarisation evolution of light travelling in standard telecoms fibre which is integrated
into a QKD system.  If this effect were to remain it would cause massive encoding
errors in a fibre based system.  In addition, unlike existing QKD systems which use
active optical components to make a basis set selection which can cause thermal
instability in fibre systems, the one implemented in this chapter uses passive optical
components.  Most QKD systems in use today operate at a wavelength in the third
telecommunications window around 1550 nm benefiting from the low fibre attenuation
of 0.2 dB/km of standard telecommunications fibre used in the global communication
infrastructure [1].  The system described in this chapter operates at a wavelength of 850
nm and although it suffers from a higher fiber attenuation of 2.2 dB/km it can make use
of the mature silicon single-photon detector technologies which offer superior timing
jitter, detection efficiency and dark count rate characteristics than the alternatives at
1550 nm.  Operating at a wavelength of 850 nm also avoids the spectrally wide
spontaneous Raman scattering background generated by high power classical data
channels which can considerably increase the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in QKD
systems [2].  The QKD system described in this chapter is operated using a variety of
single-photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) detectors including thick and thin junction
SPADs as well as a superconducting nanowire device resulting in the most
comprehensive comparison of different detector technologies in a QKD environment.
This comparison of detectors in addition to theoretically modeling how the detector
affects the performance of a QKD system could assist engineers in designing detectors
which are optimised for use in quantum key distribution systems in the future.
4.1.1 Operation of the QKD system
The experimental system is shown in Figure 4.2.  The setup is based on an asymmetric
double Mach-Zehnder design using 5 µm core diameter panda eye polarisation
maintaining fibre to maximise interferometric fringe visibility.  The fibre
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beamsplitters/combiners used are fused biconical taper couplers.  These optical fibre
couplers are fabricated in industry by twisting together, melting and pulling two single-
mode fibres around each other so that they get fused together over a uniform length
called the coupling region as shown in Figure 4.1.  The fibre cores are tapered and
thinned out so that each core overlaps with the evanescent wave associated with light
guided in the other mode which allows energy transfer [3].
Figure 4.1. Fabrication method for a fused biconical tapper.  The output ports are
denoted by PT  and PC [4].
The delay in Alice establishes a phase reference for the quantum state set by the phase
modulator in the short arm while the equal delay in Bob allows for interferometric
recombination of photons which have taken different paths at the final beamsplitter.  A
histogram of the time of arrival of photons travelling through the system is shown later
in Figure 4.29.  Only the photons which have travelled through the short arm in Alice
and the long arm in Bob and vice versa undergo interference and the remaining two
pulses are temporally gated out in software.  The optical delay in Alice and Bob is
created via a vernier controlled air gap.  This allows fine adjustments to be made in the
timing delay between the short and long arms in the interferometer which slightly
relaxes the required accuracy that must be obtained when splicing to ensure that the
nominal interfering peaks are temporally overlapping to within the coherence length of
the laser.  A variable air gap (OZ Optics ODL-200) was selected over a fibre stretcher
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because of the superior optical delay which can be created with the air gap, which is a
maximum of 3 cm in the system described here, which compares to a few mm in a fibre
stretcher.  Asymmetric double Mach-Zehnder designs in QKD systems commonly
employ an active phase modulator (Photline NIR-MX800-LN-10)) at Bob to perform a
basis set selection.  However, this active component can induce thermal instability in
the system and affect long term operation.  The system described here employs two
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers at Bob, one for each of the two basis sets, in
order to improve thermal stability and to enable long-term continuous usage.  To
prevent environmentally induced changes in the birefringence of the fibre quantum
channel from affecting the polarisation state of the transmitted photons, Alice scrambles
her polarisation via a depolariser.  A polarisation beamsplitter (PBS) (OZ Optics PBS)
in Bob allows him to passively and randomly select what basis set he should make his
measurement in.  The operation of the depolariser together with the PBS in Bob is
discussed in more detail in section 4.1.4.  The QKD system was designed to be robust
against externally induced changes in the relative path-lengths of the interferometers.
During secure key exchange Bob continually monitored the visibility of his
interferometers.  Once the QBER exceeded a threshold level, typically 11%, key
exchange was halted, and Alice’s attenuation was reduced until pulses were transmitted
which on average contained more than one photon.  At this point Bob varied the relative
path length delay of his interferometers using a computer controlled piezo-electric
variable length air gap in the delay arms until the visibility was improved.  This was
achieved using fully automated custom tuning software which adjusted the piezoelectric
voltage to restore good visibility.  Alice then returned the attenuation to the correct
mean photon per pulse level ( m ) and key exchange was resumed.  A m  value of 0.1
photons per pulse was used during all periods of key generation and Alice regularly
monitored the m  value launched into the quantum channel and adjusted the attenuation
using an optical attenuator (OZ Optics ODL-100) as required to compensate for any
mechanical drift in the laser alignment which could cause the power to fluctuate.  The
m  choice of 0.1 means that approximately 5% of the non-vacuum pulses leaving Alice
contained in excess of one photon, leaving it susceptible to the photon number splitting
attack.  The use of a m  value with known, controlled variances, known as decoy states,
could be used to help increase the security of the system and this method has already
been demonstrated at GHz clock rates [5].
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Figure 4.2. A schematic of the environmentally robust QKD system.  The air gap in
the transmitter is fixed for the duration of a measurement while those in receiver are
adjusted under computer control to maintain the maximum fringe visibility in each
interferometer.
The quantum communication channel is standard 9 µm diameter core Corning SMF-28e
[1].  Operation at a wavelength of 850 nm requires mode manipulation techniques as 9
µm diameter core fibre can support more than one longitudinal mode.  As described in
Chapter 3 short lengths of 5 µm core diameter fibre are spliced onto the ends to spatially
filter higher order modes.
4.1.2 Vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL)
The light source which was used in the system was a Honeywell HFE4093-322 vertical
cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL) operating at a wavelength of ~850 nm [6].
VCSELs are ubiquitous in modern long haul communications systems due to their low
cost, low power consumption, high modulation rates and single-longitudinal mode
operation [7].  The VCSEL was capable of operating at 2.5 Gbits/sec but was operated
at 1 GHz to avoid excessive temporal intersymbol interference [8]. A spectrum of the
laser output at various operating temperatures is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. The spectrum of the Honeywell HFE4093-322 VCSEL when maintained at
various temperatures using a peltier cooler.
The laser had a temperature dependent central wavelength of emission as shown in
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, and was determined to have a TlD D  of 0.0773 nm/°C.
With increasing temperature the gain spectrum and the Fabry-Perot (FP) resonance of
the cavity are red-shifted.  The FP cavity resonance is determined by the temperature
dependence of the refractive indices while the gain spectrum shift is due to the
temperature dependence of the bandgap [9].  This required that the VCSEL be
maintained at a constant temperature via a peltier cooler.  A temperature of 15 °C was
chosen as the operating temperature to try to maintain thermal equilibrium with the
laboratory which was maintained at 15 °C using an air-conditioning unit which also
ensured that water condensation did not develop on the device.  The stability of the
lasing emission wavelength was also important as the splitting ratio of fused biconical
tapers have a wavelength dependence which could affect the interferometric visibility,
since the two interfering beams must be equal amplitude to ensure high visibility [10].
This is explained in more detail in section 4.1.3.  The VCSEL also exhibits a
temperature dependence on the laser threshold current resulting in the power output
increasing or decreasing with fluctuating temperature.
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Figure 4.4. A Gaussian fit of the spectra peaks in Figure 4.1 is used to obtain the
central wavelength.  This wavelength is then plotted against the operating temperature
maintained by the peltier cooler.
The full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) was measured to be 86.359 pm and the
central wavelength was 849.64 nm at a temperature of 15 °C.  This allows the coherence
length of the laser, assuming it has a spectral broadening that is determined by a
Gaussian process, to be calculated by
22ln 2
cL
l
p l= D Equation (4.1)
where l  is the central wavelength and lD  is the spectral FWHM [11].  The calculated
value was determined to be ~5.5 mm (corresponding a coherence time 18.52 ps in free
space).
A short duration optical pulse is required to minimise the effect of timing jitter in the
system, which could result in temporal intersymbol interference, resulting in bits being
encoding incorrectly.  A short duration optical pulse was achieved by the technique of
gain switching in which a relatively long duration electrical driving signal can produce a
much shorter temporal optical pulse [12], [13], [14].  In this method the threshold for
laser oscillation is first obtained by the characteristic luminosity-current (L-I) curve for
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the VCSEL.  Figure 4.5 shows the L-I curve for various temperatures in the range 8-
28  ºC.  In edge emitting semiconductor lasers the threshold current thI  is given by
0
expth
T
I
T
µ æ öç ÷è ø
Equation (4.2)
where 0T  is the characteristic temperature.  This shows that increasing temperature
increases the threshold current.
Figure 4.5. Characteristic L-I curve for the Honeywell HFE4093-322 VCSEL
operating at various temperatures.  When operated at a temperature of 15 ºC the
threshold for laser operation was approximately 0.94 mA.
However as can be seen in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, the threshold current temperature
dependence is affected by the temperature range in which the laser is operating.  This is
caused by the laser gain spectrum and FP resonator modes shift to longer wavelengths
at different rates as the temperature increases.  Depending on the initial location of the
gain peak with respect to the emission wavelength, the laser gain will either decrease or
increase as the gain peak and emission wavelength slip into or out of alignment [15],
[16].  The optimal temperature for alignment between the gain spectrum and FB
resonator modes for the VCSEL studied here occurs at 45 ºC, where the laser threshold
reaches a minimum.  However operation at this temperature exceeds the manufacturers
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recommended operating regime.  When operated in the QKD system at 15 ºC the
measured slope efficiency of the VCSEL was 0.14 mW/mA and the threshold for laser
oscillation was approximately 0.94 mA.
Figure 4.6. Variation in the threshold current for laser oscillation against
temperature.
The schematic for gain switching is shown in Figure 4.7.  The VCSEL was operated
below the drive current for laser oscillations to occur by applying a constant DC current
via a bias Tee (Picosecond Pulse Labs 5575A Bias-T).  The gigahertz modulation signal
was then provided by a pulse pattern generator through the bias Tee.  The bias Tee
consists of a capacitor and an inductor and is used to supply a DC offset to an AC
signal.  The capacitor represents a low-impedance path for the RF signal and a high
impedance for the DC signal while the inductor offers a low impedance path for the DC
signal and a high impedance for the RF signal [17].  The quality of the optical pulse was
examined using a 12 gigahertz fast p-i-n photodiode on a 2.75 GHz bandwidth
oscilloscope.  Ideally in a QKD system the duration of the optical pulse should be as
short as possible, with a clear distinction between the on and off state and also there
should be no obvious double pulsing which broadens the temporal FWHM.  Various
conditions of the DC drive current, the width of the electrical driving signal and its
voltage amplitude were investigated to obtain the optimal drive conditions.
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Figure 4.7. A schematic showing the arrangement for gain switching.  The VCSEL is
operated just below laser threshold via the DC current.  A pulse pattern generator
(PPG) provides the gigahertz modulation signal.
Figure 4.8 shows the electrical driving signal output form the pulse pattern generator
used to pulse the VCSEL under optimal gain settings.  The 1 GHz signal has a peak-
peak amplitude of 1.5 volts and a FWHM of 503 ps.
Figure 4.8. 1 GHz, ±750 mV peak-peak electrical driving signal for the VCSEL under
optimal gain settings.  The FWHM was measured to be 503 ps.
The DC current applied through the bias Tee was 0.5 mA.  Figure 4.9 shows the
temporal response of the VCSEL measured using a fast p-i-n photodiode and a
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gigahertz oscilloscope.  The insert shows the VCSEL temporal profile under gain
switching settings that have not been optimised.
Figure 4.9. The temporal profile of the VCSEL on a fast p-i-n photodiode displaying a
FWHM of 47.9 ps under optimal gain switching settings.  The insert shows gain
switching settings which have not been optimised using a DC current of 0.8 mA and a
1 GHz electrical driving signal of ±1000 mV with 50% duty cycle.
4.1.3 Polarisation of vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL)
The performance of any interferometric system depends greatly on the polarisation of
the interfering beams [18], [19].  For two plane waves whose electric fields are given by
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 01 1 1
2 02 2 2
, cos
, cos
E r t E k r t
E r t E k r t
w d
w d
= × - +
= × - +
rr r
r r
rr r
r r
Equation (4.3)
The result intensity 2
T
I E=
r
  when they undergo interference in a point in space is
given by
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 2 12
2
I E E E E E
E E E E
I I I
= = + × +
= + + ×
= + +
r r r r
r r r r
Equation (4.4)
147
The term 2 212 1 22I E E= ×
r r
 is referred to as the interference term.  If the plane waves are
perpendicular to each other, then the term 12 0I = , due to the dot product of the electric
field vectors.  When the plane waves are parallel then Equation (4.4) is simplified to
1 2 1 22 cosI I I I I d= + + Equation (4.5)
where d  is the phase difference between the waves.  Depending on the value of d
either constructive or destructive interference is observed.  The visibility of the resulting
fringes can be given by
min
min
max
max
I IV
I I
-= + Equation (4.6)
where maxI  and minI  are the light intensities of constructive and destructive fringes
respectively.  The visibility of the fringes is decreased by the factor cosy  where y  is
the angle between the interfering electric fields.  For maximum fringe visibility the
intensity of the two interfering waves should be equal such that 1 2I I= .  In the case of
the unbalanced Mach Zehnder interferometer in the QKD system, each arm usually has
a different attenuation due to air gap losses, and in the case of Alice due to the loss of a
phase modulator.  The light which has travelled through the reference arm in Alice and
signal arm in Bob and vice versa are made to have equal intensities by placing an
adjustable screw attenuator into the air gaps in Alice’s and Bob’s interferometers which
reestablishes the symmetry of the interfering pulses.  However this technique has
security implications as Alice sends a signal and references pulses with unequal
amplitudes.  The secure key rate is lower in this scenario than in the ideal case
depending on the ratio of the reference pulse amplitude to the signal pulse amplitude
[20].
The laser polarisation was investigated by sending collimated laser light through a free
space polariser. The power output from the laser was monitored as a function of
polariser angle and the resulting polar graph is shown in Figure 4.10.  Two distinct
transverse electric (TE) modes with roughly equal power are observed.  The two modes
arise from the fact that most VCSEL designs use circularly symmetric structures which
results in no mode selection [21].  If the two orthogonal polarisation modes were
allowed to remain they would degrade the visibility of the interferometry.  A high
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extinction ratio sheet polariser in excess of 10000:1 is used to remove this component
leaving a single polarisation component as shown in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.10. Polar graph showing the orthogonal polarisation components from the
laser.
Figure 4.11. Polar graph showing the effect of the insertion of the high extinction
ratio polariser to leave a single polarisation component.
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Another common feature with VCSEL lasers is that the output polarisation can
randomly flip axis [21] which can be an issue with PM fibres in which the light has to
be correctly aligned with the stress members of the fibre.  In Figure 4.2 after the laser
light has been collected into the fibre, a static polarisation controller is used to correctly
align its polarisation with an in-line fibre polariser.  This ensures optimal polarisation
alignment with PM fibres.
4.1.4 Operation of compact depolariser
The high clock rate quantum key distribution system is designed to be robust against
environmentally induced fluctuations in the relative path lengths of the interferometers.
The phase states for the implementation of the BB84 protocol are encoded using pulses
of highly polarised light.  However if the sender Alice was to transmit these encoded
photons directly through standard telecommunications fibre, stress induced changes in
the fibre birefringence would cause the polarisation to evolve randomly and thereby
decreasing the visibility of the double Mach-Zehnder interferometers and increasing the
QBER.  However if the light emitted from Alice is fully depolarised then the effect of
birefringence in the quantum channel can be eliminated.  There are many various
schemes which has been proposed in the literature for the implementation of such a
device using either all fibre approaches [22], [23], [24] or bulk optics approaches
[25],  [26].  To be compatible with current fibre optic communications systems a fibre
approach would be the preferred option to ensure successful integration into a QKD
system.  The compact fibre depolariser is based on a Mach-Zehnder type interferometer
arrangement as shown in Figure 4.12 [25].
Figure 4.12. Schematic of the compact depolariser system with the 45º degree splice.
150
The depolariser was constructed using 5 μm core diameter panda eye polarisation
maintaining fibre.  The 45º splice at the input ensures that when polarised light is
incident on the splice it equally excites two orthogonal polarisation modes in the fibre.
The polarisation beam splitter then causes each polarisation mode to take different paths
in the depolariser.  In one of the arms an adjustable air gap allows the path separation to
be adjusted.  When the optical delay between the two arms in the depolariser is such
that it is longer than the coherence time of the source and shorter than the optical pulse
duration then when the two beams of light with orthogonal polarisations are combined
at the final combiner, depolarised light is produced [25].  This effectively creates a
differential group delay gdt  which can be easily controlled by the adjustable air gap.
This type of depolariser is capable of depolarising light sources with a relatively narrow
linewidth (< 0.1nm).  In the case of the all-fibre Lyot depolariser, which will be
described in more detail in section 4.1.6, it relies on the differential group delay being
created by the fibre length itself, which means that narrower linewidth sources require
ever increasing lengths of fibre to fully depolarise them.  The degree of polarisation
(DOP) of the light exiting the depolariser was experimentally measured by monitoring
the maximum and minimum power level detected when the light is analysed using a
high extinction ratio polariser.  The DOP can be analytically calculated as follows [27],
[28].
( ) max min
max min
% 100I IDOP
I I
-= ´+ Equation (4.7)
where maxI  and minI  are the maximum and minimum recorded intensities after passing
through a linear analyser.  Completely polarised light has a DOP of 100% while
unpolarised light has a DOP of 0%.  The DOP and the polarisation output from the
depolariser were investigated as a function of the path length difference between the
arms of the depolariser.  Figure 4.13 shows the DOP measured as a function of the
analyser angle when the optical delay path between the two arms of the depolariser was
identical.  The two orthogonal polarisation components are still clearly visible and the
maximum residual DOP is 82%.  Figure 4.14 shows the DOP measured at an air gap
separation of 20 mm which corresponds to a temporal separation of about 97 ps
(refractive index of fibre core 1.4591 [29]) which is longer than the coherence time of
the laser source. This demonstrates that the ratio of the polarised light to the total light
intensity reduces to a value of about 11%.
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Figure 4.13. Degree of polarisation as function of analyser angle for a zero path
length difference in the compact depolariser.  DOP ≈ 82%.
Figure 4.14. Degree of polarisation as function of analyser angle for a 20 mm path
length difference in the compact depolariser.  DOP ≈ 11%.
152
Figure 4.15. The variation of the degree of polarisation (DOP) as a function the air
gap separation for a fixed analyser angle.
Figure 4.15 shows the variation of the degree of polarisation as a function of the air gap
separation when analysed using a polariser with a fixed angle.  At each delay position
the light intensity was observed to fluctuate between a maximum and a minimum value
when analysed with the polariser but this fluctuation ceased when the polariser was
removed as the light intensity was measured on a free space optical detector which was
insensitive to fluctuations in polarisation.  At an air gap separation of 0 mm, which
corresponds to a zero path length difference in the arms of the depolariser the light still
contains a large fraction of polarised light.  As the separation is increased the DOP
decreases and it reaches a minimum value when the separation is longer than the
coherence length which was calculated to be 5.5 mm when derived from the linewidth
of the source.  The coherence length can also be calculated from Figure 4.15 by using
the half-width at half maximum which gives a value of 5.1 mm [30].  Deviations from
the calculated value of 5.5 mm may be attributed to the finite number of points in Figure
4.15 when fitting the Gaussian linewidth and to the uncertainly in the measured value of
the linewidth of the source.
4.1.5 Security consideration of depolariser
The depolariser allows light propagating through standard telecommunication fibre to
be immune from birefringent effects in the fibre.  Polarised light travelling in this
channel would suffer a random evolution of its polarisation as a result of stress induced
changes in the intrinsic birefringence in the fibre [31], [32], [33], and thus would require
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active polarisation controllers at the receiver to ensure good interferometric visibility
[34].  When integrated into the QKD system in Alice, the depolariser generates
depolarised light which then travels through standard telecoms fibre and arrives at Bob
the receiver. In Bob a polarisation beam splitter acts as a random routing component
and it is by this method in which he randomly selects which basis set to make his
measurement in.  This method may produce a potential security loophole in which an
eavesdropper may be able to exploit.  If the eavesdropper was to intercept a photon
emitted from Alice and then resend the photon with a particular polarisation, it is
possible for her to force Bob to make a particular basis set measurement of her
choosing.  This would enable the adversary to gain additional information on the key.
A potential solution to this problem would be to introduce a second depolariser into Bob
before his polarisation beam splitter (PBS).  This would hopefully guarantee that any
light reaching Bob’s PBS is depolarised ensuring that his basis set selection is
completely random.
A design consideration which must be taken into account with the depolariser is its loss.
A high optical loss in such a component (~10 dB in the case of the compact depolariser)
in Alice is not a big issue when she is using a weak coherent source.  It is possible for
her to turn up her laser power to accommodate this loss but still ensuring a 0.1 mean
photon number per pulse leaving her system.  However if the depolariser were to be
placed into Bob’s apparatus then its loss would have a major bearing on the overall bit
rate for the QKD system.  In the next section a low loss Lyot depolariser is discussed
which can in some ways alleviate this problem.
4.1.6 Lyot depolariser
An alternative to the compact depolariser is to use an all fibre Lyot depolariser [35].  In
its original design conception in 1929 it consisted of two birefringent crystals with a 2:1
thickness ratio in which the optic axes are orientated at 45° to each other [36].  It was
designed originally to work with a broadband light source.  Depolarisation is produced
by the different wavelength components of the source suffering unequal phase
retardation as it travels through the crystal [37], [30].  The fibre Lyot depolariser works
in a similar fashion, the two birefringent crystals are replaced by two lengths of
polarisation maintaining (PM) fibre which are spliced together at an orientation of 45°
as shown in Figure 4.16.  The requirement of the fibres having a specification length
ratio is removed if the input light is polarised and aligned with the birefringent axis or
stress member of the input fibre [30].
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Figure 4.16. All fibre Lyot depolariser built from two polarisation maintaining fibre
spliced with their stress members at an angle of 45º.
The output degree of polarisation for the Lyot depolariser for a Gaussian spectral shape
is given by
2
( ) exp
2 ln 2
g zz
dwdtg
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Equation (4.8)
where dw  is the spectral half-width at half maximum, gdt  is the differential group
delay and z  is the length of the second jointed fibre [37].
Figure 4.17. The predicted degree of polarisation as a function of the distance which
was modelled using a half-width at half maximum dw  of 120.2 10´ Hz and a
differential group delay of 91.35 10-´ ns/m.
Figure 4.17 shows the effect of the spectral linewidth dw  of the source has on the
degree of polarisation.  It shows that the Lyot depolariser requires ever increasing
lengths of fibre to achieve the same degree of polarisation for narrower linewidth
sources.  The Lyot depolariser also suffers a potential security loophole which can be
exploited by an Eavesdropper.  Like in the case of the compact depolariser the ability of
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the PBS to act as a random routing component requires depolarised light at its input.
The DOP of the Lyot can be increased by an eavesdropper in an intercept-resend attack
by decreasing the spectral width of the light thereby having control over Bob’s basis set
measurement.  However, as in the case of many security loopholes, this issue may be
resolved if Bob monitors the coherence length of the source which can be measured
using interferometric techniques in which he adjusts the path length different to
determine the FWHM of the interferometric fringe pattern [38].
4.1.7 Effectiveness of the compact and Lyot depolariser
In an ideal situation when depolarised light is incident at the PBS in Bob it is randomly
routed into one of Bob’s two interferometers for his basis set measurement.  However
due to optical imperfections in the QKD system the light still possesses a residual
amount of polarisation and hence will affect the 50:50 splitting ratio at the PBS due to
polarisation fluctuations.  To test the effectiveness of each depolariser, polarised light
was passed through the depolariser and sent through the PBS.  The photon count rate on
the two output ports of the PBS (port 1 and port 2) was monitored using two single-
photon detectors.  Figure 4.18 shows the effectiveness of the all fibre Lyot depolariser
when its length was 100 metres.  Port 1 and port 2 show the count rate on the two output
ports of the PBS.  The symmetry of the photon count rate on the output of the PBS is
apparent.  As the photon count rate on port 1 increases the corresponding count rate on
port 2 decreases due to polarisation evolution of the light.  It is also possible to see a
direct correlation between the photon count rate, on both channels, with temperature.
When the temperature begins to increase or decrease a corresponding fluctuation in the
photon counts rates may be observed which suggests the primary source of polarisation
evolution is due to temperature variations in the environment.  Temperature sensors
were located both inside and outside the box containing Bob.  At a length of 100 metres
the Lyot depolariser was not particularly effective showing a residual DOP of about
25% as shown in Figure 4.18.  When this length was doubled to 200 metres a dramatic
reduction was observed in the DOP to about 7% shown in Figure 4.19.  At this length
the Lyot appears to be even more effective than the compact depolariser in Figure 4.20
which had a DOP of 10%.  The 200 m Lyot depolariser has also the added benefit for
having a loss of about 1.5 dB in comparison to about 10 dB for the compact depolariser.
When the depolariser was removed from the system and the PBS in Bob replaced by a
50:50 beamsplitter the recorded visibility of the interferometers dropped to 67% which
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is equivalent to a QBER contribution of 16.5% which demonstrates the effectiveness of
the depolariser and PBS arrangement.
Figure 4.18. The Lyot depolariser with 100 metre fibre length.  The left axis shows the
count rate as a fraction of the total count rate across both channels.  The photon count
rate is monitored on the two output ports of the PBS.  The right axis shows the
temperature fluctuations over the measurement.  The lowest standard deviation was
0.071 for a particular output port.  Residual DOP was about 25%.
Figure 4.19. The Lyot depolariser with 200 metre fibre length.  The left axis shows the
count as a fraction of the total count rate across both channels.  The photon count rate
is monitored on the two outputs of the PBS.  The right axis shows the temperature
fluctuations over the measurement.  The standard deviation was 0.0194.  Residual
DOP was about 7%.
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Figure 4.20. The compact depolariser.  The left axis shows the count as a fraction of
the total count rate across both channels.  The photon count rate is monitored on the
two outputs of the PBS.  The right axis shows the temperature fluctuations over the
measurement.  The standard deviation was 0.0278.  Residual DOP was about 10%.
4.1.8 Electronic and software for the QKS system
4.1.8.1 Time division demultiplexing
A key piece of hardware infrastructure is the conversion of the SPAD electrical signal to
a time of arrival of a photon.  The piece of electronic hardware which was used to time
tag the arrival times of the photon was a time interval analyser (TIA) GT685 [39].  The
GT586 has two independent timing inputs which poses a challenge for the implantation
of the BB84 protocol for QKD which encodes information using four phase or
polarisation states. This means that the timing information of four detectors is required
for the system described here.  The technique of time division multiplexing is used to
allow timing information from all four detectors when only two designated timing
inputs are available.  This is implemented by splitting the electrical signal from each of
the four detectors into two and then adding known delays of electrical cable into each
delay arm. Each half is then fed into a four input logic OR gate (Philips 755 Quad 4
logic gate) whose output is then fed into the two timing inputs channels of the TIA.  By
looking at the delays between the two channels allows knowledge of which detector
fired and its timing information. The process can be followed more closely in Figure
4.21. When the difference between the time tags on channel A and B is 0.8 ns then
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SPAD 1 fired and likewise SPAD 2, 3 and 4 are identified by timing delays of 1.6, 2.4
and 3.2 ns respectively.
Figure 4.21. Schematic for time division multiplexing.
By histogramming the timing difference between the time tags on channel A and B,
created when light is equally incident on all four SPADs, it is possible to observe four
peaks in the histogram corresponding to the four timing delays which have a full-width
at a hundredth-maximum of ~0.5 ns.  The increments of 0.8 ns in the timing delay for
each detector becomes more obvious from examining Figure 4.22.  A delay of 0.8 ns
means that the adjacent peaks are well separated temporally to avoid any ambiguity
about which detector fired because of the timing jitter of the detector.  The probability
that dark counts in the detectors could cause simultaneous clicks is negligible.  The joint
detection probability for two detectors is given by
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2:P t t t t I t I t t tD D = D D Equation (4.9)
where events occurs at times 1t  and 2t  in a window 1tD  and 2tD . ( )1 1I t  and ( )1 2I t  are
the instantaneous light intensities [40].  In the case of two detectors with dark count
rates 1N  and 2N , the probability of coincidence events in a time window tD  is given by
( ) 21 2P t N N t= D Equation (4.10)
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This probability already incorporates the dead time of the detector which is about 50 ns
for a Perkin Elmer Si-SPAD.  For a dark count rate of ~350 counts per second and a sub
nanosecond time window ( ) 0P t » .
Figure 4.22. The result of histogramming the difference between the time tags on
channel A and channel B on the time interval analyser card with equal light intensity
falls on all four detectors.  Four characteristic peaks are observed corresponding the
delays of 0.8, 1.6, 2.4 and 3.2 ns.
4.1.8.2 Generation of 4 states for the BB84 protocol
The implementation of the BB84 protocol for QKD requires that Alice randomly
encodes information using a “1” or a “0” chosen randomly from two basis sets.  For the
QKD system described here, this requires Alice being able to generate 4 different phase
states.  A pulse pattern generator (PPG) provides the electrical signal to the lithium
niobate (LiNbO3) phase modulator to generate the states.  The phase modulator works
via the electro-optic effect previously described in Chapter 3, whereby an applied
electric field can change the refractive index n  of the crystal thereby causing the speed
of light c  to vary according to c n .  The PPG has only two designated outputs which
requires that the outputs be electrically combined at the output in addition to using a
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data pattern the four voltages states can be produced.  Channel 1 is set to a voltage of
0.8 volts which produces a phase shift of 2p  and channel 2 is set to produce a voltage
of 1.6 volts which is the voltage required to produce a phase shift of p .  As shown in
Figure 4.23, by the choice of bit value being either on or off on channel 1 and channel 2,
the four states required can be generated.  The Avtech electrical power combiner
(Avtech AVX-CP-2) has an electrical loss of 3 dB [41] which means the maximum the
PPG can supply to the phase modulator through the combiner was 1.4 volts.  This
required that the output from the combiner be amplified using a Picoseconds Pulse Labs
amplifier (Model 5866) to produce 2.4 volts to create the final state.
Figure 4.23. Diagram showing how a four level voltage system can be generated
using a two output pulse pattern generator.
Figure 4.24 shows a typical electrical driving signal which is applied to the phase
modulator to generate the four states.  Electrical ringing can be observed in the signal
especially when the voltage is being changed from a high to a low level.  The amplitude
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jitter can be as much as 8% of the voltage amplitude leading to phase encoding errors
which will be described in more detail in section 4.2.1.
Figure 4.24. Graph showing a typical electrical driving signal to the phase modulator using a
four level pseudo-random signal.
4.1.8.3 Pattern Matching
A 10 MHz Rubidium frequency (Novatech 2960 AR) standard acted as the master clock
for the system and was used to the clock the Agilent 81134A pulse pattern generator
(PPG).  The frequency standard uses the hyperfine transition of electrons in an atom of
Rb-87 to control the frequency.  The ground state hyperfine splitting frequency is
683468261090429 Hz [42].  The output is used to apply an external clock signal for the
internal phase lock loop in the PPG and also the time stamping card to ensure all
devices are correctly synchronised.  The PPG was then used to provide the 1 GHz
electrical signal to drive the VCSEL and also to provide the 1 GHz signal to the lithium
niobate phase modulator crystal.  In QKD Alice sends encoded photons at precise time
intervals to Bob who then detects the photon using a single-photon avalanche
photodiode (SPAD).  For final key generation to be successful it is necessary that when
Bob records a photon event he must know precisely from what position in Alice’s bit
pattern the photon was sent.  This synchronisation is often provided by a bright light
pulse [43], [44] or by clock signals derived from the global positioning system (GPS)
[45].  The approach adopted here is to use software synchronisation [46], [47] which
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has the added benefit of not requiring additional synchronisation hardware.  A
pseudorandom bit sequence (PRBS) known to both parties can be used to synchronise
Alice’s and Bob’s clock using pattern recognition techniques [48], [49].  The clock rate
of the system is 1 GHz which means that Alice emits a photon at an integer times the
clock period.  Bob’s rate of detector clicks will be dramatically reduced by the
transmission distance, his detection efficiency and his measurement apparatus loss.
Figure 4.25 shows a histogram of the photon arrival times at Bob when Alice sends a 32
bit pseudorandom pattern (00100100011101100110110010110011) that is used for
synchronisation.  The non-interfering pulses are still visible and are temporally gated in
software as shown in Figure 4.26.
Figure 4.25. Histogram of a 32 bit, pseudo-random bit pattern sent by Alice.  The non-
interfering pulses are still visible.
The first bit in this pattern is not necessary the first bit sent from Alice.  Due to the
transit time of a photon traveling through the system the position of the first bit in
Alice’s pattern can be randomly distributed along the entire bit length of the pattern.  In
an ideal case the length of the bit pattern should be longer than the time it takes a
photon to travel from Alice to Bob thereby eliminating the chances of more than one
repeat of the pattern being in transit at any given time. A similar technique is used to
avoid range ambiguity in time-of-flight laser ranging systems [50].  The software
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operates as follows; a series of n  windows ( n  is the length of the PRBS) of width TD
and spaced by the clock period of the laser source is opened on the time tags recorded
by Bob.  The time tags which fall into each of the n  windows are then rounded down to
the nearest integer number corresponding to the clock period and a modular division by
the length of the data pattern is performed. This essentially converts each recorded time
tag to a bit timing position recorded by Bob.  Alice and Bob already know the bit
sequence for synchronisation and then compare their bit values and compute the QBER.
Due to the transmission distance and the random time at which Bob’s time stamping
card starts acquiring data there will be an offset between Alice’s and Bob’s bit pattern.
For a pseudorandom pattern in which Alice’s sent pattern and Bob’s received pattern
are not synchronised correctly the QBER should be approximately 50%.  In the case
where there is no synchronisation Bob then increments each of his recorded bit times by
one position and repeats the comparison with Alice.  This procedure is repeated 1n -
times.  The result of this process is shown in Figure 4.27.  At one position the QBER
reduces dramatically which indicates that Alice’s and Bob’s pattern have been correctly
locked.  The whole procedure can be thought of as a correlation between Alice’s and
Bob’s signals.
Figure 4.26. Histogram of the time of arrival of photons sent by Alice.  The non-
interfering pulses have been temporally gated using software control making the
PRBS of 00100100011101100110110010110011 more distinguishable.
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Figure 4.27. Output from the program to synchronise Alice’s and Bob’s clocks.  When
the value of Bob’s timing bits are offset by 6 bits in this example there is a dramatic
reduction in the QBER enabling a synchronisation between Bob’s and Alice’s clocks.
4.2 Results and theoretical evaluation of QKD system
The QKD system described in this chapter was tested with a variety of single-photon
detectors which have reasonably good detection efficiencies at a wavelength of 850 nm.
The characteristics of these detectors have a significant bearing on the overall system
performance of the QKD system in which they are used.  A number of previous
demonstrations of QKD at a wavelength of 850 nm have used thick junction Si-SPADs
as the detectors [44], [51].  These detectors have the advantage of having good
detections efficiencies of about 40% at this wavelength but they do suffer from a
relatively long timing jitter with a full-width at half maximum of about 400 ps.  This
timing jitter can lead to temporal intersymbol interference especially when the system is
operated at clock rates in excess of 1-2 GHz [52].  This results in photons being
recorded in successive bit periods as the timing jitter can exceed the clock period.  Thin,
or shallow, junction Si-SPADs have the benefit of shorter duration FWHM timing jitters
of about 70 ps but can exhibit long tails in their timing profile caused by relatively slow
diffusion of photo-generated carriers into the device multiplication region [53].  These
diffusion tails can be characterised by the full-width at 10th-maximum (FW10%M) and
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full-width at 100th-maximum (FW1%M) timing jitters, and can be observed in the
timing histograms shown in Figure 4.28 and shown numerically in Table 4.1.  These
thin junction detectors generally have reduced detection efficiencies of <10% at this
wavelength.
Figure 4.28. The normalised instrument responses for the specific detectors when used
in the QKD system.  The dashed lines represent a piecewise exponential fit used in the
theoretical model.  (SSPD is the single-photon superconducting nanowire detector)
The detection efficiency of a thin junction Si-SPAD may be improved without
compromising the temporal response and dark count rate by the use of a resonant cavity
to increase the effective interaction length for absorption of incident photons [54].  The
lower mirror of the resonant cavity is formed by the two layers of buried SiO2 in the
silicon substrate, and the upper mirror is formed by the silicon/air interface.  The upper,
low-doped p-epilayer contains the active n+p-junction of the detector with an active area
of 20 µm diameter.  The complete epilayer structure had a thickness of 5 µm.  In Figure
4.28 it can be seen that the resonant cavity and the thin junction Si-SPAD from Micro
Photon Devices (MPD) have a very similar instrument response.  Both of these devices
have a similar structure but the MPD detector was grown on an all-silicon substrate
without a cavity.
The rapid development of single-photon superconducting nanowire detectors (SSPD) in
recent years has seen them being used in many quantum information applications [55],
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[56].  These detectors are based around a thin, narrow strip of a superconducting
material such as niobium nitride which is biased at close to the critical current while
cooled to a temperature of 3 K; a temperature which is below the superconducting
transition temperature.  An incident photon creates a resistive hotspot as the current
density in parts of the nanowire exceeds the critical level, which leads to a readily
detectable current pulse.  The thin junction Si-SPADs and the SSPD exhibit comparable
FWHM timing jitters but unlike Si-SPADS, SSPDs have an approximately Gaussian
temporal response, as can be seen in Figure 4.28.  An SSPD can be operated at a
number of different bias currents. As the bias current is increased the detection
efficiency increases but at the expense of a higher dark count rate (DCR).  The SSPDs
used in this chapter had a detection efficiency of ~10% for light at a wavelength of 850
nm and a DCR level of ~10 counts per second.  The benefit of using SSPDs has already
been demonstrated at GHz clock rates in various QKD demonstrations at wavelengths
of 1550 nm [56] and full field-tests on installed optical fibre [57].
Type Detector
Dark Count
Rate
(per second)
Detection
Efficiency
(%)
FWHM
(ps)
FW10%
M (ps)
FW1%M
(ps)
After
pulsing
probability
Thick-
Junction
Si-SPAD
Perkin
Elmer 198 42 432 837 1473 0.5%
Thin
Junction
Si-SPAD
MPD 200 8.4 71 276 898 3%
IDQ 15 1.6 63 193 1245 3%
Resonant
Cavity 21 18 74 271 913 2%
NbN SSPD
Nanowire
SSPD 10 10 62 120 196 -
Table 4.1. The characteristic parameters of the specific detectors when used at a
wavelength of 850 nm in the QKD system.
The QKD system was operated using a 180 µm active area diameter PerkinElmer
SPCM AQR 12 thick junction Si-SPAD [58], a 20 µm active area diameter thin junction
MPD PDM CCTC Si-SPAD [59], a 50 µm active area diameter IDQ id100-MMF50
thin junction CMOS Si-SPAD [60], an experimental 20 µm diameter active area
resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD [54] and a niobium nitride (NbN) nanowire
meander line superconducting single-photon detector (SSPD) with a meander area of 20
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µm by 20 µm and a fill factor of 50% [61].  The semiconductor detectors were peltier
cooled to an operating temperature in the range ~230 K to ~260 K while the SSPD
operated at a temperature of 3 K in a closed-cycle refrigerator [62].
4.2.1 Theoretical model
A theoretical model of the system was developed to predict the QBER, raw photon flux
recorded by Bob (raw bit-rate, RBR), the time and basis set sifted photon flux (sifted
bit-rate, SBR) and final key generation rate.  Although applied specifically to the
experimental QKD system described in this chapter, this model can be adapted for use
with other QKD systems.
The  raw  bit  rate  ( RawR ) can be calculated from the clock frequency (n ), the mean
photon number per pulse ( m ), the length of the fibre ( FibreL ), the per unit attenuation of
the fibre ( 0.603Fibrea = at a wavelength of 850 nm), the transmission coefficient of Bob
( 0.22Boba = ), the detection efficiency of the single-photon detector ( Detectiona )  and  the
dark count rate of the detector ( DarkR ):
( ) ( )( )etFibreLRaw Fibre D ection DarkR Rn m a a= × × × + Equation (4.11)
This calculation can be adapted for a system employing decoy states by replacing the
constant m  term with a term which describes the variance in the mean photon number.
The sifted bit rate (SBR) after time filtering and a random basis set choice ( ( )SiftedR TD )
is calculated as
( ) ( )Sifted Protocol Raw SystemR T R I TaD = × × D Equation (4.12)
where Protocola  is the protocol loss (which is equal to 12  for the BB84 protocol) and TD
is the duration of the gate used for temporal filtering. ( )SystemI TD  is the fraction of
counts that are retained after temporal filtering, which depends on both the duration of
the filtering gate and the system detector response function. ( )SystemI TD  was modelled
from an instrument response of the laser output as recorded by the detector and time-
stamping electronics.  The experimental system operates at a clock rate of 1 GHz,
meaning that for the Si-SPAD detectors there is still a significant degree of temporal
intersymbol interference.  This is modelled by constructing a temporal probability
distribution function ( ArrivalP ) for the incoming photons based on the instrument
response of the system for a particular detector and the four possible paths which a
photon may take through the QKD system.  In the phase-basis set system described here
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a photon can arrive at the detector having taken one of four possible paths, the short arm
in Alice and the short arm in Bob, the delay arm in Alice and the delay arm in Bob, the
short arm in Alice and the delay arm in Bob or the delay arm in Alice and the short arm
in Bob.  The first two possible paths do not experience interference and do not
contribute to the secure key and are time-gated out of the measurement analysis.
However, the diffusion tails on the temporal response of the Si-SPAD detectors may
cause photons which have taken these non-interfering paths to be detected during the
gate assigned to the following interfering path.  The time delay between the short and
delayed paths in Alice and Bob is set to be 500 ps so that the non-interfering pulses are
equally time spaced from the preceding and following interfering pulses.  This means
that over a periodic signal, the pulses from the short in Alice and delay in Bob path are
superimposed on those from the delay in Alice and short in Bob path.  The maximum
clock rate of the QKD system is limited by temporal intersymbol interference resulting
from the diffusion tails of photons following the non-interfering paths.  QKD systems
which operate using different techniques for basis set measurements (e.g. those not
using matched interferometer delays or those using polarisation basis sets) will have a
different temporal probability distribution which can be modelled in a similar way.
Figure 4.29 shows ArrivalP  for an MPD detector and can be considered a probability
distribution of the possible times at which a photon from a single pulse may reach the
detector.  Therefore
( )
max 2
max 2
12
0
1
T
T
t
System Arrival
t
Arrival
I T P dt
P dtn
D+
D-
D = × ò
ò
Equation (4.13)
where maxt  is as defined in Figure 4.29 and ArrivalP  is defined for a duration of 2 n .  The
probability distribution ArrivalP  is formed using a system instrument response, such as
those shown in Figure 4.28.  To reduce the effects of noise on the signal, the instrument
response was modelled as ResponseD  using a piecewise exponential representation[63]
whose form is given by Equation (4.14).
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Equation (4.14)
where 2s  is the variance of the Gaussian region, 1C , 2C , 3C  and 4C  are multiplicative
constants, 0t  is the time of the maximum count return in the peak and 0t , 1t  , 2t , 3t  and
4t  are the points at which the transitions between functions occur.  These values are
calculated using an iterative Levenberg–Marquardt algorithm [64].  The SSPD was
modelled using the Gaussian term alone, with no need for the exponentials which define
the diffusion tail.  The fits resulting from this model are shown by the dashed lines in
Figure 4.28 and the fitting parameters are shown in Table 4.2.
The parameters used for the piecewise exponential fits on the instrument responses are
listed in Table 4.2.  The parameter 0t  defines the peak position of the instrument
response so the transition points are quoted in Table 4.2 with respect to this parameter.
To construct ArrivalP , the piecewise fit ResponseD  was plotted at each of the possible time-
periods at which a photon could arrive at a detector with the amplitude dependent on the
relative loss of the path taken, as shown in Figure 4.29 for the MPD Si-SPAD (blue).
The simulated trace from an SSPD (red) is shown for illustrative purposes. ArrivalP  then
is the summation of the different overlapping ResponseD  functions for a particular
detector, as indicated by the grey dashed line in Figure 4.29 for the MPD Si-SPAD.
ArrivalP  is periodic and detectors tails exiting the graph at 2 n  re-enter at zero time.  The
function ArrivalP  will change for other QKD systems but using the principle described
here allows other systems to be modelled in a similar fashion treating the arrival time of
the photon as a probabilistic event.
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Detector
t1 - t0
(ps)
t2 - t0
(ps)
t3 - t0
(ps)
t4 - t0
(ps)
τ1
(ps)
τ2
(ps)
τ3
(ps)
τ4
(ps)
σ
(ps)
Thick Junction
Si-SPAD PerkinElmer 240 350 636.5 940 151.7 144.15 270.54 603.7 125
Thin Junction
Si-SPAD
MPD 36.3 56.3 104.3 626.3 42 83.75 225.64 291.6 21
IDQ 37 98 668 1070 33 413 1076 1296 20
Resonant
Cavity 20 70 120 420 39.63 118.6 270.6 347.9 17
NbN
Superconducting
Nanowire
SSPD — — — — — — — — 69.5
Table 4.2. The parameters used in the piecewise exponential fits to the instrument
responses shown in Figure 4.28 and the coefficient of determination and goodness of
fit of the resulting fits.
Type Detector C1 C2 C3 C4
Coefficient of
Determination
r2
Goodness of Fit
χ2
Thick Junction
Si-SPAD PerkinElmer 1.5×10
3 2.5×103 13 0.25 0.997 1.00
Thin Junction
Si-SPAD
MPD 2.7×1010 0.91×105 23 4.5 0.998 1.00
IDQ 1.4×1013 0.85 0.07 0.05 0.946 1.00
Resonant
Cavity 3×10
8 2×102 2.82 1.1 0.985 1.00
NbN
Superconducting
Nanowire
SSPD — — —  — 1.00 1.00
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Figure 4.29. The probability distribution for the theoretical model of the expected
arrival time of the photon.  The red curves are the results obtained by simulating a
histogram of a 1010 repetitive sequence on one SSPD.  The blue curves are the
individual detector response for each peak simulated using an MPD detector.  The
grey curve is the summation of the individual blue MPD detector curves, indicating
the intersymbol interference.  All curves are created using the piecewise exponential
model.  The probability distribution is periodic and curves which have not reached
zero by the maximum time will re-enter the graph at minimum time and continue to
decay until they reach zero.  This probability distribution can be adapted for any QKD
system by considering the shape of the entire system response over one clock period.
The definition of ArrivalP  given in Figure 4.29 considers perfect interferometric visibility
and therefore perfect destructive interference at time mint .  Any counts observed in the
temporal gate between min 2t T-D and min 2t T+ D  are, provided TD is short relative to
the clock period, caused by intersymbol interference.
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Calculation of a final secure bit rate requires calculation of the QBER.  In a generic
QKD system, the QBER can be expressed as containing contributions from the
decoding of the quantum states (measurement at Bob), errors in the encoding of the
states at Alice, the dark counts of the detector and the timing jitter of the complete
system:
Jittertotal Decoding encoding DarkQBER QBER QBER QBER QBER= + + + Equation (4.15)
Each term can be calculated once the characteristic parameters of the system are known
which allows the final QBER to be calculated.  The term DecodingQBER  is caused by the
classical visibility of the interferometers which make up Alice and Bob and can be
expressed as [65]:
1
2
Visibility
DecodingQBER
J-= Equation (4.16)
where visibilityJ  is the classical visibility expressed as a fraction.  This was measured to be
0.98, which indicates that the contribution to the QBER from the visibility is 1%.  In a
fully optimised system based on double asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers it is
possible to reduce this contribution to less than 0.1% [66].  This may be achieved using
a narrower linewidth source such as a distributed feedback laser (DFB) which can
typically have a linewidth in the MHz region [67].  In a polarisation basis set QKD
system, like the one described in Chapter 3, this term can be calculated from the
extinction ratio of Bob's polarisation analysers.  The term EncodingQBER  defines the
contribution to the QBER caused by errors in Alice's encoding of the quantum states on
the photons.  In this system it is due to phase jitter in Alice's modulator which can be
modelled as [68]:
2
2
1 1 cos
2Encoding
QBER d
f
f
f ff
D+
D-
-= D ò Equation (4.17)
where fD  is the variation in phase caused by the modulator.  The driving electronics
for the phase modulator, which include PPG jitter and amplifier jitter, were found to
have an amplitude jitter of 354 mV, corresponding to a fD  of 0.69 rad and a
contribution to the QBER from phase jitter of 1%.  In a polarisation basis set system this
term can be calculated from the polarisation jitter in Alice's polarisation modulator if an
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active scheme is used, or the extinction ratio of her polarisers if a passive scheme is
used.
The contribution to the total QBER caused by the dark count rate of the detector
becomes more significant at longer transmission distances when the photon flux
reaching Bob is greatly reduced.  This contribution can be calculated via:
( )
Protocol
1
2 Dark
Dark
Sifted
T R
QBER
R T
a u× × ×D ×
= D Equation (4.18)
When the dark count events are histogrammed the events are randomly and evenly
distributed across the entire histogram range.
Calculation of JitterQBER  requires the model developed in Figure 4.29.  The value for
JitterQBER  is given by the ratio of the probability of finding a photon in the gate around
the minimum (destructive interference) position to the sum of this probability of finding
a photon in maximum (constructive interference) and minimum position (i.e. total
number of photons in the timing gates).
min
min
min max
min max
2
2
2 2
2 2
Tt
Arrival
Tt
Jitter T Tt t
Arrival Arrival
T Tt t
P dt
QBER
P dt P dt
D+
D-
D D+ +
D D- -
=
+
ò
ò ò
Equation (4.19)
The theoretical model predicts the best QBER that may be obtained from an
experimental system and does not take into account time-varying changes in the
alignment which can lead to fluctuations in the observed values of QBER.  These
fluctuations are stochastic in nature and the precise QBER at a particular time cannot be
determined from the model.  An upper bound on the QBER will occur when the
alignment drifts to the point where the phase states are out of phase.
Calculation of the final secure bit rate must take into account the error correction which
will be required to generate a final, secure key [69].  The exact fraction of sifted bits
used in the generation of the secure key depends on the algorithm employed, but all
commonly employed QKD error correction algorithms [70] and security analysis have a
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strong logarithmic dependence on QBER.  From work published by Gottesman, Lo,
Lütkenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) the net bit rate ( )NetR TD  can be calculated as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 1
Total
net p Total p Sifted
QBERR T f H QBER f H R Tæ öæ öD = -D - × - × - D × × Dç ÷ç ÷- Dè øè ø
Equation (4.20)
where ( )2H x  is the binary entropy function [71] given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2log 1 log 1H x x x x x= - × - - × - Equation (4.21)
pf  is the efficiency of the error correction protocol relative to the Shannon limit (for the
Cascade error correction protocol [69] pf  has a value of 1.16) and D  is the fraction of
pulses intercepted by an eavesdropper.  In the analysis presented here this is given by:
2
2
mD » Equation (4.22)
for a weak coherent pulsed source.  This analysis does not consider the photon number
splitting attack which for a weak coherent source the m  value must be reduced
according to the channel loss.  For a full analysis Equation (4.22) must be modified to
become
M
D
p
p
D = Equation (4.23)
where Mp  is the probability of Alice emitting a multiphoton pulse and Dp  is the
fraction of the pulses which has been detected at Bob.  The value Dp  takes into account
the loss of the quantum channel in addition to inefficiencies in Bob’s detectors.  In an
ideal photon number splitting attack Eve replaces the transmission link with a lossless
channel and only allows multiphoton pulses to be sent to Bob, after keeping one photon
for herself.  Figure 4.30 shows the key generation rate when a full GLLP security
analysis is applied for QKD systems operating at wavelengths of 1550, 1310 and 850
nm using the same detection efficiency.  The higher transmission loss at a wavelength
of 850 nm in telecommunication fibre limits its range to about 2 km while at 1550 nm
that distance can be extended to just over 30 km.
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Figure 4.30. The key generation is shown for a wavelength of 1550 nm, 1310 nm and
850 nm using a full GLLP analysis.  The attenuation per km of telecoms fibre at
wavelengths of 1550, 1310 and 850 nm are 0.22, 0.35 and 2.2 dB/km respectively.
The values used in the model have been taken from Gobby et al.’s system operating at
a wavelength of 1550 nm[66].  For the purposes of comparing the key generation rate
at the different wavelengths the same detector efficiency is used and QBER values.  At
1550 nm key generation is successful up to about 30 km, however the higher
attenuation of optical fibres at 850 nm means that key generation using the full GLLP
analysis is only successful about up to two kilometres.
4.2.2 GHz phase basis set QKD results
The performance of the QKD system described can be tested with a variety of fibre
connectorised detectors as required.  This allows a quantitative comparison of how the
characteristic of a given detector can affect a QKD system.  Figure 4.31 and Figure 4.32
show the lowest experimentally recorded quantum bit error rate (QBER) and
corresponding net bit rate (NBR) for the five different detectors employed.  The dashed
lines in both figures show the results of the theoretical model when applied to the five
detectors and Table 4.2 quantifies the quality of the theory model.
Table 4.3 shows the contributions to the QBER due to detector timing jitter.  Due to the
availability of optical fibre, a calibrated optical attenuator was used to simulate real
fibre.
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The shape of the QBER graph is primarily determined by the timing jitter profile, dark
count rate and the detection efficiency of the detector.  The thick junction PerkinElmer
Si-SPAD exhibits a baseline QBER of about 7.2% which is higher than those observed
when using the thin junction SPADs.  The instrument response of the thick junction Si-
SPAD shows a FWHM of 432 ps in comparison to ~67 ps for the thin junction Si-
SPADs.  Consequently there is a higher possibility of photons being time tagged in an
incorrect window thereby increasing the QBER.  If the instrument response is
considered as a probability distribution of arrival time for the photon then it can be seen
that a longer FWHM timing jitter will have a greater effect on the QBER than a longer
FW10%M.  Using detectors with comparable FWHM timing jitters, a longer FW10%M
will lead to an increase in QBER.  The higher baseline QBER obtained using the IDQ
Si-SPAD in comparison to the MPD Si-SPAD, which both have a similar FWHM is
partially due to the longer FW10%M and partially due to the much lower detection
efficiency of the IDQ detector of 1.6% compared to the MPD detector efficiency of
8.4%.  Although they both have similar FWHM timing jitter, the resonant cavity Si-
SPAD exhibits a baseline QBER of 4% while the SSPD exhibits a baseline QBER of
2%.  This is mainly due to the tail present in the temporal response of the resonant
cavity Si-SPAD which is completely absent in the SSPD response.
Following basis set reconciliation defined in the BB84 protocol to produce the sifted
key, the detected photon events are temporally filtered to reduce the effect of dark
counts using a gate of 100 ps duration centered on the most probable detection time.
Figure 4.31 shows the variation in the NBR with transmission distance for each of the
detectors used.  The superior timing resolution of the SSPD of 196 ps FW1%M
compared to 913 ps FW1%M for the resonant cavity Si-SPAD means that the NBR for
the SSPD was larger even though its detection efficiency was 10% compared to 18% for
the resonant cavity device. As a consequence of the lower overall QBER values
obtained for the SSPD and the relatively high defection efficiency and good timing
resolution for the resonant cavity Si-SPAD, these detectors gave the highest NBRs
compared to the other detectors.
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Figure 4.31. The highest bit rate obtained against distance for the 5 detectors used.
The dashed lines show the predictions made by the theoretical model.
Figure 4.32. The lowest QBER obtained against distance for the 5 detectors.  The
dashed lines show the predictions made by the theoretical model.
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Type Detector QBERJitter (%)
Thick Junction Si-SPAD PerkinElmer 6.0
Thin Junction
Si-SPAD
MPD 2.9
IDQ 2.5
Resonant Cavity 3.3
NbN Superconducting Nanowire SSPD 0.0
Table 4.3. The quantum bit error rate due to detector timing jitter ( JitterQBER ) for the
detectors presented in this Chapter.
4.2.3 Effect of temporal gate on the QBER and NBR
To minimise the effects of dark counts in the system a temporal window is opened on
the expected time of arrival of a photon.  The duration of this window can affect the
QBER and NBR from the system.  The PerkinElmer thick junction Si-SPAD has a
FWHM timing jitter of 432 ps which exceeds the TD  temporal gate duration of 100 ps
and results in some temporal filtering of the raw detector events.  Figure 4.33 shows the
effect of varying the gate duration on both the QBER and NBR.
Figure 4.33. The effect of varying , the gate duration, on the PerkinElmer thick-
junction Si-SPAD.
TD
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Increasing the gate duration increases the counts within both the min 2t T± D  and
max 2t T± D  temporal windows.  Increasing the duration of TD increases the effect of
intersymbol interference which leads to increase in the baseline QBER. In the case of
the NBR an increase in the temporal window increases the counts included in the
min 2t T± D  and max 2t T± D  temporal windows.  However an indefinite increase in TD
does not necessarily lead to ever increasing NBR values as the QBER rises with longer
duration TD , as observed in the case of the 150 ps temporal window where the
reduction in the NBR is due to the higher QBER for this TD .
4.2.4 Long term stability results
To demonstrate the long term stability of the QKD system, it was left to run
continuously for a period of 24 hours fully autonomously and without operator
intervention using the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD and SSPD detectors.
During this period, the bit rates and QBER were automatically recorded and are shown
in Figure 4.34 and Figure 4.35 for the resonant cavity device.  A fixed fibre distance of
2 km was used throughout these measurements.  The system was operated in enclosed
aluminium boxes which help to maintain the stability of the interferometers in a
laboratory.  Air conditioning maintained the temperature of the laboratory to within
±2.5 °C.  The mean NBR was 7.75 kbits s-1 (excluding the tuning phases), the mean
QBER was 6.9% and the system was transmitting key for 68% of the duration of the
experiment.  When the SSPD was operated the mean NBR was 17.6 kbits s-1 (excluding
the tuning phases), the mean QBER was 3.49% and the system was transmitting key for
82% of the duration of the experiment.  The insert in Figure 4.34 shows the voltage
applied to the piezo electric actuator located in the vernier mechanism in the airgap in
Bob over the first 6 hours operation.  Custom tuning software adjusts this voltage to
compensate for path length drift due to environmental fluctuations.  The SSPD gave
superior average NBR and lower average QBER values over the resonant cavity device.
Although part of this is explained by the lower QBER values resulting from the superior
timing resolution of the SSPD, part of it is due to the time duration in which the system
was transmitting key.  The run with the SSPD was stable for 82% of the time but this is
in no way dependent on the detector choice but on the random variations in temperature
and air currents in the laboratory from day to day which can destabilise the
interferometers.
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Figure 4.34. The QBER against time for 24 hour fully automated operation of the
environmentally robust QKD system using the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD.
When the QBER exceeded a threshold value, automatic tuning was initiated, as
indicated by the red points in the top graph, and key generation was temporarily
halted as the air gaps were adjusted to minimise the QBER.  The insert shows the
applied voltage to the piezoelectric controlled adjustable air gap for tuning.  The flat
parts of the trace represent times when the interferometers are stable and the applied
voltage does not need to vary.  To go from destructive interference to constructive
interference required the voltage applied to the piezo actuator to change by about 2.8
volts.  The average voltage change that needed to be applied to tune the
interferometer was 0.24 volts.
Figure 4.35. The NBR against time for 24 h fully automated operation of the
environmentally robust QKD system using the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD.
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4.2.5  Predictions of future system performance with detector improvements
Since the first observations of single-photon pulses in avalanche photodiode biased
above breakdown in the 1970s [72] there has been rapid progress over the years.  Efforts
have been made at understanding how the device geometry and the readout electronics
can affect the overall performance of the detector with the aim of making
improvements.  The long tail in the instrumental response of the Si-SPADs, due to
minority carriers drifting from the neutral region into the active region can be reduced
or eliminated by altering the detector structure.  Double epitaxial structures like the one
shown in Figure 4.36 have been grown in which the active junction is built in the p-
epilayer and the substrate/epistrate np junction is at zero or reverse bias.  Electrons
which have been photo-generated in the substrate are not able to reach the epilayer.  The
substrate/epistrate junctions are in competition with the active junction in collecting the
electrons generated in the neutral p-epilayer which helps reduce the diffusion tail effect
in the instrumental response function.
Figure 4.36. Schematic cross section of a planar epitaxial device developed by Cova
et al. [73].
The FWHM timing jitter of a PerkinElmer thick junction Si-SPAD can be reduced by
modifying the pulse readout electronics within the detector module which makes it
possible to extract the avalanche current from the detector without affecting the initial
rise time [74].  This modified circuit reduces the FWHM of the detector without
affecting the dark count rate or detection efficiency.  The shortest unmodified
PerkinElmer Si-SPAD FWHM reported in the literature, was by Restelli et al. in  a
previous free-space GHz clock rate QKD system demonstration, was 350 ps, which
decreased to 200 ps after circuit modification [75].  This modified detector had similar
detection efficiency to the thick-junction detector used in these experiments.  With these
improvements in detector timing resolution and future possible developments, a
prediction of how the QKD system would perform in this scenario has been made.
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The theoretical model was used to calculate the total QBER for the detector used by
Restelli et al. in its initial and modified state if it had been possible to use it in the QKD
system described in this chapter.  In modelling the QKD system performance it was
assumed that the detector of Restelli et al. exhibited the same DCR and FW10%M and
FW1%M as the thick junction Si-SPAD used experimentally in this chapter.  A detector
with a FWHM jitter of 390 ps was also modelled, which was chosen as halfway
between the FWHM of the unmodified PerkinElmer Si-SPAD used experimentally and
the unmodified PerkinElmer Si-SPAD of Restelli et al.  The theoretically predicted
QBER values and NBR are shown in Figure 4.37, along with the experimentally
observed QBER for the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD and the SSPD as
performance indicators.  The FWHM of the unmodified PerkinElmer Si-SPAD used in
the QKD system is comparable to the time delay of 500 ps between interfering and non-
interfering paths introduced by the path length difference in the interferometers.  As the
FWHM is reduced, the effect of temporal intersymbol interference is reduced, thus
lowering the QBER.
Figure 4.37. Theoretical model results for a PerkinElmer thick junction Si-SPAD with
identical efficiency and dark count rate, but with varying FWHM durations of 200ps, 350ps
and 390ps.  This is compared to the theoretical and experimental results obtained with the
detector jitter of FWHM of 432 ps.  The FWHM of 200 ps was chosen as it represents the
lowest timing jitter of such a thick junction detector in a QKD system found in the literature
[76].  The grey dotted line indicates the theoretical fit to the experimental results for the
resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD and the green dotted line is theoretical fit for the SSPD.
Hollow data points represent the experimentally recorded values for the PerkinElmer thick
junction Si-SPAD with a FWHM timing jitter of 432 ps, the SSPD and the resonant cavity thin
junction Si-SPAD.
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The detector temporal response affects the baseline QBER as higher values of the
FWHM lead to greater levels of intersymbol interference and a greater contribution to
the overall QBER from Equation (4.19).  The sifted bit rate (SBR) also increases due to
higher probability of photons arriving in the 100 ps time gate.  From Equation (4.12) it
can be observed that ( )SystemI TD  acts as a scaling factor between the raw bit rate and the
sifted bit rate and the resultant values
for are shown in Table 4.4.  The grey dotted line in Figure 4.37 shows the theoretical fit
to the experimental results for the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD and the green
dotted line shows the theoretical fit to the experimental results for the SSPD.
Timing Jitter
FWHM (ps)
(%)
432 0.10 6.0
390 0.11 4.6
300 0.12 4.2
250 0.17 2.5
Table 4.4. The effect of altering the FWHM timing jitter of a PerkinElmer thick
junction Si-SPAD. ( )SytemI TD is the scaling factor from the raw bit rate and the
sifted bit rate, as can be seen from Equation 5.2. The resulting quantum bit error
rates (QBERs) are shown in Figure 5. TD , the duration of the temporal gate, was
100 ps.
Thin junction Si-SPADs typically exhibit long diffusion tails in the instrument response
due to carrier pairs being photo-generated outside the detector depletion region and
slowly diffusing into the depletion region [77].  It is possible to reduce the duration of
these diffusion tails by altering the microstructure geometry.  The piecewise exponential
model for the system instrument response presented in Equation (4.14) allows a
prediction of how Si-SPADs with different diffusion tails would affect the performance
of the QKD system.  For comparison purposes, the thick junction Si-SPAD was also
subjected to the same modelling approach.
The t  values presented in Table 4.2 were scaled to 90%, 80% and 70% of the original
values to simulate shorter decay tails and the resulting QBERs and NBRs are shown in
( )TISystem D JitterQBER
184
Figure 4.38 and Figure 4.39 respectively.  As the duration of the diffusion tail is
decreased, the contribution to the overall QBER from intersymbol interference (
JitterQBER  in Equation (4.15)) decreases.  This leads to a reduction in the overall
modelled QBER and a corresponding increase in the NBR.
Figure 4.38. Results from the theoretical model showing the effects on the QBER of
altering the decay tails of the instrumental responses of the Si-SPADs by changing the
t  values in the piecewise exponential fit model of Equation (4.14). The t  values
were reduced relative to the values quoted in Table 4.2 as denoted by the scaling
factors.
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Figure 4.39. Results from the theoretical model showing the effects on the net bit rate
(NBR) of altering the decay tails of the instrument responses of the Si-SPADs by
changing the t  values in the piecewise exponential fit model of Equation (4.14).  The
t  values were reduced relative to the values quoted in Table 4.2, as denoted by the
scaling factors.
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A reduction of the diffusion tail fit t  values to 70% of the experimental values lowers
the QBER which could be obtained with the resonant cavity Si-SPAD to the same value
as were achieved with the SSPD. The net bit rate has increased over that which was
obtained with the original t  values and as a result is higher than that achieved with the
SSPD.  A comparison of Figure 4.37 and Figure 4.39 shows that were the PerkinElmer
thick junction Si-SPAD with a 200 ps FWHM temporal response to be used in the QKD
system it would produce very similar net bit rates as a 70% tail resonant cavity thin
junction Si-SPAD with approximately the same QBER at distances of up to 10 km.  At
distances longer than 10 km the QBER rises rapidly for 200 ps FWHM PerkinElmer
thick junction Si-SPAD and the net bit rate suffers a corresponding rapid decrease with
transmission distance.
4.2.6 Modelling effect of varying the clock frequency on QKD system parameters
If it can be assumed that the characteristic parameters of the system such as the
instrument response and uncertainty in the phase state do not change with the clock
frequency then it is possible to model the characteristics of the QKD system for a range
of different clock frequencies.  Figure 4.40 shows the result of modelling varying the
clock frequency for both the SSPD and the resonant cavity thin junction Si-SPAD when
using a 2 km long quantum channel.
Figure 4.40. A theoretical prediction of the effects of changing the clock frequency of
the QKD system on the net bit rate and the quantum bit error rate.
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The corresponding decrease in the period of a single bit as the clock frequency increase
means that the contribution to the QBER from intersymbol interference increases.  The
diffusion tail of the resonant cavity Si-SPAD leads to a higher degree of intersymbol
interference in comparison to the near Gaussian instrument response of the SSPD
resulting in a maximum clock frequency of ~1.5 GHz for the resonant cavity Si-SPAD.
The SSPD can be used at frequencies up to ~5.5 GHz in this system when using a 100
ps duration temporal gating window.  The approximately Gaussian temporal response of
the SSPD means that shorter temporal gate durations can be used and results have been
calculated for a 75 ps gate.  With the reduced gate the maximum clock frequency for the
resonant cavity Si-SPAD increases slightly to ~2 GHz while for the SSPD it increases to
~6.5 GHz.  By reducing the size of the temporal gate from 100 ps to 75 ps does not have
a significant effect on the baseline QBER although it does push the characteristic QBER
verses distance curve to slightly longer distances. However the reduction in the TD
reduces the
2
2
t T
Arrivalt T
P dt
+D
-Dò  term in Equation (4.19) leading to a reduction in the NBR.
4.3 Conclusions
This chapter has looked at a gigahertz clock rate phase encoding QKD system which
implements the BB84 protocol.  The system is built using optical fibres which allows
the system to be integrated into standard optical communication infrastructures.
Custom designed software compensated for changes in the path lengths in the
interferometers due to fluctuations in the fibre birefringence caused by environmental
effects.  This allowed the system to be run autonomously, collecting data for over a 24
hour period.  When operated using the SSPD and resonant cavity Si-SPAD detector, net
bit rates of 17.75 and 16.7 kbits s-1 were obtained respectively and the tuning software
managed to maintain the stability for over 19 hours.  Similar techniques to compensate
for path length drift in Mach-Zehnder interferometers has been demonstrated elsewhere
where over a 19 hour period of operation the system was stable for 99% of the time over
20.3 km of installed optical fibre [68].
The novel depolariser technique to remove the effect of environmentally induced
birefringent in the quantum channel was also successfully demonstrated in a QKD
system for the first time.  Photons emitted from the sender had a degree of polarisation
of ~10% which enabled the random routing of photons in the receiver when incident on
a 50:50 beamsplitter.  This enabled Bob to passively and randomly route the photons
into one of two Mach-Zehnder interferometers to make a basis set selection.  The use of
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passive optical components reduced the complexity required in the receiver and
eliminated thermal stresses which would destabilise fibre interferometers.  The
depolariser technique allowed an interferometric visibility of 98% to be achieved even
after transmission through standard telecoms fibre and its insensitivity to temperature
fluctuations over the course of a day enabled the system to operate continuously during
this period.
A variety of single-photon detectors, some commercially available and some research
and development, were tested in the system in order to perform a comparison of how
detector characteristics can affect a gigahertz clock rate QKD system.  It was
demonstrated how dark count events, timing jitter, and detection efficiency can
influence the lowest QBER and highest net bit rate which can be achieved from the
system.  The resonant cavity Si-SPAD and the SSPD devices obtained the highest bit
rates and transmitted over the longest distances (~18 km) due a combination of low dark
count rate (10 Hz for SSPD and 21 Hz for resonant cavity Si-SPAD), high timing
performance in the case of the SSPD (Gaussian FWHM ~62 ps) and good detection
efficiency of ~18% in the case of the resonant cavity.  Although the PerkinElmer device
had by far the best detection efficiency, it gave the second lowest net bit rate due to
having an inferior FHWM compared to the other devices.  This was the most detailed
comparison of single-photon detectors in a QKD system to date which experimentally
demonstrates the competing effects of timing jitter, dark counts and efficiency have on
the QBER and the net bit rate.  In the future this could enable detectors to be designed
and manufactured with the aim of maximising the performance of a QKD system.
To get a better understanding of the competing effects of timing jitter, dark counts and
detecting efficiency a general theoretical model was developed and applied to the
different detectors which were used in the QKD system.  The model was able to
accurately predict the experimental data in Figure 4.31 and Figure 4.32.  In particular
this model is able to predict the fraction of photon detection events which remain after
temporal filtering by treating the arrival time of the photon as a probabilistic event
which is characterised by the detector instrumental.  This could be beneficial to many
photon-counting applications where temporal filtering is carried out, as previously in
the literature this fraction was determined empirically.  The model was later used to
predict the future behaviour of the system in the case of hypothetical realistic detectors
and also expected improvements in existing detectors.  One of the benefits of the model
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is that it can been readily adapted for other QKD systems operating in free-space or
optical fibre at 1550 nm by altering Equation (4.16) and by modifying the system
instrument response when calculating the probability time of arrival of the photon arrivalP
which is system and detector dependent.
The theoretical model was also used to investigate the optimal frequency of operation
with regard to the maximum bit rate achievable. The maximum clock rate using a
temporal window ΔT of 100 ps was ~1.5 GHz and ~5.5 GHz for the resonant cavity
thin-junction and SSPD device respectively while using a ΔT of 75 ps a clock rate of ~2
GHz and ~6.5 GHz could be achieved for each detector respectively.
The theoretical model is able to predict that for the 1 GHz clock rate system described
here, that if a PerkinElmer thick-junction Si-SPADs with 42% detection efficiency, 198
dark counts per second and pulse read-out electronics modified to give a FWHM timing
jitter of 200 ps were to be utilised as the detector, the NBR achieved would exceed that
of the 62 ps FWHM timing jitter SSPDs with 10% detection efficiency and ten dark
counts per second at distances of up to 15 km.  This is only observed because of the 1
GHz clock frequency used in the QKD system.  At higher clock rates the temporal
intersymbol interference would increase the QBER obtained with the PerkinElmer thick
junction Si-SPAD thereby reducing the net bit rate.
The experimental results shown here have only used a single layer meander SSPD[78]
Recently, SSPDs embedded in an optical cavity have been reported with an intrinsic
efficiency of 57% at a wavelength of 1550 nm and with a practical efficiency greater
than 20% [79], [80], [81], [82].  It is possible that further progress will produce SSPDs
to match the 850 nm operating wavelength of this system resulting in an increase in the
transmission distance and bit rate.
It is also possible to increase the operating clock rate of the QKD system by using a
different optical design.  Differential phase sifted QKD systems have been shown to
operate at clock rates up to 10 GHz, also employing Mach Zehnder interferometers[83].
In this scheme a single photon is transmitted from Alice to Bob in a superposition of
three different phase states. The single photons are prepared at Alice and individually
transmitted with equal probability into three arms. This system also exhibits the non-
interfering peaks visible in the QKD system described here but has been operated at 10
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GHz clock frequencies with secure key generation rates of 17 kbit s−1 over 105 km of
fibre using SSPDs.
Figure 4.41 compares the net bit rate obtained from various QKD systems reported in
the literature using various implementations and detectors.  The points denoted by ○ and
● represent the results obtained using the thin-junction resonant cavity device and thick
junction Si-SPAD previously described in this chapter.  The points denoted by ◇ are
taken from Hiskett et al. which implements a phase encoding system operating at a
wavelength of 1550 nm, a clock frequency of 1 MHz and using transition edge sensors
with a detection efficiency of 65%[84].  Points denoted by △	 are taken from Dixon et
al.[85] and use InGaAs SPADs which operate using self-differencing techniques
already described in Chapter 2.  The phase encoding system operated at a wavelength of
1550 nm implementing decoys states to overcome the PNS attack.  The clock rate of the
system was 1 GHz and the detector efficiency was 10% at 1550 nm.  Points denoted by
■ and □ are taken from Wang et al. [86] and Takesue et al. [56] respectively and both
use superconducting nanowires implementing the differential phase shift (DPS) QKD
protocol described in Chapter 2 and operate at a wavelength of 1550 nm.  Wang et al.
used a Faraday-Michelson interferometer for phase encoding similar to the approach
adopted in the “plug-and-play” technique described in Chapter 2.  The systems operated
with a 2 GHz clock frequency and with a SSPD detection efficiency of 3%.  Takesue et
al. used a standard Mach-Zehnder interferometry arrangement for phase encoding using
a 10 GHz clock frequency using SSPDs with a detection efficiency of 0.7%.	
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Figure 4.41. The net bit rate obtained from various QKD systems reported in the
literature using various implementations and detectors is shown.  Points denoted by ○
and ● represent the results obtained using the thin-junction resonant cavity device and
thick junction Si-SPAD previously described in this chapter.  Points denoted by◇ are
taken from Hiskett et al. [84] which implements a phase encoding system operating at
a wavelength of 1550 nm, a clock frequency of 1 MHz and using transition edge
sensors with a detection efficiency of 65%.  Points denoted by △ are taken from Dixon
et al. [85] and use InGaAs SPADs which operate using self-differencing techniques
using.  The phase encoding system operated at a wavelength of 1550 nm implementing
decoys.  The clock rate of the system was 1 GHz and the detector efficiency was 10% at
1550 nm.  Points denoted by ■ and □ are taken from Wang et al. [86] and Takesue et
al. [56] respectively and both use superconducting nanowires implementing the
differential phase shift (DPS) QKD protocol described in Chapter 2 and operate at a
wavelength of 1550 nm.  Wang et al. used a Faraday-Michelson interferometer for
phase encoding, similar to the approach adopted in the “plug-and-play” system.  The
systems operated with a 2 GHz clock frequency and with a SSPD detection efficiency
of 3%.  Takesue et al. used a Mach-Zehnder interferometry for phase encoding using a
10 GHz clock frequency using SSPDs with a detection efficiency of 0.7%.
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Chapter 5 	
Quantum Digital Signatures
5.1 Introduction to classical digital signatures
Digital signatures can be thought of as an analogue of a handwritten signature but
guarantees a much higher level of security over their handwritten counterpart.  Digital
signatures are widely used in today’s world and are used for signing legal contracts,
authenticating legal software for download and they also allow the transmission of
public keys and as a result are  used in the previously discussed public key cryptography
discussed in Chapter 2.  A digital signature scheme is usually composed of a signer and
one, or potentially more verifiers.  The scheme is commenced by the signer running a
key generation algorithm to produce a pair of keys (pkey, skey) where pkey is the signer’s
public key and skey is the signer’s private key.  The signer then publically announces the
public key and one assumes the verifier is in procession of an authentic copy of the
public key.  The digital scheme then allows the signer to certify a message such that any
other party who is in procession of pkey, can then verify that the message originated from
the signer and has not been tampered with.  Figure 5.1 shows an outline of how the
scheme works in principle.
Figure 5.1. Outline of a digital signatures scheme [1].
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Digital signatures fall under the branch of public key cryptography where a party, a
signer in the case of digital signatures, only has to distribute a key over a public but
authenticated channel.  Two important aspects of digital signatures are that they are
publically verifiable and have the property of non-repudiation.  Publically verifiable
means that if a receiver verifies that a message is authentic then other parties who
receive the signed message also agree on it being legitimate.  Non-repudiation means
that once a signer signs a message they cannot later deny that the message was sent
from them.  This feature is often used when a recipient then needs to prove to a third
party, a judge, that the signer did certify a message, assuming that the judge is also in
procession of the public key [2].
5.2 Security of digital signatures
The security of digital signatures is based on the unproven assumptions in the theory of
computational complexity, namely the idea that P NP¹ . P  represents decision
problems that can be efficiently solved while NP  represent decision problems in which
the solutions have proofs which can be efficiently checked [3].  A digital signatures
scheme is not secure against an adversary with unlimited computational power or
unlimited time.  It is quite common to use a security parameter k  which can be used to
quantify the level of security of the scheme.  The signer passes this parameter as the
input to the key-generation algorithm and the length of the public and private key will
depend on k .  To satisfy a level of computational security a digital signature scheme
has the property that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary will only succeed
in forging a signature with negligible probability.
5.3 Digital signature architect
The digital scheme should consist of three polynomial-time algorithms ( , ,Gen Sign Vrfy
). The key generation algorithm Gen  takes the security parameter k  as its input and
outputs the public key pkey or verification key, and the private key/signing key/secret
key keys .  For a given security parameter k  the signing algorithm Sign  uses the private
key keys  and the message m  as its input and outputs a signature s , ( )keysSign ms ¬ .
Finally the verification algorithm Vrfy  takes the public key keyp , the message m  and
the signature signal and outputs a single bit b , ( ),keypb Vrfy m s= , with b =1 meaning to
accept and b =0 to reject the signature.  The signer runs the Gen  algorithm to obtain the
keys keyp  and keys .  When a sender wants to send a message m  it runs ( )keysSign m s®
and sends ( ),ms  to the receiver.  The receiver who already knows the public key keyp
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is able to verify the authenticity of the message by checking the value ( ),keypVrfy m s .
This allows it to be proved that the sender sent m  and that it was not modified in transit
[2].  Some of the one-way functions which digital signatures relies on are discussed in
the next section.
5.4 Cryptographic one-way functions
A regular occurrence in cryptography and digital signature schemes are one-way
functions.  These are functions which are easy to compute in one direction but harder to
reverse without some a priori knowledge.  A computational problem is considered easy
if it can be solved in polynomial time.
5.4.1 Trapdoor functions
Diffie and Hellman introduced the idea of trapdoor one-way functions for use in
asymmetric encryption and public key distribution [4].  They described a trapdoor
function with the following properties;
1. given a description of the function ( )f x  and x  it is computationally feasible to
compute ( )y f x=
2. given ( )f x  and ( )y f x=  it is computationally infeasible to compute ( )1f y-
3. given ( )f x , ( )y f x=  and a parameter z  it is computationally feasible to
compute ( )1x f y-= .
The calculation of ( )y f x=  is the process of enciphering the plaintext with the public
key and the calculation of ( )1x f y-=  is the deciphering of the ciphertext with the
private key.  Without the knowledge of trapdoor information z  it is computational
infeasible to invert the function [5].
5.4.2 Prime factorisation and discrete logarithm problem
The security of classical cryptography such as RSA relies upon the difficulty of integer
factorisation problems.  The integer factorisation problems states that given a positive
integer n  find its primes factors such that n  can be written as 1 21 2 kee e kn p p p= K  where
ip  are distinct primes and 1ie ³ .  The most straight forward factorising algorithm is by
trial division.  This can be attempted by trail division by all “small” primes where
“small” depends on the size of n .  In a worst case scenario trail division can be
attempted by all primes up to n .  In this case trail division will completely factor n
but the procedure will take above n  divisions when n  is a product of two primes
which are the same size.  To factor n  completely takes ( )logO p n+  divisions where p
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is the second largest prime factor of n .  This method is completely infeasible for large
enough integers [6].  The most efficient classical algorithm of factorising integers over
100 digits is the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) and was used to factor a 130 bit
digit number in the RSA factorising challenge [7].
The discrete logarithm problem involves the branch of mathematics called group theory.
Let ng  denote the element in the infinite group G  where g  is multiplied by itself n
times.  The discrete logarithm problem states that if g GÎ  and another element h GÎ ,
find an integer x  such that xg h= .  Like the factoring problem, the discrete logarithm
problem is believed difficult to compute and is used in the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
5.4.3 Cryptographic hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions are used extensively in the construction of secure digital
signature schemes.  They essentially compress a message to produce a condensed
version called a message digest.  This is particularly useful when seeking to improve a
signature scheme that can sign k -bit messages into one that can sign message of
arbitrary length.  In order to sign a long message all that is required is to hash all
messages before signing them.  These functions have the following properties, they
should be preimage resistant which means that given a hash h  it is computationally
infeasible to find a message m  such that ( )h hash m= , second-preimage resistant
meaning that given a input 1m  it is computationally infeasible to find another input 2m
with 1 2m m¹ such that ( ) ( )1 2hash m hash m=  and finally collision resistant meaning that
it should be computationally infeasible to find two messages 1m  and 2m  such that
( ) ( )1 2hash m hash m= .  The birthday “paradox” places an upper bound on the collision
resistance.  The number of messages that is needed to hash to find a collision is
approximately equal to the square root of the number of possible output values, i.e. 22n
where n  is the number of output bits of the hash function   The secure hash algorithm
(SHA-1) is the most widely used hash algorithm in use today and produces a 160 bit
message digest and has a collision resistant of about 802 [8].
5.5 History of digital signatures and digital schemes
The concept of digital signatures was first born out of work that Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Len Adleman outlined in their 1978 paper [9].  If Bob wants to send a
signed message M  to Alice he first creates his signature S  for the message M  by
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using his decryption function BD , ( )BS D M= .  He then encrypts S  using AE , Alice’s
encryption process and sends the result ( )AE S  to Alice.  Alice then decrypts with AD
to obtain S .  The message is obtained by the encryption procedure of the sender BE ,
( )BM E S= .  Bob cannot refute having sent the message since only he could create
( )BS D M= . Alice can also convince a third party acting as a judge that ( )BM E S=
which is proof that Bob signed the message.  Given a message M the ciphertext C  is
the remainder when eM  is divided by n  such that ( ) ( )modeC E M M nº = , where n
is the product of two primes p  and q  and e  is a positive integer.  The value of n  is
made public but p  and q  are kept private.  Together e  and n  are the encryption key.
Decryption can be performed by ( ) ( )moddD C C nº  where d  and n  are  the
decryption keys.  The value d  is chosen such that the greatest common divisor (gcd) of
d  and ( ) ( )1 1 1p q- × - = .
5.5.1 Lamport one-time signature
Lamport’s one-time digital scheme was first purposed in 1979 [10].  The scheme is
based on cryptographic hash functions ( f ) which are mathematically infeasible to
invert.  For the secret key, each bit that a signer S  may wish to sign in the future they
choose two numbers ( )
( )
0
isk  and ( )
( )
1
isk , chosen randomly from the domain of f .   The
signer then announces ( ) ( )( )i ibpk f sk=  as her public key.  Later to sign that the value of
the i -th bit is b  she announces the value ( )ibsk .  The receiver can authenticate for each
bit b and the supposed signature is  by checking if ( ) ( )? iibif s pk= .  Figure 5.2 shows an
example of signing a 3 bit message.  The public key consists of 6 elements
1,0 1,1 2,0 2,1 3,0 3,1, , , , ,y y y y y y  which are computed from the function f  using the private
keys 1,0 1,1 2,0 2,1 3,0 3,1, , , , ,x x x x x x .  In matrix notation this is given by Equation (5.1).
1,0 2,0 3,0 1,0 2,0 3,0
1,1 2,1 3,1 1,1 2,1 3,1
y y y x x x
pk sk
y y y x x x
æ ö æ ö= =ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
Equation (5.1)
To sign a message 1 2 3m m m m= P P  where im  is a single bit and P  represents string
concatenation, the signer publishes , ii mx  for 1 3i£ £ .  The signature is  consists of
1, 2, 3,, ,i i im m mx x x .  The verifier accepts the signature only if ( ) ? , ii mif x y= .   The scheme is
called a one-time signature as each part of the secret key can only be used once.  The
very large length of the public keys make the scheme impractical as the public keys
have to be transmitted reliably at the beginning [2].
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Figure 5.2. Lamport digital signature scheme for signing a three bit message m=011
[2].
5.6 Security concerns with classical digital signatures
As seen previously digital signatures have been shown to be able to sign a message so
that a receiver can authenticate the sender and also verify that the contents were not
altered.  The security of such a scheme is based on the computational difficulty of
reversing certain one-way functions but such security is not guaranteed into the future
with possible better algorithms or quantum computers [11], [12].  The paradox of these
functions is that it is not possible to prove that they are non-invertible as the proof
would suggest that they are not one-way to begin with [13].  The MD5 message digest
algorithm, proposed by Rivest in 1994, is a cryptographic hash function that produces a
128 bit message digest [8].  For over a decade this function was considered to be
resistant to collisions.  A collision is a pair of distinct data values x  and x¢  for which
( ) ( )H x H x¢= .  However in 2005 Chinese cryptographers discovered a new technique
for discovering collisions in this algorithm which can be done in 5 minutes to an hour
using an IBM P690 multiprocessor server [14].  In 2012 Microsoft announced that the
authors of the Fame malware used collisions in MD5 to forge a Windows code signing
certificate [15].  As a result the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
recommends that such a function is no longer suitable for Secure Socket Layer (SLL)
certificates or digital signatures [16].
5.7 Security and information theory background for quantum digital signatures
5.7.1 Entropy and information
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2 the Shannon entropy and information are closely
related and are used extensively in cryptography for assessing the security of a system.
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The link between entropy in thermodynamics and information was firmly established by
Landauer’s principle which states that the erasure of an unknown bit requires at least
ln 2kT  of heat per lost bit [17].  The cross over between the field of mathematics and
physic is very apparent in cryptography as information is often described by the branch
of probability.  If the value of a random variable X is measured then the Shannon
entropy of X quantifies how much information on average we gain by measuring X .
In relation to statistical mechanics and information theory, entropy can be thought of as
a measure of missing information, the information that could be gained if a complete
measure of a system could be performed [18], [19].  The entropy of a system is often
written as a probability distribution 1, np pK   The Shannon entropy of such a probability
distribution is given by the following [20]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1
log
n
n i i
i
H X H p p p x p x
=
º º -åK Equation (5.2)
where ( )ip x  is the probability of the outcome of ix .  In simple terms, if an information
source produces a string of 1 2, nX X XK  values which are independent random variables
then the Shannon entropy can be thought of as the minimal physical resources that is
required to store all the information and which can later be fully reproduced.  The
entropy associated with a two-outcome random variable is given by
( ) ( ) ( )log 1 log 1binaryH X p p p p= - - - -  Equation (5.3)
p  and 1p -  are the probability of the two outcomes.  One of the outcomes of the
Shannon entropy is that if an event occurs with probability 1p -  or with probability
0p =  no information is gained by making a measurement.  The function reaches a
maximum at 0.5p = , where with a unbiased coin toss with a heads or a tails outcome
maximum information is gained by performing a measurement.  This means that one bit
of information is needed to communicate the outcome of the coin toss.  However in the
case of a fair die at least ( )2log 6  bits is required.  More information is obtained when
rolling a die than is obtained with a coin toss.  The probability of obtained heads with a
coin is 1 2  while the probability of rolling a 3 with a die is 1/6 [21].
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Figure 5.3. The binary entropy function.  The function reaches a maximum value at
probability p=0.5.
Two other important concepts relating to entropy which are used to calculate security
bounds for quantum information systems are conditional entropy and mutual
information [22], [23].  It is usual to being by defining X  and Y  as two random
variables.  The entropy of X  on the condition that we know Y   is given by
( ) ( ) ( )| ,H X Y H X Y H Y= - Equation (5.4)
where ( ),H X Y  is the joint entropy.  This is a measure of the average uncertainty of X
given that we know the value of Y .  The mutual information quantifies how much
information X  and Y  have in common and is given by
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ): ,H X Y H X H Y H X Yº + - Equation (5.5)
5.7.2 Von Neumann entropy
In classical information theory the Shannon entropy is used to measure the uncertainty
of an random variable whereas the von Neumann entropy is the quantum mechanics
equivalent. It is given by
( ) ( )2Tr logS r r r= - Equation (5.6)
where r  is the quantum state and tr  represents the trace of the matrix.  If the
eigenvalues of r  are given by xl  then the von Neumann’s entropy may be recast as
209
( ) logx x
x
S r l l= -å Equation (5.7)
The Shannon noiseless coding theorem states that given n  random variables with
entropy ( )H x , they can be compressed into ( )nH x  bits with minimum risk of
information loss as n ®¥ .  If however they are compressed into fewer than ( )nH x
bits then it is likely that information will be lost.  Likewise n  qubit messages from a
quantum source with a von Neumann entropy ( )S r  can be compressed into a
maximum of ( )nS r  [24].  If the state r  is  a pure state stater  then the von Neumann
entropy ( ) 0stateS r = , which means that further repeated measurements of the state
yields no further information [18].
5.8 Quantum gates in quantum computation
Quantum computers offer the possibility of a remarkable increase in the speed of
computers for performing calculations.  Quantum algorithms can make use the fact that
quantum bits, or qubits, can be a superposition of a 1 or 0.  One of these quantum
algorithms is based on Shor’s quantum Fourier transform which enables an exponential
increase in speed over classical algorithms for factorisation [25].  The other is based on
Grover’s algorithm for quantum searching [12], [26].  In order to perform such
calculations there is a need for the quantum equivalent of logic gates in classical
computation.  Two such quantum gates are discussed in sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 which
are needed to describe the comparison of two quantum states via the “swap test”.
5.8.1 Fredkin gate
The Fredkin gate, shown schematically in Figure 5.4,  is  a  type  of  logic  gate  used  in
quantum mechanics.  It has three inputs a , b , c  and has three outputs a¢ , b¢ , and c¢ .
The bit value c  is called the control bit and has the property of not being altered by the
gate such that c c¢= .  The control bit determines which action is to be performed on a
and b .  If 0c =  then a  and b  are not altered by the gate such that a a¢=  and b b¢= .  If
on the other hand c  =1 then the bits a  and b  are swapped at the output such that a b¢ =
and b a¢ = .  The Frekin gate has the property of being reversible and being able to be
used as a universal logic gate.
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Figure 5.4. Fredkin gate.  The output bits a  and b  depend on the control bit c
which is unaltered by the gate.  If c  = 0 then the inputs a  and b  are not altered but
if the control bit is set to 1 then the input bits are swapped such that a b¢ =  and b a¢ =
.
5.8.2 Hadamard gate
The Hadamard gate is given by the following matrix,
1 11
1 12gate
H æ ö= ç ÷-è ø
Equation (5.8)
and it transforms 0  into ( )1 2 0 1+ and 1  into ( )1 2 0 1-  [27], [28].  The
transform itself can be thought of as a generalised class of Fourier transform and can be
thought simply as a 90° rotation about the x and z axis on the Bloch sphere.  It can be
implemented using linear optics such as Mach-Zehnder interferometer.  The Hadamard
gate has the useful property that if gateH  is independently applied to n  qubits which are
all initial prepared in the same state 0  then the state produced is a superposition of all
the integers from 0 to 2 1n - .  Therefore a superposition which contains exponentially
many terms can be prepared using only a polynomial number of operations [24].
5.9 Determining quantum states and the Holevo bound
The property of the inability of quantum states to be copied and their inability to be
distinguished unambiguously can be quantified by the Holevo bound.  The laws of
quantum mechanics make it impossible to perfectly distinguish between two non-
orthogonal quantum states.  This can be thought of in relation to the accessible
information.  If a sender Alice prepares a quantum state f with probability p  and
prepares the state j  with probability 1 p-  then the accessible information to the
receiver Bob must be less than ( )H p  as there is no way to distinguish the state with
absolute certainty.  In the classical scenario if Alice prepares a bit 0 with probability p
and a bit 1 with probability 1 p-  then there is no physical reason why Bob cannot
determine the two states and his mutual information is given by ( )H p , which is the
entropy in which the state was prepared.  Formally stated the Holevo bound is given by
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( ) ( ) ( ): x x
x
H X Y S p Sr r£ -å Equation (5.9)
This describes the scenario where Alice prepares a quantum state xr  where
1, ,x n= K   each given by probabilities 1, , np pK  and Bob performs a measurement on
the state where the outcome is Y . x x
x
pr r=å .  His accessible information is bounded
by the term on the right of Equation (5.9) and is often called the Holevo quantity c .  If
the sates xr  are not orthogonal then the Holevo bound implies that the mutual
information ( ):H X Y  is always less that ( )H X  which means that it is impossible for
Bob to determine X  with 100% certainty based on his measurement of X .  This can be
demonstrated when Alice prepares two states 0  and cos 0 sin 1q q+  depending on
the outcome of a coin toss.  The combined state in the 1 0  basis is given by
2
2
1 0 cos cos sin1 1
0 02 2 cos sin sin
q q qr
q q q
æ öæ ö= + ç ÷ç ÷è ø è ø
Equation (5.10)
The Holevo bound is plotted as a function of the angle q  in Figure 5.5 and reaches a
maximum at 2q p=  which corresponds to the two states being orthogonal to each
other.  It is only in this scenario that Bob is able to distinguish the states with 100%
certainty [13].
Figure 5.5. Holevo bound as a function of angle when the states 0  and
cos 0 sin 1q q+  are prepared with equal probability.  A maximum is reached when
2q p=  which occurs when the states are orthogonal to each other and Bob is able
to distinguish the states with 100% certainty.
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5.10 The current state of quantum digital signatures
In 2001 Gottesman and Chaung established a scheme for quantum digital signatures
[29].  In this paper they introduced the notion of a quantum one-way functions, that is a
function whose input is a classical bit string k and whose output is a quantum state
kf .  The function made uses properties of quantum systems [13], namely that a
quantum bit may be represented as a superposition of states 10 1oj a a= +  and that
the mapping kk f®  is easy to compute and verify but it is impossible to reverse due
to limits determined by quantum information theory.  Holevo’s theorem limits the
amount of classical information that may be obtained from the quantum system.  The
digital scheme proposed is as follows; Alice chooses pairs of L -bit strings
0 1{ , ,},1
i ik k i M£ £  where 0ik  is used to sign a message 0b =  and 1ik  used to sign a
message with 1b = .  These are used as the private keys in the protocol.  Alice then
prepares the states { }0 1,k ki if f  which will be used for Alice’s public keys and used in
the one way function.  These public keys are accessible to all including potential
forgers.  For validation purposes Alice then sends a single-bit message b  by sending the
signed message ( )1 2, , , , Mb b bb k k kK  over an insecure classical channel.  Each recipient,
Bob and Charlie, are then able to perform the mapping ib
i
kbk fa  on the public keys
via a swap test [30] and counts the number of incorrect keys.  In practice this is done by
both Bob and Charlie receiving two copies of the public key from Alice which means
there are 4T copies of the public key in circulation.  Verification is performed by each
receiver verifying that everyone received the same public key i
bkf .  Each recipient first
carries out a swap test between their two keys and then passes one copy to the other
recipient who then carries out another swap test.  If any of the keys fail the swap test
then the protocol scheme is halted.  The swap test involves checking that given the
outputs kf  and kf ¢ , is k k¢= .  To perform this swap test, an ancilla bit is prepared in
the state ( )1 2 1 0+ .  The ancilla bit is used as the control bit in a Fredkin gate
which acts on kf ¢  and kf .  A Hadamard transform is then performed on the ancilla
bit and measured.  The swap test is passed if the result is 0 in the case where
k kf f¢ = .  If the result is 1  then the test fails, k k¢¹ ´, and happens with
probability...  If k kf f d¢ £ then the result 0  will occur with a probability of at most
2(1 ) 2d+ .
The above scheme set the foundations for quantum digital signatures schemes and can
be seen as a quantum mechanical equivalent of the Lamport one-time signature
discussed in section 5.5.1. However the paper did not elaborate about how such a
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scheme could be practically implemented.  It was not until 2006 that a paper by
Anderson, Curty and Jex [31] proposed a practical way of implementing the a quantum
signature scheme.  The discussion and experiments in the following sections are based
around such a system.
5.11 Security using coherent states in quantum information
The security of using coherent states in quantum information systems relies principally
on the fact that it is impossible to perfectly distinguish between two non-orthogonally
encoded coherent states.  A coherent state with an amplitude a  is an eigenstate of the
annihilation operator aˆ .  In the photon-number representation a coherent state may be
defined as
( ) ( )
2
1 2
0
exp 2
!
n
n
n
n
aa a
¥
=
= - å Equation (5.11)
A coherent state occupies a particular area in phase space, due to the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle such that given two coherent states ie ja a+ =  and
( )ie j pa a+- =  with 0j = , the an overlap between the states is given by
22f e a-= Equation (5.12)
When the amplitude 2a  becomes large the overlap approaches zero and the two states
a+  and a-  are orthogonal.  Alternatively, when 2a  is small a quadrature
amplitude measurement of the form †ˆ ˆi ix e a e aq q-= +   cannot unambiguously
discriminate between the two states.  For example a measurement of a+  may produce
results that could have been produced if a-  was measured and vice versa.  The
implications of this can be understood by taking a sender Alice and receiver Bob who
start communicate securely using coherent states in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Alice can randomly prepare one of two non-orthogonal states and Bob guesses the state
sent by measuring the amplitude of x .  Assuming the transmitivity of the quantum
channel 1h =  then Bob’s probability of measuring incorrectly is given by
( )21 1 12ep f= - - Equation (5.13)
The error probability is directly related to the overlap of the states f  and  by
Equation (5.12) also by the magnitude of 2a .
Figure 5.6 shows the overlapping probability distribution for quantum states prepared as
0 and 1.  The shape of the distribution and in particular the overlap can be exploited by
Alice and Bob in post selection.  For Bob’s measurement result x  which falls in the
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centre region, the error probability of determining a 1 or 0 is high.  On the left and right
side of this region in the tails of the distribution, results can be verified as 1 or 0 with
more certainty.  For coherent states, Eve’s and Bob’s probability distributions of
measurement outcomes x  are independent which means that it is possible for Eve to
obtain inconclusive results in which she is unable to assign a 1 or 0 while Bob is quite
definite about the state.  The mutual information shared between Alice and Eve AEI
depends only on Alice’s selected amplitude 2a  and is independent of the measurement
results x  of Eve and Bob.  Alice and Bob are able to determine the error probability and
their mutual information ABI  for each single event x  after the measurement.  For a
given overlap f  given  by 2a  Bob can establish a lower limit on his measurement
result x  such that AB AEI I> .  Bob can select a threshold 0x  to eliminate inconclusive
result that fall outside the range 0x x< .  Owing to this fact, the shared knowledge
between Alice and Bob about the selected events 0x x> is larger than that shared
between Alice and Eve, allowing a secret key to be distilled [32].
Figure 5.6. Probability distribution of measurements results x  for two no-orthogonal signal
state 1 and 0.  The inconclusive results given by the shaded region can be removed in a post-
selection procedure.  The error probability is high in this region due to the large overlap of the
probability distributions .. and ( )0p  [32].
The previous paragraph describes the underlying principle behind the continuous
variable QKD protocol briefly discussed in Chapter 2 and is also the principle behind
the quantum digital signatures scheme in section 5.12.  The above description only
looked at using two non-orthogonal coherent states but the same ideas can be applied to
the QDS protocol which used eight non-orthogonal states in the experimental
demonstration.  In essence by carefully controlling the overlap f  by the choice of 2a
Alice is able to ensure that the states cannot be determined unambiguously.  The non-
orthogonal states in the limit of large 2a  become orthogonal enabling unauthorised
parties to determine the state with complete certainty.
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5.12 Quantum digital signatures
5.12.1 Comparison of quantum states for quantum digital signatures
The comparison of quantum systems is much more complication than its classical
counterpart.  It is not possible to measure all the observables of a system simultaneously
and also the measurement value has a probabilistic outcome.  The optimal way to
compare the state of two unknown pure quantum systems is to check if their combined
state is symmetric or anti-symmetric [33], [34].  Experimentally this can be done using a
symmetric 50:50 beam splitter [35].  Two photons incident on the beam splitter will exit
via different ports if they are in the anti-symmetric polarisation state and exit in the
same port if they are in the symmetric polarisation state.  If two quantum states have
been prepared in the same initial state then their combined state is also symmetric.  This
means that finding the state in an anti-symmetric state is a definite indication that the
two states were different.  The choice of coherent states allows better than optimal
success probability of determining if two states are equal.  In the case of two general
pure quantum states j and f , the success probability of determining if they are equal
for the universal comparison strategy is the probability of them being an anti-symmetric
state is given by
( )21 12asymP f j= - Equation (5.14)
For coherent states this becomes
( )21 12asymP e a b- -= - Equation (5.15)
The success probability for the coherent state comparison is given by
21
21asymP e
a b- -= - Equation (5.16)
which is larger than the universal comparison method [31].
Figure 5.7(a) shows how two coherent states of light [36] mix on a beamsplitter [37].  A
coherent state is the quantum mechanical equivalent of a classical monochromatic
electromagnetic wave.  The equivalence between a light wave and a harmonic oscillator
allows properties of the quantised harmonic oscillator to be applied to the quantised
electromagnetic field states [38].  In mathematical terms it can be stated that
aˆ a a a= , where aˆ is the annihilation operator for the relevant electromagnetic field
mode.  The input states to the beamsplitter are a  and b  and the outputs given by
( )1 2 a b-  and ( )1 2 a b+ . It is possible to see that if a b=  then
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( ) ( )1 2 1 2 0a b b b- = - =  which is the vacuum state, and no light exits
through that port.  This simple operation forms the basis of the signature verification
protocol.  Figure 5.7(b) shows a schematic representation of the signature comparison
system employed by Bob and Charlie [39].  At each receiver the signature from Alice is
split into two equal amplitude components and one of these is shared with the other
receiver who performs the same action on their copy of the signature.  The retained
component of the signature is then mixed on a beamsplitter with the component
transmitted from the other receiver.  It can be seen from Figure 5.7(b) that if the two
components are the same then the original signature will be recovered through one port
of the beamsplitter and a vacuum state 0  will  be generated at  the other.   In order to
detect any attempts by Alice to send differing signatures to Bob and Charlie only
requires detection of any non-zero number of photons at the relevant beamsplitter ports.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.7. Field mixing on a balanced splitting ratio cube. The states a  and b
are coherent states.  (b) Public key distribution in the case where Alice (the sender) is
not trusted.  Bob and Charlie (the receivers) separate half of the key from Alice and
send it to the other party where it is compared on a beamsplitter with the other party's
key half.
The QDS protocol is implemented as follows, Alice randomly selects a series of phase
encodings from the set { }2 , 0,1, , 1k N k Np = -K  where N  is the number of possible
phase encodings and k  is  an  integer  in  the  range  0  to 1N - .  Alice sends a series of
phase encoded coherent states 0,lr and 1,lr  (analogous to the classical public key) to
receivers Bob and Charlie.  The 0,lr  phase encoding are those used sign a binary “0” at
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position l  in the message (where l is an integer of less than or equal to the message
length, M ) and the 1,lr  phase encodings are those used sign a binary “1” at position l .
Bob and Charlie pass the complete series of encoded states 0r  and 1r  through the
comparison system multiport of Figure 5.7(b) to verify that they both received the same
phase encoded states.  If the signature states were identical coherent states then the
multiport will preserve them otherwise the overall state shared by Bob and Charlie will
become symmetrised which prevents repudiation by Alice.  Bob and Charlie store their
phase encoded states in quantum memory [40] until they need them.  To sign a message
Alice then sends a message and the classical description of the corresponding state
(analogous to the classical private key) to Bob and Charlie.  Bob and Charlie check the
states against those stored in their memory by measurement.  Bob for example can
check the classical description of the key states against those stored in his quantum
memory by generating coherent states according to Alice’s description and individually
interferes them with the corresponding states in his memory.  He then checks whether
the number of photodetection events at the signal null-port, shown in Figure 5.9, is
smaller than as L , called the authentication threshold.  If the message passes
authentication Bob can then prove to Charlie that the signed message came from Alice
by forwarding the message to Charlie and the classical description of the signature
states he received from Alice.  In order to verify that a signed message forward by Bob,
Charlie follows the same procedure just described for Bob but with a modified threshold
v aS S>  called the verification threshold.  A difference g  between the two thresholds
ensures that Alice cannot make one of them accept while the other rejects a message
except with increasing small probability as g  increases.  The quantum digital scheme
can be thought of as a quantum version of the Lamport public key scheme described in
section 5.5.1
The choice of mean photon number per pulse 2a for the coherent states emitted by
Alice to each party depends on the number of possible phase encodings N  in  her
alphabet and the signature length M .  A greater number of coherent states per signed
bit increases security for a given 2a .  Figure 5.8 shows how the information on each
encoded laser pulse available to a malicious party, given by the von Neumann entropy
[41] ( )singleS r , for two receivers ( 2T = ) varies with increasing 2a .  For each position
in the key string of length M  there are N  possible encodings therefore there are MN
possible states.  The accessible information which can be obtained on the state in a
single key position is bounded by
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( ) ( ) ( )acc key key n n
n
I S p Sc r r r£ = -å Equation (5.17)
where ( )keyS r  is the Von Neumann entropy of keyr .  It is necessary to ensure that the
information about the whole signature known by Alice far exceeds that which is
accessible to a malicious party, ( ) ( )2log SingleM N M T S r× >> × × .  Figure 5.8, shows that
values of 2a  must be chosen so that the corresponding values of ( )singleT S r×  are far
below the corresponding dashed asymptote.
Figure 5.8. The von Neumann entropy ( )SingleS r  for two receivers (Charlie and Bob,
therefore 2T = ) as a function of the mean photon number 2a  for number of phase
encodings N  equal to 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32.  The greyed region indicates the range of
2a  values used in the experiment.  The asymptotic value of the entropy increases
with the number of phase encodings N , indicating that it is possible to use higher
2a  values for greater values of N .
5.12.2 QDS Experimental system
The signature verification scheme was experimentally implemented in optical fibre as
shown in Figure 5.9.  The system has many design and component similarities to the
quantum key distribution system described in Chapter 4 in regard to experimental setup
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and data acquisition and processing.  The most common feature to both systems is the
use of asymmetric unbalanced Mach Zehnder interferometers for encoding information
on pulses of light.  The quantum digital signatures (QDS) system was assembled from
polarisation maintaining (PM) fibre which supports a single-mode at a wavelength of
850 nm.  PM fiber ensures that random fluctuations in the polarisation of light guided in
the fibre which could degrade the interferometric visibility are removed [42].
Figure 5.9. A schematic of the experimental demonstration of quantum digital
signatures.  The laser used is a vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL) and the
detector is a single-photon avalanche diode.  The addition of a phase modulator in
the fibre length between the 50:50 beamsplitter in Alice’s and Bob’s entry point to the
multiport allows to test scenarios where Alice attempts to cheat by sending different
phase states.  The motorised optical attenuator allows Alice to vary the amplitude of
her phase encoded pulses.
5.12.2.1 Laser source characterisation
The spectral profile of the vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL) which
provides the multiphoton pulses is shown in Figure 5.10 showing a central wavelength of
849.8 nm and a full-width half-maximum (FWHM) of 0.23 nm.
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Figure 5.10. The spectra of the vertical cavity surface emitting laser profile under
operating conditions used in these experiments, taken using an optical spectrum
analyser with a resolution of 0.1 nm.  The quoted FWHM was obtained by fitting a
Gaussian curve to the recorded spectrum.  The central wavelength was measured to
be 849.8 nm having a FWHM of 0.23 nm.
The relation between interferometric fringe visibility V  and the linewidth nD  of the
source is given by
( )exp
4ln 2
V
pt n- Dé ù= ê úë û
Equation (5.18)
where t  is the temporal delay between the interfering light.  This implies that a
narrower linewidth source gives improved visibility although misalignment of the stress
members in PM fibre can also degrade this value.
The temporal profile of the VCSEL is shown in Figure 5.11 and has a FWHM of 0.924
ns.
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Figure 5.11. The temporal profile of the VCSEL under operating conditions, taken
using a 12 GHz InGaAs Schottky amplified photoreceiver with a 30 ps risetime.  The
FWHM was measured to be 0.924 ns.
The VCSEL was pulsed using a high speed laser driver board (MAXIM3996) shown in
Figure 5.12 and is designed for fiber optic local area network (LAN) transmitters [43].
Figure 5.12. MAXIM driver board for the VCSEL.
This board has an automatic power control that adjusts the laser bias current to maintain
the optical power constant regardless of changes in the operating temperature however
the laser is still maintained at a constant temperature of 15 ºC (± 0.1 ºC) using custom
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designed in-house controller.  An Agilent 81134A pulse pattern generator (PPG)
provided the ±250 mV differential input voltage to the driver board.  Variable resistors
on the board allow the amplitude of the modulation current to be modified until an
optical pulse with the shortest temporal duration as in Figure 5.11 to be obtained.
Figure 5.13 demonstrates that by operating at a pulse repetition frequency of 100 MHz
avoids temporal intersymbol interference when using high detection efficiency
commercial thick junction detectors.  Although thin-junction Si-SPADs have superior
timing resolution compared to thin junction ones, by operating at a clock rate of 100
MHz means that with regard to bit rate it is more beneficial to use high detection
efficiency detectors.  A wavelength of 850 nm was chosen to ensure good compatibility
with comparatively mature silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) which
have a detection efficiency of ~40% at this wavelength [44].  SPADs were selected as
the detectors as the losses of the system mean that the pulses transmitted by Alice are in
the single-photon regime at the detectors.  The losses of Charlie’s and Bob’s
demodulation interferometers are ~6 dB each.  The loss of the multiport signal port in
Charles’s and Bob’s multiport are 6 dB and 7.6 dB respectively.
The current lack of low cost and easy to use quantum memory which can allow the long
term storage of photons [45], [46] requires the experimental system to directly measure
the phase of the photon after it has left the multiport.  To achieve this, a phase reference
pulse is required.  The system time multiplexes a phase reference pulse between
successive 10 ns separated signal pulses using an asymmetric double Mach-Zehnder
approach as demonstrated in many quantum key distribution systems employing phase
encoding [47].  The same approach is adopted in Chapter 4 which used Mach-Zehnder
interferometers for encoding phase in a quantum key distribution system.  In an ideal
QDS system, the receivers would use their paths with air-gaps (OZ Optics ODL-200) to
delay only the signal pulse so that it recombines with the corresponding reference,
revealing the phase encoding.  However, in this current system there will be photons
which take non-interfering paths in sender and receiver (i.e. both short paths or both
delayed paths) contributing nothing to the signature and theses are software gated from
the photon arrival times recorded using the free-running SPADs.  Figure 5.13 shows the
non-interfering pulses together with a constructive (maximum) and destructive
(minimum) interferences pulses.
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Figure 5.13. System instrumental response from the QDS system.  Two interfering
peaks are visible, one for constructive and one for destructive interference along with
the two non-interfering peaks.  Also shown is the position and width of the gate for
calculating the encoding error and bit rate.
In post-processing, the time gating software opens a window of duration 2 ns centered
on the expected arrival time of a pulse and disregards events which occur outside of this
window.  The events which lie outside of this window are still recorded by the
acquisition electronics.  In a full system with quantum memory there would be no need
for the asymmetric double Mach-Zehnder interferometers and the phase encoded
photons would be stored in quantum memory at the output of the comparison stage,
making the raw count-rate in the experiments closer to that which would be obtained if
quantum memory was available.
Environmental fluctuations can destabilise the Mach-Zehnder interferometers and result
in large phase encoding errors.  Each variable air-gap in the multiport and demodulation
interferometers contains a piezoelectric brick positioned in the vernier mechanism
which is connected to a voltage generator under computer control.  Alice, Bob and
Charlie can ensure that each of their interferometers is correctly aligned in relation to
their phase by Alice sending a prearranged sequence of phase encoded bits.  Alice and
each receiver then perform a correlation between the sent and received sequence and
adjusts the voltage on the piezoelectric brick until a maximum is obtained in their
correlation.  A similar procedure is used in Chapter 4 for tuning the interferometers in
the QKD system and is described in more detail there.
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To generate a series of 8 equally spaced phase encodings in the range 0 2pK  required
that the pulse pattern generator (PPG) was capable of generating the required number of
states.  A similar approach was adopted here as in Chapter 4 for the generation of 4
phase encodings for the BB84 protocol.  A schematic of the approach adopted here is
shown in Figure 5.14.  An Agilent 81110A dual output pulse pattern generator was
capable of internally combining its two outputs resulting in a four step data pattern of
levels 0, 3, 6 and 9 volts.  This output was then combined with the output of an Agilent
81134A PPG with a voltage step of 1.5 volts.  This second PPG although capable of
operating at higher clock speeds was only capable of outputting 2 volts peak-to-peak.
The final combined output resulted in voltage levels of 0, 1.5, 3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9, and 10.5
volts.  The increment of 1.5 volts between each state ensured an equal spacing between
the generated states due to the Vp  of 6 volts for the phase modulator crystal.  The
electrical driving signal which is applied to the phase modulator is shown in Figure
5.15.  The electrical signal shows some electrical ringing especially at transitions from
one state to the next which could result in large phase encoding errors but this effect can
be minimised by pulsing the laser at occasions when the electrical signal is for each
state is constant as shown in Figure 5.15.  The phase encoding error which can be
attributed to the phase jitter in the polarisation modulators can be given by
2
2
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f ff
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-= D ò Equation (5.19)
where fD  is the variation in phase caused by the modulator [48].  The amplitude jitter
of the electrical signal for the phase modulator is 200 mV which corresponds to a
maximum error in the phase of 0.1 radians as the voltage required for a phase shift of p
radians is 6 volts. phaseError  is ~0.02%.
The QDS system described here requires the timing information from 6 detectors, two
for events on Bob’s and Charlie’s multiport null-ports and four to record events on their
signal port and signal null-ports.  The dual input GT658 time interval analyser [49]
(TIA) described in Chapter 2, was used to record events on the two multiport null-port
arms and PicoQuant’s HydraHarp quad input TIA [50] was used to record events on
Bob’s and Charlie’s demodulation interferometers.  As these TIAs have independent
clocks it is necessary to ensure that the time tags recorded on each device were correctly
synchronized.  A 10 MHz Rubidium (Rb) (Novatech 2960 AR) frequency standard was
used as the master clock for the system and used for the reference signal for the internal
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phased locked loop (PLL) in each pulse pattern generator (PPG).  Phase locked loops
are a control system that generates an output voltage whose phase is regulated by the
phase of an input reference signal [51].  The Rb clock had a 1 pulse per second output
(1 PPS) that was used as the external arming input for the GT658 and the input
reference for the HydraHarp.  This 1 PPS signal can be used to synchronise the internal
clocks in the TIAs and compensate for any electrical timing delay to ensure that
histograms obtained on both devices when timing events are derived from the same
signal source occur at the same bin/time position.
Figure 5.14. Electrical schematic for the QDS system.  The Agilent 81110A PPG
produces a four level step pattern of 0, 3, 6 and 9 V which is then combined with a 0
and 1.5 V step pattern from the Agilent 81134A PPG to create the required voltage
pattern for encoding 8 states.  The signal is amplified and then split and sent to
Alice’s and Charlie’s phase modulator.  The one pulse-per-second (PPS) output from
the 10 MHz Rb master clock is used to synchronise the independent clocks of the
GT658 and HydraHarp TIA cards.  The HydraHarp TIA records timing events from
Bob’s and Charlie’s demodulation interferometers while the GT658 TIA records the
multiport null-port events.
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Figure 5.15. Electrical driving signal for the generation of 8 phase encodings with
the temporal response of the VCSEL superimposed (temporal response shows two
periods which was then simulated for the remained 6 pulses)
The presence of a phase modulator in the section of fibre prior to either Bob or Charlie
allows the investigation of the case where Alice sends different signatures to different
recipients.  The air-gap in the other arm allows the transmission losses to be balanced
between each arm so that the same 2a value is launched to each recipient and permits
compensation for small path-length differences between the two launch arms. 2a  is
defined after the phase modulator/air-gap before entry into the multiport. 2a  is set by
a computer controlled motorised attenuator which is accurate to within 1% of the
calibrated value.  The measured pulse-to-pulse variance in the amplitude of the laser
was less than 3%.  An exact measurement was noise limited by the detector used and a
deconvolution method had to be used to estimate the worst case variance.
5.12.3 Experimental results
Figure 5.16 shows the experimental results obtained from Charlie in the system using
eight equally spaced phase encodings ( 8N = ) and an honest Alice sending the same
signature to both Bob and Charlie.  For these measurements the phase modulator in the
Alice to Bob arm was deactivated.  The dashed lines represent the predictions for the
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quantities made by a theoretical model and the data points are actual experimentally
recorded values.  The signal port raw rate is given by
1
2raw receiver dark
VSignal Rn h m a +æ ö= × × × × +ç ÷è ø
 Equation (5.20)
Figure 5.16. Experimental system results for one receiver, in this case Charlie, with
eight equally spaced phase encodings.  The system clock rate was 100 MHz.  Data
points represent actual experimental results while dashed lines are theoretical
predictions.  The raw count rate is the detector click rate summed over both of
Charlie's signal SPADs after the asymmetric double Mach-Zehnder interferometers,
the time gated count rate is the raw count rate after temporal filtering using a 2 ns
duration window centred on the expected arrival time to reduce the effects of non-
photon generated events, intersymbol interference and non-interfering photons.  The
encoding error is the number of pulses incorrectly phase demodulated by Charlie
over the total number of pulses he received.
where n  is the clock frequency, h  is the detector efficiency, receivera  is the fractional
loss of the receiver V  is the interferometric visibility and darkR  is the dark count rate of
the detector.  The null port raw rate is given by
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Equation (5.21)
The above equation assumes a 96% fringe visibility for both the comparison system and
the combined encoding/decoding asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers.  As the
mean photon number per pulse launched by Alice into the comparison system increases,
so the count rate at the detectors increases.  The multiport null-port count rates are
significantly lower than those at the signal port but are non-zero.  The counts in this port
are primarily due to the interferometric fringe visibility of the multiport (although dark
count events at the detectors do make a small contribution) and can be predicted, as
denoted by the dashed lines.  This null port rate sets a baseline for the system operating
with an honest Alice.  The temporally filtered rates are calculated by multiplying
Equation (5.20) and Equation (5.21) by
( ) ( )
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Equation (5.22)
where maxt  is defined in Figure 5.13.  This essentially treats the four possible paths that
a photon can take though a cascaded Mach-Zehnder as a stochastic process whose
probability is affected by the differing attenuation in each path. ( )arrivalP t  is generated
by fitting a piecewise Gaussian-exponential function to the detector instrumental
response and recreating a histogram of the possible paths a photon takes through the
system, scaling the heights according to the loss occurred in each path as shown in
Figure 5.13.  The recorded arrival time of a photon on a TIA depends on the particular
path taken and also on the timing jitter of the detector. Figure 5.13 shows two gating
windows of 2 ns duration ( TD ) which are centered on the maximum probability of the
arrival time for interfering peaks.  Only those counts which fall inside the gating
windows are included in the temporally filtered rate and ( )systemI TD  was calculated to
be ~0.4 of the raw count rate, using Equation (5.22).  The encoding error is defined as
the number of temporally filtered pulses detected by a receiver at his signal null-port,
divided by the temporally filtered total number of pulses recorded by that receiver.  The
encoding error rate is constant within experimental fluctuations across the range of
experimentally examined 2a values for as the effects of intersymbol interference and
dark count events in the detectors (dark counts) are negligible.  The detectors have a
mean dark count rate across all six detectors (three each in Bob and Charlie) of 320
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counts per second and the probability of intersymbol interference for each detector is
3×10-8.  The contribution to the encoding error due the phase encoding error, the
interferometric visibility, the dark count rate and temporal intersymbol interference is
given by
encoding phase decoding dark jitterError Error Error Error Error= + + +  Equation (5.23)
The terms darkError  and jitterError  summed contribution to the encoding error for the
QDS system is less 0.01%.  The term DecodingError  is due to the interferometric visibility
of the interferometer and can be given by
1
2
Visibility
decodingError
J-= Equation (5.24)
where VisibilityJ  is the classical visibility of the interferometer.  For a fringe visibility of
96% decodingError  is 2%.
5.12.4 Cheating scenarios in QDS: Forgery by Bob
Assuming Bob to be the forger, Charlie should be able to detect a mismatch between
Alice’s choose phase encoding in a signature state and Bob’s best average guess if the
system is to be immune to forgery.  This mismatch results in a higher probability for a
photodetection event on Charlie’s signal null-port when he measures the state using a
phase different from that in which it was encode in.  This scenario was experimentally
tested by examining the encoding error at Charlie if he measures using a phase
difference from that defined by Alice, shown in Figure 5.17 and quantifies the effects of
a mismatch between the encodings in true and forged signatures.  The encoding error
used here is defined as the fraction of encoded photons sent by Alice which are
incorrectly phase modulated by Bob.  The symmetry of the phase encoding/decoding
process is evident by observing the diagonal elements in Figure 5.17 and the matrix
elements in Table 5.1.  The off diagonal elements indicate the case where Charlie
measured incorrectly and clearly show that if Charlie measures using a different phase
form that sent by Alice he observes an increase in his encoding error when Bob attempts
to forge a message.  A greater difference between the probabilities of null-port events
for differing and identical phases reduces the required key length for a desired level of
security.
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Figure 5.17. The variance in encoding error (expressed as a percentage) for Charlie
when he measures using the same and different phases from that sent by Alice.  The
result shows that Charlie can detect an increase in his encoding error % when Bob
attempts to forge a message.  The above matrix allows the probability of cheating in a
passive attack to be evaluated.
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3
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p 56.3 71.7 97.9 71.6 57.1 27.5 2.8 22.5
7
4
p 28 57.2 71.1 97.6 71.3 58.6 27 2.9
Table 5.1. The variance in encoding error (expressed as a percentage) for Charlie
measuring using the same and different phases from that sent by Alice.
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5.12.5 Cheating by Alice
The QDS system can be tested against the case were Alice attempts potentially the
simplest form of cheating on the system and sends slightly different signatures to Bob
and Charlie using the phase modulator in the fibre connecting Alice to Bob in order to
change the phase encoding of certain pulses in the signature sequence.  The system was
setup to change the phase of two pulses in every sixteen by a fixed phase and the count
rate at the multiport null port and the error rate at Charlie were monitored.  The results
for the raw count rate at the multiport null port can be seen in Figure 5.18.  It can be
observed from Figure 5.18 that as Alice increases the magnitude of the phase difference
between the states, the count rate at Charlie's null port increases as expected and this
simple cheating strategy by Alice is relatively easy to detect.
Figure 5.18. Alice cheats in the simplest way and tries to send different signatures to
Bob and Charlie.  She alters the phase encoding of two pulses in every sixteen by a
fixed amount.  The "Honest rate" is the observed null port count rate when Alice is
not cheating and sends the same signature to Bob and Charlie.  It can be observed
that as Alice makes progressively greater changes to the phase encodings sent to one
party, the count rate at the null port increases.  The dashed lines represent the
predicted count rate using Equation (5.21) and the cosine phase sensitivity of the
interferometer.
5.12.6 Security Overview
The QDS system is considered secure if it demonstrates security against forging,
repudiation and is robust.  Security against forging means that the probability of
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producing a private message m  which was not sent from Alice, and passes verification
by all other recipients decays exponentially quickly with the length L  of the quantum
digital signature.  Security against repudiation entails that for any malicious activity on
the part of Alice, the probability of a message failing verification with one recipient
once it has already passed authentication with the other decays exponentially fast in
terms of L .  The QDS system is considered robust if when all parties are honest then a
message will be authenticated and verified except with a probability which decays
exponentially quickly in terms of L .
5.12.6.1 Forging quantum digital signatures
In the scenario where either recipient is dishonest (Charlie or Bob) there are two
possible forging strategies available to them.  In the active attack the malicious party
has the ability to alter the states he forwards to the other party within the multiport
which enables him to maximise his cheating probabilities later.  In the passive attack
Bob does not interfere throughout the quantum signature but attempts to cheat by
inspecting his copy of the quantum signature.  If one assumes that Bob is the potential
forger then in the passive attack the probability of Bob generating a photodetection
event with Charlie per individual quantum signature element is given by
{ }{ } ( ) ,1min Trforgeryp cNf qf f qf q rP= Påå Equation (5.25)
where ( )Tr qfrP  is the probability that Bob measures and thus later declares the angle
f  if the state he measured was encoded with the angle q , qr  is the coherent state sent
by Alice with a chosen phase q , ,cf q  is the probability of Charlie registering a
photodetection event in his signal null-port if the state he had in his memory was
encoded with q  and Bob declared f . fP  are operators which describe the
measurement performed by Bob on the signature copy that he has access to.  For Bob
his optimal measurement involves minimising the probability of causing a
photodetection event.  This constitutes a minimum cost measurement with a cost matrix
C  with elements ,cf q .  In a minimum cost measurement if a quantum state jr  occurs
with prior probability jp  and we choose a measurement with a measurement operator
iP  and that obtaining result i  when the state prepared was actually jr  carries a cost of
ijC  [52].  The cost matrix C  was obtained experimentally for the QDS system and is
related to the encoding matrix shown in Figure 5.17.  In the case where Bob is honest
then the maximum probability of causing a photodetection event is given by originalp  and
is equal to the largest diagonal elements of the cost matrix C .  If the condition that
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forgery originalp p>  for a larger enough signature length L  then it is possible to distinguish
between honest and cheating scenarios using a statistical approach using Hoeffding's
inequality.  Hoeffding's inequality can be used to provide an upper bound on the
probability that the sum of random variables deviates from its expected value [53].  The
authentication and verification thresholds can be set to 1 3 originalas g p= +  and
2 3 originalvs g p= +  where the gap forgery originalg p p= -  plays a key role in the cheating
probabilities.  The value g  was calculated to be 48.304 10-´  for a mean photon per
pulse value of 0.16.  The details of how of how the cost matrix C  and the gap g  were
calculated is given in more detail in appendix A.  In a passive attack strategy in the case
of a cheating Bob the probability of forging equals the probability of Bob causing fewer
than vs L  photodetection events in Charlie’s signal null-port.  Using Hoeffding's
inequalities the probability of forging is bounded by
222exp
9forging
g Le æ ö£ -ç ÷è ø
Equation (5.26)
Similarly the probability for Bob and Charlie to reject a message from Alice in the case
where all parties are honest is bounded by
222exp
9robustness
g Le æ ö£ -ç ÷è ø
Equation (5.27)
5.12.6.2 Repudiation by Alice
In order for Alice to repudiate her signature she needs to create signature states so that
Bob accepts and Charlie rejects the message when Bob forwards it to him or vice versa.
Bob will accept a message if the number of photodetection events is less than as L  and
Charlie will accept if his photodetection events is less than vs L .  If Alice is to succeed
in cheating she needs that Charlie accumulates ( )v as s L-  more photodetection events
than Bob.  The probability of Alice causing one recipient to accept and the other to
reject is given by
( )1
2
v as s L
repudiatee
-æ ö= ç ÷è ø
Equation (5.28)
5.13 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the concept of digital signatures and shown how it can be
used to sign a message in such a way that all users can authenticate the identity of a
sender and verify that the message has been unaltered in transmission.  The security of
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such a classical digital scheme is based on the computational difficulty of reversing
certain one-way functions but such an assumption cannot be guaranteed indefinitely in
the future.  Quantum computers or more realistically in the short term better algorithms
could render such systems insecure overnight.  In contrast quantum mechanics allows
the construction of quantum one-way functions whose security is based not on
computational difficulty but on the properties of quantum mechanics.  In this chapter a
quantum digital signature scheme has been described as well a working demonstrating
of the system. The system operates at a clock frequency of 100 MHz and a wavelength
of 850 nm using commercially available silicon single-photon detectors.  Results from
the system have been shown for 8 phase encodings using different values of 2a  and
also the effect of a cheating Alice.
One of the issues with the current setup is that it does not employ any form of quantum
memory as the long term storage of qubits in a practical manner has yet to be
demonstrated.  Another issue with the current setup is that it is not practical to extend
the distance between Charlie and Bob as they share a common arm of a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer and maintaining the path length difference over a large distance of
optical fibre would be impossible.
Increasing the clock rate of the system would also be beneficial.  In addition to an
increase in the bit rate which would be obtained the security of the system is also
affected.  To sign a particular message which meets a level of security given by the e
term in Equation (5.26), Equation (5.27) and Equation (5.28) requires a particular
message length L .  The longer L  is, and hence the more secure the system is, the more
time that is required to sign a message.  Increasing the clock speed would decrease the
time required.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions
Chapter 1 provided a very brief introduction to the field of classical and quantum
cryptography and gave an outline of the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 provided a more in depth discussion of quantum key distribution (QKD),
charting its development from its initial birth through to the current state of the art.
Classical cryptography systems were first introduced and the potential security
problems inherent in these systems, namely if quantum computers could become a
reality, was discussed.  This then led on to show how cryptography systems based on
quantum mechanics can offer verifiably secure encryption, which is based solely on the
physical laws of quantum mechanics.  Chapter 2 also dealt with how QKD systems
could be physically realised in the laboratory.  The principles and ideas of single-photon
generation and detection were described together with time-correlated single-photon
counting, used for the detection of faint repetitive optical signals.
Chapter 3 introduced a QKD system that utilised a single-photon source (SPS) for
security enhancement.  Using such a light source in a QKD system potentially offers
substantial increase in security, as a SPS is robust against the photon number splitting
attack unlike weak coherent pulses (WCP), and hence an increase in bit.  If QKD is to
become a widespread technology then the cheap and easy integration into existing
classical communication networks is vital.  The challenge involves trying to co-
propagate a faint quantum signal with a much more intense classical signal, all in the
same channel  The system in this Chapter operated at a wavelength of 850 nm and
offers the possibility that quantum data can coexist with classical data channels as they
are spectrally well separated from each other.  The SPS itself used a semiconductor
quantum dot contained in a micropillar cavity, emitting at a wavelength of 895 nm, and
optically excited at a pulse repetition rate of 40 MHz.  The system used a polarisation
encoding implementation of the BB84 protocol,  the results of which have been
successfully published in reference [1].  The highest emission rate leaving Alice was
~16 kHz with a ( ) ( )2 0g  of 0.85.  This enabled key generation to be successful over 2
km giving ~65 bits/s.  Although transmission over 2 km may seem short compared to
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long haul telecommunication distances, it does offer the potential for use in
metropolitan telecommunications access links, which the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) recommends be no longer than 20 km [2].
Chapter 4 introduced an environmentally robust, gigahertz clocked, phase encoding
QKD system.  Phase encoding was implemented using unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometers.  The aim of the research was to demonstrate a QKD system, which by
using novel techniques, is robust against environmental fluctuations.  This novel
solution was used to eliminate random fluctuations in the intrinsic birefringence of the
quantum channel, which is composed of standard telecoms fibre.  These fluctuations are
caused by environmentally induced stress, which can randomly alter the state of
polarisation of light travelling through the quantum channel.  This random polarisation
evolution would be detrimental to the interferometric visibility and would result in
larger encoding errors.  The technique used a light source that has been deliberately
depolarised, which eliminates birefringence effects in the fibre and allows the receiver
to use passive optical components to make a random basis set selection.  This
depolarising technique reduces the complexity required in the receiver and eliminates
active components, commonly used in other QKD systems, which can thermally
destabilise the interferometers.  The success of this depolarising method was
demonstrated for the system by generating a key, operating completely autonomously
over the course of 24 hours, over a 2 km fibre reel.  The system securely generated keys
for over 19 hours with an average bit rate of 16 kbits/s.
Chapter 4 also made the most comprehensive comparison of detectors in any QKD
system published to date [3], looking at a variety of thick and thin junction Si single-
photon detectors (SPAD) together with a superconducting nanowire device (SSPD).
The goal was to investigate how various detector parameters, including timing jitter,
detector efficiency and dark count rate, can affect the net bit rate achievable from the
system.  This may help when engineering detectors for QKD systems when trying to
maximum the performance of the system.  To aid the analysis, a theoretical model was
developed to show how the various detector parameters affect the characteristic
quantum bit error rate and net bit rate verses distance curve.  The model was in very
good agreement with the experimental results, which showed that detectors with good
timing jitter and reasonably good detection efficiency, such as the resonant cavity
SPAD and the SSPD, gave the largest bit rate.  Furthermore, the versatility of the model
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was demonstrated by predicting how particular improvements in detector design and
performance could increase the net bit rate, which might hopefully stimulate future
detector development.
Chapter 5 introduced the concept of digital signatures and how they play a vital
importance in modern electronic commerce.  Ron Rivest was famously quoted as saying
that “they may prove to be one of the most fundamental and useful inventions of
modern cryptography” [4].  However, akin to all modern classical cryptography, the
security relies on the unproven difficulty of reversing certain mathematical functions.  If
a computational efficient method could be found it would have a profound and dramatic
effect on modern commerce and communication systems.  Quantum digital signatures
(QDS) seek to eliminate this problem by relying solely on principles of quantum
mechanics for its security.  The QDS system described in Chapter 5 enables two parties,
Bob and Charlie, to receive a message so that they are able to authenticate and verify
that a message was sent by Alice and that it was not interfered with in transmission.
Quantum signatures were encoded onto the phase of coherent pulses of light, enabling
Alice to select from a possible of eight quantum signatures states.  By careful choice of
the amplitude of her phase encoded coherent states, she can ensure that the states are
non-orthogonal, thus ensuring unauthorised parties cannot gain information about the
state.  Phase encoding was implemented using unbalanced Mach-Zehnder fibre
interferometers, similar to the approach adopted in Chapter 4, which makes it possible
for the easy integration into current communication solutions.  The experimental QDS
system, which is the first of its kind in the world, proved its ability to detect certain
cheating scenarios in which the sender can attempt to get one receiver to accept a
message while the other to reject.  This work will hopefully encourage other researchers
and institutions to follow on from this work and develop other QDS protocols and
experimental implementations.
In summary, the work detailed in this thesis has led to 1. the first experimental
demonstration of quantum digital signatures [5], 2. an environmentally robust, short
wavelength, gigahertz clock rate, quantum key distribution system capable of
autonomous operation [6], 3. a general purpose theoretical model, capable of predicting
how detector performance affects quantum information experiments [3] and finally, 4. a
quantum key distribution test-bed using a single-photon source [1].  The experiments
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outlined in the preceding chapters can and will form the basis of future experiments at
Heriot-Watt and other institutions and research laboratories.
6.2 Future work
6.2.1 Quantum digital signatures
Chapter 5 looked at what is believed to be the first experimental demonstration of
quantum digital signatures.  However, due to the lack of practical and easily accessible
quantum information storage, it was not possible to fully implement the QDS scheme
originally proposed by Anderson et al.[7].  In that protocol, Charlie and Bob would
have to store their quantum signature states, received from Alice, in quantum memory
and later interference them with states generated by each receiver from the classical
description of the quantum state sent from Alice.  To overcome this problem a
technique commonly used in phase encoding QKD systems was used, in which a
reference pulse is phase modulated and time multiplexed with a reference pulse, using
asymmetric double Mach-Zehnder interferometers[8].  For more than two phase
encodings a phase modulator is required in the receiver’s interferometer.  The issue with
this current setup is that for state discrimination, Bob/Charlie must receive his classical
description of the quantum signature state (i.e. electrical signal to the phase modulator)
at the same time as he receives the actual signature state sent by Alice.  To remove the
requirement for Bob/Charlie to employ active phase modulators to measure the received
quantum state, the experimental setup shown in Figure 6.1 was proposed by the research
group.  The experimental arrangement for Alice to encode her signature states, and the
system which enables Bob and Charlie to compare their quantum signature states
received from Alice (i.e. the multiport), are almost identical to those employed in
Chapter 5.  The method by which Charlie and Bob measure the phase of the encoded
photon differs slightly, in that a phase modulator is used.  For each receiver a total of
four demodulation interferometers are required for the case where Alice can select from
a possible of 4 phase encodings.  Each demodulation interferometer has one output
designated for the vacuum pulse, while the remaining output is for detecting one of the
available phase states 0  , 2p , p  or 3 2p
The ability of a receiver, either Charlie or Bob, to distinguish a signature state sent from
Alice depends on the optical loss of the system.  If a receiver was to try to distinguish a
signature state sent from Alice, using only one of their demodulation interferometers in
Figure 6.1, the losses incurred in the system compared to the system used in Chapter 5
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would be approximately 14 dB higher.  A demodulation interferometer outlined in
Chapter 5 has ~10 dB loss while the system employing 4 interferometers with no active
phase modulator is estimated to have a loss of ~ 6 dB per each demodulation
interferometer.  In terms of the security parameters of the QDS system, there is an
exponential dependence on the number of pulses required to sign a single bit, therefore,
the loss of the system can be crucial.  The next generation of the experiment could look
at increasing the gated bit rate from the system while maintaining the same clock rate.
Figure 6.1. Scheme for quantum digital signatures with unambiguous state
discrimination.  Both Charlie’s and Bob’s  phase demodulation apparatus
contains 4 interferometers designated for measuring one of the 4 phase states
0, 2p , p  and 3 4p .  As in Chapter 5 the multiport symmetrises the states sent
by Alice which guarantees against repudiation by Alice.
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The unbalanced Mach-Zehnder approach to phase encoding, which uses a phase
modulated pulse, time multiplexed with a reference pulse, results in photons which do
not experience any interference (described in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5).  These
photons do not contribute to any generated key and are time gated out using software.
However, using polarisation routing techniques, shown by Marand and Townsend [9],
photons are forced to take interfering paths only in the double Mach-Zehnder chain,
thereby eliminating the non-interfering pulses.  Using the theoretical model described in
Chapter 4, it is estimated that by using this technique the time gated bit rate could be
increased by a factor of ≈2.4.
Another possible QDS experimental implementation is shown in Figure 6.2, which
implements a slightly different QDS protocol.  In this arrangement the multiport has
been removed and Charlie and Bob are connected to Alice by a single optical fibre each.
This removes the issue of the two receivers needing to be in very close proximity to
each other.
Figure 6.2. Experimental arrangement for the “sparse encoding” scheme for
QDS.  In this modified QDS scheme Alice sends a sequence of states to Charlie
and Bob who after the states have been received asks Alice to reveal all but
one element of the sequence. Alice has no a priori knowledge of the choice
Charlie and Bob make.  The revealed parts of the sequence are used to check if
the received states for both parties are the same while the sequence states
which has not been revealed can be used for the quantum signature.
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 The phase encoding and decoding of optical pulses uses the same principles as
described in Chapter 4.  In this layout, Alice sends a sequence of encoded pulses to
Charlie and Bob, in which they agree on a chosen position in the sequence and ask
Alice to reveal the classical description of the remaining states.  As the majority of the
sequence is used to check whether the states sent to both parties are the same, with only
one state of the sequence retained for the signature, the scheme can be thought of as a
“sparse encoding” method.  However, one of the issues with this scheme is that it
requires quantum memory to be implemented.  The security of the system requires
quantum memory which can hold the states for a duration of the order of twice the
transit time between Alice and Bob/Charlie.  Instead of measuring the states as soon as
they arrive, Charlie and Bob should be able to store their states until they have a
significant number and then perform measurements based on permutations of their
received states.  In principle, this could be achieved by adding long reels of fibre into
the receiver, but maintaining the path length in fibre interferometers to within a
wavelength of the source would be very challenging.
6.2.2 Possible future QKD work
The progress in experimental quantum key distribution has been rapid since it was first
demonstrated close to 30 years ago.  Using various implementations, the desire of
researchers was to extend the distance over which keys could be generated and also the
number of bits sent.  Future work in this field could look at cryptographic protocols
other than BB84, such as distributed phase reference protocols and continuous variable
protocols, which were described in more detail in Chapter 2.  The distributed phase
reference protocol looks attractive as it is tolerant to the photon number splitting attack.
In 2010, Lo et al. [10] described a measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol,
which uses a combination of decoy states technology together with approaches in
entanglement based QKD protocols and is described in more detail in the next section.
6.2.3 Measurement-device-independent QKD
One area of possible future research, which at the time of writing is being investigated,
is a newly proposed QKD scheme by Lo et al., called measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD[10].  A diagram of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 6.3 and is
designed to be immune from QKD hacking attacks based on imperfect devices, recently
demonstrated by Lydersen et al.[11].  MDI QKD has the potential to double the
transmission distance that can be covered over other QKD systems using conventional
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laser diodes.  In MDI QKD, both Alice and Bob are transmitters and the measurement
procedure can be performed by an untrusted third party.  In this scheme, Alice and Bob
use decoy states, randomly preparing four possible BB84 polarisation encodings using
weak coherent pulses, and then sends the state onto an untrusted third party called
Charlie.  Charlie performs a Bell state measurement which projects the incoming
photons into a Bell state [12].  The rectilinear basis set (vertical, horizontal) is used as
the key generation basis, while the diagonal basis set (45º, 135º) is used for testing only.
Once the quantum communication has been completed, Charlie announces events where
he obtained a successfully result, as well as the measurement result itself.  Alice and
Bob keep those events in which Charlie was successful and discard the rest.  Using an
authenticated public channel, Alice and Bob select events in which they used the same
basis set as in their transmission.  In Lo et al. they simulated the distance over which the
MDI QKD scheme could operate.  Using a value of 14.5% for Charlie’s detector
efficiency and transmittance of optical components, key generation could in theory be
successfully completed up to a channel loss of 40 dB, which equates to about 200 km if
the loss coefficient of the quantum channel is 0.2 dB/km.  One of the practical
difficulties in implementing MDI QKD is the ability to generate indistinguishable
photons from two independent laser sources.  Lo et al. demonstrated in their paper how
this was achievable.  They used one continuous wave (CW) laser emitting at a
wavelength of 1550 nm, and one CW laser whose emission wavelength could be
temperature tuned, both of which are commercially available.  The lasers were used to
create two optical pulses with a full-width half-maximum (FWHM) of 200 ps using
intensity modulators.  The spectral bandwidth of such optical pulses is 5 GHz. This is
much larger than the central frequency mismatch between the two laser sources, in
which the central wavelength of one of the laser sources can be tuned in steps of 0.1 pm.
The Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) effect [13] was demonstrated, a phenomenon in which
anti-correlations are observed in the output mode when two photons interfere on a 50:50
beamsplitter.  Lo et al. managed to observe a HOM dip of 0.534, calculated using the
normalised coincidence rate, ( )1 2pC C C C= , where pC is the probability of
simultaneous clicks on both detectors and 1C  and 2C  are the photodetection count rates
on the output of the 50:50 beamsplitter.  In theory, when the two photons perfectly
overlap in space they become indistinguishable and the coincidence rate should drop to
a minimum value.
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Figure 6.3. Schematic of MDI QKD system.  Alice and Bob independently and randomly
prepared4 BB84 polarisation states via their polarisation modulators (Pol-M).  Decoy states
are prepared by Alice and Bob by intensity modulators.  Photons from Alice and Bob interfere
at the 50:50 beam splitter (BS).  At the outputs of the BS a polarisation beam splitter (PBS)
transforms the incident photons in the horizontal (H) for vertical basis sets.  If the Bell state
measurement is successful two detector clicks are observed corresponding to detector
designated for orthogonal polarisation.  A detection click in D1H and D2V or  D1V and D2H
indicate the Bell state ( )1 2 HV VHy - = -  while a detector click in D1H and D1V or D2H
and D2V indicates the state ( )1 2 HV VHy + = + [10].
6.2.4 Future prospects for single-photon sources in quantum information
Although interest in using single-photon sources for applications in QKD may be
waning in recent years, due to the development of decoy state protocols, the wider field
of quantum information still requires efficient SPS.  In 2001, Knill et al. [14] showed
that for efficient quantum information processing, linear optics are sufficient as opposed
to using non-linear effects, provided the photons are quantum mechanically
indistinguishable.  They described a controlled-sign flip gate through the teleportation
of quantum states.  The fidelity of the teleportation critically depends on the
indistinguishability of photons emitted from a source, a property that can be obtained by
using a SPS.
248
Another possible future use for SPS is in the area of quantum repeaters.  Distributing
quantum states over long distances is limited by photon loss.  However Briegel et al.
proposed an elegant solution to use entanglement to build a quantum repeater [15].  The
idea involves dividing the overall transmission distance into individual smaller sections,
distributing the entanglement in each section and then repeatedly swapping the
entanglement between neighbouring links until the complete distance is covered.  The
proposed scheme requires a source of heralded photon pairs to operate.  The
entanglement distribution rate is dramatically increased if a SPS is used, as multiphoton
emission increases the errors during the entanglement swapping operation.
Future development of SPS will aim for greater collection efficiencies and device
integration for quantum-enabled technologies in information processing and
communications.  Davanҫo et al. demonstrated a room temperature operation, silicon
heralded single-photon source, at the telecommunications band of 1550 nm through four
wave mixing.  This type of work aims to provide quantum photonic chips that can
integrate single-photon sources with waveguide quantum photonic circuits and single
photons detectors, all on the same silicon chip [16].  Other groups have continued to
look at coloured centres in diamond with Mizuochi et al. demonstrating an electrically
driven single-photon source based on a single neutral nitrogen-vacancy centre in a
diamond diode structure [17].  Other research groups are looking at coupling quantum
dots to a photonic crystal waveguide, where light slow-down effects can enhance the
light-matter coupling strength, allowing efficient channelling of single photons from a
quantum dot into a photonic crystal mode [18].  There is also much interest in
generating entangled photons on demand and there is on-going work to eliminate fine-
structure splitting effects in quantum dots via electric and strain fields [19] [20].
With regard to future advances in single-photon detector technology, there is interest in
further improvements in single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) at telecoms
wavelengths.  One of the drawbacks of InP/InGaAs detectors is the phenomenon of
afterpulsing, described in Chapter 2.  The quality of the material plays a major role in
the density of defects that lead to trapping centres, which in turn results in afterpulsing.
This can limit the usefulness of these detectors in photon-counting applications at high
repetition rates.  It is believed that the trapping centres are located in the InP layer but
its exact nature is not fully understood.  Current research is looking at improvements in
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material growth in addition to limiting the current that flows through these devices
using self-differencing circuits [21].
Current research in silicon based SPADs is looking at complementary metal–oxide–
semiconductor (CMOS) fabricated devices, that can integrate both the detector and the
associated quenching circuits onto the same chip, which has the benefit of reduced size
and low parasitic capacitance.  However CMOS technology is not fully optimised for
SPAD fabrication.  Planar detector technology is now looking at identifying and
removing all possible sources of contamination in the detector processing such as
transition metals.  Decreasing the electric field in the p-n junction depletion region is
also being examined to reduce band-to-band tunnelling and the field-enhanced
tunnelling of carriers.  With careful design, devices with reduced dark counts, higher
photon detection efficiencies and lower timing jitter may be achieved [22].
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Appendix A
In Chapter 5 an experimental quantum digital signatures system was first introduced.
The security analysis presented in that chapter made use of a minimum cost
measurement for an attempted forgery by one of the recipients.  The cost matrix realised
by in the experimental set-up using 8 differing phase states and with average photon
number of 2 0.16a =  per pulse is given by
3.89 4.40 5.24 5.95 6.35 6.00 5.29 4.39
4.56 3.88 4.43 5.29 6.04 6.39 6.02 5.20
5.28 4.60 3.89 4.42 5.29 6.02 6.37 5.95
5.68 5.22 4.58 3.90 4.40 5.24 5.91 6.30
6.36 5.68 5.27 4.59 3.89 4.43 5.24 6.01
5.62 6.36 5.66 5.23 4.57 3.89 4.41 5.30
5.26 5.
C = 310
68 6.40 5.70 5.22 4.60 3.88 4.40
4.61 5.24 5.65 6.36 5.68 5.22 4.56 3.88
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The cost matrix is related to the values presented in Figure 5.18 in chapter 5.  Whereas
in Figure 5.18, the values shown were the encoding errors, the cost matrix values are
calculated by dividing the total number of signal null-port counts by the total number of
pulses (including vacuum) emitted by Alice during the duration of the measurement (or
equivalently clock frequency multiplied by measurement duration).  As in Figure 5.18
in chapter 5, the diagonal elements represent the cases when receiver measures using the
same phase as set by Alice, the off-diagonal elements represent the cases where a
different phase is employed.  The number of pulses reaching a receiver’s signal null-
port is, roughly speaking, proportional to the intensity of the incident light, and the cost
matrix elements will therefore scale linearly with 2a .
In the most general case for an arbitrary cost matrix, the computation of the optimal
measurement is difficult. However if the cost matrix C is replaced by a cost matrix
where each entry is less than or equal to the entries of the original cost matrix (an
element dominated matrix), the overall cost of the optimal transform can only decrease.
In the ideal case, where the experiment is completely symmetric, the cost matrix C is
circulant and symmetric. The symmetrised and circularised cost matrix which lower
bounds the original cost matrix is characterised by its first row which is given by
3(3.88, 4.39,5.22,5.91,6.30,5.91,5.22, 4.39) 10rowC
¢ -= ´
and the upper bounding symmetrised and circularised matrix is characterised by the row
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3(3.90,4.43,5.30,6.04,6.39,6.04,5.30,4.43) 10rowC
¢¢ -= ´
For both lower and upper bounding cost matrices it was numerically checked if the
fourth Helstrom criterion is satisfied [1], so in both cases, the minimum cost
measurement is realised by the square-root measurement, and the costs are given by
-3cost 4.70 10lower = ´  and costupper = 34.76 10-´ .   For  the  worst  case  scenario,  it  is
necessary to take the largest diagonal element of the actual cost matrix as honestp , which
is 3.9×10-3, and the lower and upper bounds on the gap g are -48.03 10lowerg = ´  and
48.64 10upperg -= ´ , This demonstrates that the bounding technique yields a useful
bound.  Thus the security of the QDS system can be characterised by the lower bound
on the gap 48.03 10lowerg
-= ´ .
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